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This essay describes a visionary philosophy of education at Morehouse College. The educational process at Morehouse, construed here as a form of pedagogical personalism, is personified in three luminaries of Morehouse College: Benjamin Elijah Mays, Howard Washington Thurman, and Martin Luther King. The educational process at Morehouse should be interpreted as an ambivalent response to segregation and discrimination in Jim Crow America. Like all black institutions in the South, Morehouse was subject to racist constraints; Morehouse was created and existed in large part due to just such constraints. I attempt to more accurately describe in order to more sensitively appreciate not only how historically black colleges and universities helped to shape the spiritual or intellectual blueprint of the civil rights movement but also how they served--and continue to serve--as ongoing experiments in democratic education. By way of conclusion, I suggest that the pedagogical personalism espoused and practiced at Morehouse College during what has been called her golden age, i.e., 1940-1967, constitutes a significant contribution to the history of higher education in America.

The following essay aims at a revisionist reading of Hegel's 'Faith and Knowledge.' Whereas Kant found it necessary to limit [aufheben] reason in order to make room for faith, a principle adopted though significantly revised by Jacobi (and Schleiermacher) and Fichte, Hegel reverses this religious dictum. Ostensibly critical of the theological truce of the times, between a brand of reason no longer worthy of the name and a faith no longer worth the bother, Hegel's 1802 essay constitutes his first sustained effort to reflect himself out of--or beyond--the limits of reflectivity itself.

The article presents the discussion on disusing of oaths and the abolition or reduction of the death penalty. Topics include Martin Luther King's storied pilgrimage to nonviolence and tripping to the land of Gandhi where recent scholarship suggesting the philosophical and theological sources of nonviolent resistance tradition; and annual almanacs advocated for religious and philosophical pacifism, the disuse of oaths, and the abolition or reduction of the death penalty.

The initial and, for G. W. F. Hegel, decisive clash in the SchleiermacherHegel conflict occurred in 1802, when, in the process of mounting a more general critique of the reflective philosophy of subjectivity (Faith and Knowledge), Hegel refers to Friedrich Schleiermacher's On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers as but a slight variation on the philosophy of Friedrich Jacobi; and because Jacobi's philosophical standpoint is maligned, Schleiermacher is guilty by association. The Schleiermacher-Jacobi association is illustrative of Hegd's Jena period theory of philosophical criticism. Although Hegel might have misread Schleiermacher in other ways, he may well have been correct in this: For Schleiermacher, not unlike Kant, Fichte, and especially Jacobi, "what is truly Absolute is an absolute Beyond in faith and in feeling; for cognitive Reason it is nothing." Before he arrived in Berlin, long before Marx's quip to the contrary, Hegel not only wanted to understand his contemporaries; he wanted also to change them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]