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Many nonbelievers may engage in supernatural thinking despite their statements to the contrary. Using belief in the afterlife as a test case, we examine, across two studies, the possible discrepanc...

Recent findings of neurodegenerative pathology in former professional football players have once again called into question the role that "heading", a fundamental aspect of the game, plays in the onset of neurological disease. By introducing guidelines aimed at limiting heading among youth players, the United Kingdom recently joined the United States as the only two nations yet to implement heading regulation in response to growing concerns surrounding football's head injury burden.Evaluating the efficacy of risk mitigation strategies requires the continual reviewal of available evidence, however, youth heading guidelines have yet to undergo such an empirical evaluation. This review aims to address this absence by first discussing the literature informing heading-related health risk, followed by an assessment of the decision to limit youth heading in response to this research.The risk of injury due to heading remains highly uncertain, especially as it pertains to youth players for whom epidemiological data is severely lacking. However, consideration of policy making under conditions of scientific uncertainty, as well as intrinsic risk factors of acute head injury in children and adolescents, currently warrants a precautionary approach to youth heading regulation.Further research must be pursued to ensure that future risk management strategies remain grounded in evidence and enhance the safety of football for vulnerable individuals. While our understanding of the neurological outcomes of heading remains limited, the adoption of heading guidelines reflects an appropriate response to uncertain risk.

Although anecdotal evidence suggests that control-threatening situations are associated with an increase in conspiracy beliefs, existing research does not support this “compensatory control” hypothesis. In the current study, we test a more refined hypothesis: that the link between control threat and conspiracy beliefs is domain specific, such that perceived control in a particular domain should lead to conspiracy beliefs pertaining to that domain only. Moreover, given that conspiracy beliefs are stigmatized (i.e., not socially acceptable), we propose that they should be endorsed only when other compensatory systems are frustrated. We test these ideas in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants from North Macedonia and New Zealand, who differed in perceived government effectiveness, filled in a questionnaire measuring domain-specific and domain-general perceived control, as well as domain-specific and domain-general conspiracy beliefs. As expected, domain specificity of the control threat predicted domain-specific conspiracy beliefs in the Macedonian group only. The results have implication for compensatory control theory, suggesting that the compensatory process may not always be as fluid as believed. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-021-01977-0.

Scientific interest in religion often focusses on the “puzzle of belief”: how people develop and maintain religious beliefs despite a lack of evidence and the significant costs that those beliefs incur. A number of researchers have suggested that humans are predisposed towards supernatural thinking, with innate cognitive biases engendering, for example, the misattribution of intentional agency. Indeed, a number of studies have shown that nonbelievers often act “as if” they believe. For example, atheists are reluctant to sell the very souls they deny having, or to angrily provoke the God they explicitly state does not exist. In our own recent work, participants who claimed not to believe in the afterlife nevertheless demonstrated a physiological fear response when informed that there was a ghost in the room. Such findings are often interpreted as evidence for an “implicit” belief in the supernatural that operates alongside (and even in contradiction to) an individual’s conscious (“explicit”) religious belief. In this article, we investigate these arguably tenuous constructs more deeply and suggest some possible empirical directions for further disentangling implicit and explicit reasoning.

BACKGROUND Misinformation about abortion and pregnancy is common. Restrictions on abortion access at and beyond 20 weeks are frequently justified using the claim that a fetus can experience pain before the third trimester. The current medical consensus is that it is unlikely that fetal pain perception is possible before the 29th or 30th weeks of pregnancy. AIMS To examine the relationship between abortion attitudes and beliefs about when a fetus develops the capacity to perceive pain in utero. METHODS AND MATERIALS We used Amazon's Mechanical Turk to recruit participants residing in the United States (N = 374) and used an online questionnaire to assess their beliefs about abortion and the ability of a fetus to perceive pain. RESULTS Anti-choice participants were more likely than pro-choice participants to believe that a fetus in utero can perceive pain before the 23rd week of pregnancy (63.4 vs. 48.5%, P = 0.010) and in the first trimester (40.1 vs. 15.8%, P

