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Contemporary economic globalization is typically seen as a product of both trade and economic liberalization after the Second World War and of technological advances that have made it possible to overcome coordination and management of geographically dispersed production units. Trade liberalization and technological advances were certainly important variables, but I argue that it was neo-protectionist American policies of the early 1980s that provided the initial catalyst for globally networked production processes. American protectionism encouraged Japanese investment in the United States that allowed US car manufacturers to learn the essentials of network manufacturing as practiced by Japanese transplants in the United States. In the next stage of global network manufacturing, liberal trade played a much more pivotal role because the global supply chains could not obviously be maintained without liberal trade. In this paper, I also discuss the likelihood of a reversal and suggest that globalization is unlikely to reversed in a significant way. Liberal trade is essential to the integrity of global supply chain networks, but these new production processes have themselves created a firewall against future systemic protectionism.

This chapter looks first at how trade stability and protectionism are explained by existing theories of collective action and interest-group politics and hegemonic-stability thesis. It then explores how the proliferation of global production has strengthened the foundations of liberal trade by giving producers a stake in trade openness given their dual status not only as producers, but also consumers of imported parts and components. The general logic is borne out by results during the Great Financial Crisis which, unlike all past crises that produced higher levels of protectionism, resulted in no major deviation from liberal trade practices.

This chapter deals with the issue of income inequality that has, since the emergence of economic globalization, become progressively more acute. Inequality can be observed in both developed and developing countries and has triggered a backlash against globalization in recent years. The principal argument in this chapter is that to the extent that globalization and inequality have an associational relationship, the blame is not entirely with economic failure but, in large part, a result of political failure.

This chapter looks at the development of global production networks, the core of globalized production, and traces its origins both to neo-protectionism of the early 1980s and to the Plaza Accord of 1986. These developments in international political economy encouraged a sudden expansion of Japanese foreign direct investments, initially to the USA, and then to regional countries in East Asia. Along with new production facilities in export markets, Japanese companies also transferred their networked production technologies to other countries, which formed the basis of contemporary global production networks.

This chapter deals with how globalization has affected growth and development in developing countries. After briefly surveying the debate between proponents and critics of globalization, the chapter essentially seeks to make the point that even as developing countries face a limited menu of choice with the collapse of alternative to neo-classical development models, globalization has provided new opportunities to advance industrialization by linking into global production networks with one single component in the manufacturing process of any product, a task that is presumably easier than establishing a full and comprehensive manufacturing process in any industry. Several developing countries have had considerable success in this endeavor and provide a pathway for others to follow.

The Japanese economy has been in crisis for more than a decade and, during this time, fiscal and other measures have failed substantially to restore the bases for sustainable growth. There have been many suggestions that the relevant authorities in Japan resort to inflationary strategies to overcome deflationary pressures or undertake large-scale regulatory reform to remove some of the supply-side obstacles to growth. In 2001, Koizumi Jun'ichir l became Japan's Prime Minister and immediately promised extensive structural and regulatory reforms. Despite the known adverse social consequences of reforms, the Prime Minister enjoyed high popular support and this permitted some optimism that the reform agenda would be implemented. A year later, however, very little progress has been made and this article looks at the political obstacles to reform, in particular the electoral support base of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). We analyse the LDP's representative base and suggest that, as a party with stro...

(2000). Kakadu and the Politics of World Heritage Listing. Australian Journal of International Affairs: Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 357-372.

The paper problematises the rise of confrontational Chinese politics and explains it in terms of limited domestic political openness and representation. I begin by tracing the inconsistency between confrontational politics and economic globalization, and the presumption that globalization, and consequent homogenization, will lessen confrontational politics, at least among states that are highly integrated in the global economy through participation in global production networks. Contemporary economic globalization, unlike 19th century ‘globalization of consumption’ when consumers, more than any other societal group, had an interest in liberal trade, includes also a ‘globalization of production’ which has given businesses, as well as consumers, an overriding interest in preservation and protection of liberal trade. Logic suggests that the benefits of economic globalization will deter states from confrontational politics, partly through greater business involvement in ensuring cooperative inter-state relations that do not threaten the expansion of global production networks. Global production defines contemporary economic globalization and has important payoffs in terms of growth and prosperity. It is not surprising, therefore, that even major economic crises have not witnessed any significant departure from liberal trade, a reality that is very different from the pre-globalization period. Yet, China, despite its deep engagement in the global economy, appears to be pursuing a confrontation path and this paper is an attempt to explain this anomaly. I will look at several explanations and conclude that the main reason is the lack of business representation in Chinese domestic politics, such that commercial interests are imperfectly reflected in contemporary Chinese foreign policies.

The US-Japan relationship has been the mainstay of Japanese foreign policy in the post-war period. The importance and endurance of this relationship is underpinned by the US-Japan Security Treaty and by their economic linkages. It is remarkable also that political bonds have remained firm despite sustained trade imbalance and periodic economic and political crises. By contrast, apart from a generous aid programme, official pronouncements and rhetorical assertions of common identity, Japan remained relatively uninvolved in East Asian political, security or economic relations. The West had more to offer to Japan and, in any event, there was little goodwill towards Japan in the region as a result of wartime experiences.

(1990). Oil and American hegemony. Australian Journal of International Affairs: Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 131-141.

Introduction: Developing Countries and Global Trade Negotiations 1. Growing Power Meets Frustration in the Doha Round's First Four Years 2. Developing Countries and the G20 in the Doha Round 3. Agricultural Tariff and Subsidy Cuts in the Doha Round 4. Making and Keeping Negotiating Gains: Lessons for the Weak from the Negotiations over Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Medicines 5. Services: The Importance of Further Liberalization for Business and Economic Development in the Region 6. The Future of Singapore Issues 7. Bilateral Negotiations in a Multilateral World: Implications for the WTO and Global Trade Policy Development

In many developed countries agricultural protection is a core feature of public policy either for domestic political considerations or reasons of food security. The latter concept was initially popularized by the Japanese government as part of its quest for comprehensive security and Japan currently has an established target of 45 percent self-sufficiency in agricultural products.1 Political considerations also weigh heavily. Farmers are well organized and influential enough to obstruct liberalization even though their total numbers are relatively insignificant compared to total workforce. With decades of government handouts and protection behind them, the farming sector is not internationally competitive to survive liberalization and farmers are unprepared to abandon the farms to move into competitive industries.

The Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI) was an ambitious undertaking by members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to remove domestic controls over foreign direct investment (FDI). This significant initiative in rule-making for foreign investments did not include developing countries on grounds that open multilateral negotiations would produce only a compromise agreement and undermine the goal of achieving a “high standards” agreement. While it is true that a majority of FDI flows is between developed countries, in refusing representation to developing countries, negotiators were dismissive of the important role that FDI plays in developing countries, as a source of acquiring technology, managerial expertise, and export revenue through mandatory export requirements. It was, of course clear that developing countries would not initially be subject to the MAI discipline but expectations were that the MAI would be adopted also by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and become part of the multilateral trade regime. And countries that refused to submit to it could then be “punished” and denied FDI. In the final analysis, therefore, it would have had a major impact on developing countries and to their developmental aspirations.