Objectives Given the centrality of science over the course of the COVID-19 crisis, we evaluate changes in people’s beliefs in the power of science in the United States over the first four months of the pandemic. Study design Post-hoc analysis of cross-sectional survey data. Methods A convenience sample of 1327 participants was recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service for three surveys carried out in 14–25 January, 27 March to 1 April, and 28–29 May of 2020. Respondents completed a ten-item instrument measuring different aspects of their perceptions of science including trust, interest, and faith (answer to the question: “How much do you agree with the following statement: Science can sort out any problem.”). We conducted multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) with faith, interest, and trust as dependent variables, time as the independent variable, and political orientation and religiosity as between-subjects covariates. Results The data revealed that public levels of faith in science increased between January (M ​= ​3.2) and both March (M ​= ​3.42) and May (M ​= ​3.4). By contrast, we observed no changes in interest and trust in science over the same time period. Conclusions We speculate that increases in faith in science during the first four months of the pandemic helped people cope with the uncertainty and existential anxiety resulting from this public health crisis.

Awe is a frequently represented and commonly experienced emotion in science communication. According to a popular account of this emotion, awe is an innate and universal human affective experience that occurs when a person evaluates a target as vast, forcing a shift in their worldview. This shift is portrayed in science communication as resulting in an enhanced interest in the scientific material at hand. Based on the latest research in affective science, however, we challenge this narrow version of awe in science communication and instead advocate a broader account of this emotion in line with a constructionist perspective. We argue that there are a variety of awe types in science communication, each with different forms and functions in relation to the mandates within the multiplicity of contexts in this cultural space. We also contend that people’s awe experiences result from their previous interactions with this emotion and the unique affordances provided by the science communication situation.

Reports of people who have survived death have captured the attention of mainstream audiences. Why do these ideas enjoy persistent and widespread success in contemporary Western culture? Adopting a cognitive approach to the study of afterlife accounts and drawing upon our own research, we argue that mainstream survival narratives are popular because they provide convincing evidence that one has journeyed to another realm. Such accounts are convincing, in part, because they meet default cognitive assumptions about what human survival would look like if it were possible. We support this claim by highlighting recurring common themes in recounted episodes of near-death experiences and past life accounts and outlining how key findings in the cognitive science of religion, in conjunction with culturally situated accounts, can help scholars concerned with ideas about anomalous experiences to better understand their appeal.

It is widely believed that conspiracy theory beliefs are the product of perceived lack of control. However, to date there is mixed evidence, at best, to support this claim. We consider the reasons why conspiracy theory beliefs do not appear to be based in any straightforward way on control beliefs, interrogating existing findings and presenting new data that call the relationship into question. Across six studies conducted online using MTurk samples, we observed no effect of control manipulations on conspiracy theory beliefs, while replicating previously reported correlational evidence of their association. The results suggest that conspiracy beliefs are not suitable for compensating for threats to control. We discuss possible reasons for the discrepancy between experimental and correlational effects and examine the limitations of the studies.

Suicidal behavior constitutes a major global problem. Qualitative research utilizing the first-hand experiences of those who have survived attempts to take their own lives can offer much in the way of understanding how to live well despite ongoing suicidal behavior. Given that suicidal intentions and behaviors occur within the person's subjective construal, the solutions to living-and preferably living well-despite such inclinations must also be subjective and adaptive. The aim of this study was therefore to understand how individuals live with different aspects of their suicidal behavior and their use of effective strategies to protect themselves from future attempts. Thematic analysis of semi-structured, qualitative interviews with 17 participants with lived experience of suicidal behavior from the USA yielded two main themes: (i) the 'dynamic relationship with suicidal behavior: living with, and through', and (ii) 'the toolbox'. Each of these themes had four subthemes. Participants in this study offered important insights into what helped them not just survive ongoing suicidal behavior, but how they created unique toolboxes to continue living, and to live well. These toolboxes contained personalized solutions to dealing with recurring threats to their subjective wellbeing and included diverse solutions from spirituality, pets, peer-support, participating in the arts, through to traditional therapeutic supports. Some participants also discussed the importance of broader social policy and societal changes that help them live. The findings highlight crucial implications for suicide prevention efforts, especially in terms of encouraging collaborations with the lived experience community and furthering a strengths-based approach to mitigating suicidal behaviors. We encourage the clinical community to work in partnership with service-users to enable them to generate effective solutions to living-and living well-through suicidal behavior. ispartof: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH vol:18 issue:15 ispartof: location:Switzerland status: published

Guest deaths are an inevitable aspect of the hospitality industry. In Study 1, participants read a vignette in which the previous guest died of natural causes, suicide, or homicide. Those who learned of a death (a) saw the room as less valuable, (b) opted to stay in a more basic room in which no death occurred, despite both rooms being offered for free, and (c) anticipated feeling uneasy when imagining an overnight stay. In Study 2, we investigated the persistence of this bias. Perceived room value and anticipatory well-being can be expected to return to baseline levels only many years after the death event. Similar to “stigmatized properties” in real estate, these data confirm an irrational and recalcitrant cognitive bias surrounding consumers’ views of death-affected hotel rooms.

Unbidden confession—confession made by a transgressor in the absence of interrogation—presents an evolutionary puzzle because it guarantees social exposure and places the person at risk of punishment. We hypothesize that unbidden confession may be an ancestrally adaptive behavior and is difficult to inhibit under certain social conditions, particularly when one perceives imminent and inevitable social exposure. This serves as a pre-emptive strategy that, in the ancestral past, may have attenuated punishment from retributive in-group members. Using self-report data from a sample of 78 federal inmates, we report analyses supporting this hypothesis. Inmates who made unbidden confessions were more confident that they would be caught by police, and this confession was usually made to someone who had a stake in the transgressors’ genetic interests, most often a family member or friend. These results suggest: (1) a possible role for natural selection in shaping cognitive mechanisms that motivate confession; (2) a potential mismatch in the efficacy of unbidden confession today compared with our ancestral past, given that the law is now administered by strangers rather than in-group members; and (3) new avenues for research on the origins of sophisticated cognitive strategies.

People are known to be susceptible to psychological essentialism when reasoning about organ transplantation, believing that the mental characteristics of the donor will transfer to the recipient. Because psychological essentialism is exacerbated in negative social contexts (i.e., moral contagion bias), the effect may be especially apparent when people consider the impact of receiving organs from donors who died by stigmatized causes, such as suicide and homicide. In a forced-choice paradigm, participants overwhelmingly ranked a suicide victim as their least preferred donor, with accident victims being the most preferred donors and homicide victims the most common second choice. In a follow-up study, we investigated the psychological mechanisms underlying this unease about suicide donors. Compared to those who imagined receiving a heart from homicide or accident victims, participants who imagined a suicide donor expressed greater unease about the source of their transplant. The effect could not be explained by participants' rumination about the source of the transplant, or by the explicitly perceived stigma of suicide, but did depend on their essentialist beliefs. Those who believed that negative or neutral (but not positive) traits of the donor could transfer to them were more hesitant about receiving a heart from a suicide relative to other donors. These data suggest that the bias against suicide organ donors is moderated by socially relevant essentialist beliefs.

A large body of previous research has found that people exhibit a cognitive bias to reason teleologically about natural kinds, explaining them in terms of intelligent design and inherent purpose. In the present study, we examined whether people are also cognitively biased to explain naturally occurring events in terms of inherent purpose (i.e., mistakenly attributing intentional design behind naturally caused life events), and if so, how explicit religious beliefs may interact with this implicit bias. A semi-structured interview was conducted concerning important autobiographical events. Overall, results indicated that differing levels of cultural religiosity (i.e., whether participants were from the relatively religious USA or the relatively secular UK) did not affect the tendency to reason teleologically. As predicted, explicit religious beliefs had an effect in that atheists gave significantly fewer teleological explanations than theists; however, half the atheists (n=17) gave at least one teleological...

Cognitive scientists of religion and evolutionary theorists alike have been increasingly arguing in recent years that religion is “natural” in the sense of being motivated by core, evolved psychological intuitions. Atheism, and irreligion more generally, appear to pose problems for the naturalness hypothesis, especially considering the significant proportion of people in contemporary societies who reject supernatural beliefs. Although Geertz and Markusson clarify why the naturalness hypothesis does not imply religious determinism, they fail to weigh adequately the more conservative prediction, that of religious probabilism. Furthermore, unlike cognitive scientific accounts favoring the naturalness hypothesis, the authors base their arguments for the cultural scaffolding of atheistic cognition on sociodemographic data aloneda—source that is unlikely to be a meaningful reflection of “natural” underlying cognitive processes

We propose a coevolutionary model of secrecy and stigmatization. According to this model, secrecy functions to conceal potential fitness costs detected in oneself or one’s genetic kin. In three studies, we found that the content of participants’ distressing secrets overlapped significantly with three domains of social information that were important for inclusive fitness and served as cues for discriminating between rewarding and unrewarding interaction partners: health, mating, and social-exchange behavior. These findings support the notion that secrecy functions primarily as a defense against stigmatization by suppressing information about oneself or one’s kin that evolutionarily has been devalued in mating and social exchange.

Tattling, defined as the reporting to a second party of norm violations committed by a third party, is a frequent but little-studied activity among young children. Participant observation and quantitative sampling are used to provide a detailed characterization of tattling in 2 preschools (initial mean age = 4.08 years, N = 40). In these populations, tattling represents the majority of talk about peers’ behavior to third parties. It is usually truthful, it rarely refers to transgressions committed against other individuals, it is not often ignored by adults, it is performed more frequently by dominant children, and it correlates with teacher reports of relational aggression. These exploratory results suggest several new avenues of research into children’s developing understanding of social norms.

Just as there is remarkable continuity between the structures, abilities, and behaviors of closely related species, so too are there equally remarkable differences. Because only our species has evolved the social cognitive mechanisms that enable a heightened sensitivity to the minds of others, only our species suffers the psychological consequences. Using Sartre's famous play No Exit to illuminate the interplay between evolved psychology and social conscious experience, I show how theory of mind is both biologically adaptive and the common denominator in distinctively human types of psychological suffering.

The commentaries are a promising sign that a research programme on the cognitive science of souls will continue to move toward empirical and theoretical rigor. Most of the commentators agree that beliefs in personal immortality, in the intelligent design of souls, and in the symbolic meaning of natural events can provide new insight into human social evolution. In this response I clarify and extend the evolutionary model, further emphasizing the adaptiveness of the cognitive system that underlies these beliefs.

Children ages 3-9 years were informed that an invisible agent (Princess Alice) would help them play a forced-choice game by "telling them, somehow, when they chose the wrong box," whereas a matched control group of children were not given this supernatural prime. On 2 unexpected event trials, an experimenter triggered a simulated unexpected event (i.e., a light turning on/off; a picture falling), and children's behavioral response to these events (i.e., moving their hand to the opposite box) was coded. Results showed a significant Age GroupxExperimental Condition interaction; the only children to reliably alter their behavior in response to the unexpected events were the oldest children (M=7 years 4 months), who were primed with the invisible agent concept. For children's posttest verbal explanations, also, only these children saw the unexpected events as being referential and declarative (e.g., "Princess Alice did it because I chose the wrong box"). Together, these data suggest that children may not regularly begin to see communicative signs as embedded in unexpected events until they are around 7 years of age.

We investigated whether (a) people positively reevaluate the characters of recently dead others and (b) supernatural primes concerning an ambient dead agent serve to curb selfish intentions. In Study 1, participants made trait attributions to three strangers depicted in photographs; one week later, they returned to do the same but were informed that one of the strangers had died over the weekend. Participants rated the decedent target more favorably after learning of his death whereas ratings for the control targets remained unchanged between sessions. This effect was especially pronounced for traits dealing with the decedent's prosocial tendencies (e.g., ethical, kind). In Study 2, a content analysis of obituaries revealed a similar emphasis on decedents' prosocial attributes over other personality dimensions (e.g., achievement-relatedness, social skills). Finally, in Study 3, participants who were told of an alleged ghost in the laboratory were less likely to cheat on a competitive task than those who did not receive this supernatural prime. The findings are interpreted as evidence suggestive of adaptive design.

Across religious belief systems, some supernatural agents are nearly always granted privileged epistemic access into the self's thoughts. In addition, the ethnographic literature supports the claim that, across cultures, supernatural agents are envisioned as (1) incapable of being deceived through overt behaviors; (2) preoccupied with behavior in the moral domain; (3) punitive agents who cause general misfortune to those who transgress and; (4) committed to an implicit social contract with believers that is dependent on the rules of reciprocal altruism. The present article examines the possibility that these factors comprise a developmentally based, adaptive information-processing system that increased the net genetic fitness of ancestral human beings living within complex social groups. In particular, the authors argue that fear of supernatural punishment, whether in this life or in the hereafter, encouraged the inhibition of selfish actions that were associated with "real" punishment (and thus real selective impairments) by actual group members.

By concentrating on the unconscious processes driving evolutionary mechanisms, evolutionary psychology has neglected the role of consciousness in generating human adaptations. The authors argue that there exist several “Darwinian algorithms” that are grounded in a novel representational system. Among such adaptations are information-retention homicide, the killing of others who are believed to possess information about the self that has the potential to jeopardize inclusive fitness, and those generating suicide, which may necessitate the capacity for self-referential emotions such as shame. The authors offer these examples to support their argument that human psychology is characterized by a representational system in which conscious motives have inserted themselves at the level of the gene and have fundamentally changed the nature of hominid evolution.

In recent years, imitation has played a central role in conceptions of children’s memory, representational, and social cognitive abilities; in nonhuman primate cognitive competencies; and the evolution of human culture. In this paper, we combine data from three studies that assessed deferred imitation in three juvenile, enculturated (human-reared) chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes ), administered over a 4-year period, to assess the development of deferred imitation. The basic task used in each study involved a baseline, followed by a demonstration in which a model displayed some actions on objects to participants. After a 10-min delay, the participants were given the objects and evidence of imitation was noted. The number of trials on which chimpanzees displayed deferred imitation increased with age, both between and within participants. Developmental differences were most apparent on the more complex tasks that required coordination of actions on materials (e.g., putting a nail in form board and striking it with a hammer) than on simpler tasks (e.g., striking two cymbals together). Patterns of performance were similar when the complete set of actions (targets) were duplicated by the ape and when the ape duplicated only portions of the demonstrated behavior (approximation to the target). The results were interpreted as reflecting age-related changes in chimpanzees’ abilities to engage in complex social learning after a delay, and arguably in the symbolic representational system supporting such abilities.

The capacity to attribute meaning to personal experiences may rest on a specialized cognitive system enabling this form of causal reasoning. Close examination of these attributional tendencies suggests that this system may be distinct from those underlying other forms of causal reasoning such as a “theory of mind” system in the behavioral domain, a folk physics system in the physical domain, and a folk biology system in the biological domain. A fourth, existential domain, an abstract ontological frame within which the subjective, narrative self is envisioned to be contained, may have driven the construction of an intuitive capacity in humans that encourages them to search for the underlying purpose or reason for having had certain life experiences. This system likely has specific, definable operational rules that are responsible for activating such explanatory searches. In addition, it appears anchored to a general intentionality system that promotes the attribution of teleological purpose and higher-order mental states to an abstract agency that is envisioned to cause events and personal experiences. Identifying the component parts of this specialized cognitive system through empirical investigations can help researchers to reconstruct both its evolutionary phylogeny and to track its developmental emergence.

ResumenLa influencia de la teoria evolucionista en la ciencia y el pensamiento humano ha sido constante desde que fuera formulada por primera vez a mediados del siglo XIX, y la psicologia no ha sido inmune a dicha influencia. Sin embargo, la mayor parte de los enfoques evolucionistas se han centrado tradicionalmente en el estudio del comportamiento adulto, obviando los procesos ontogeneticos del comportamiento. En este articulo, se presenta una nueva aproximacion al estudio evolucionista del comportamiento, llamada Psicologia Evolucionista del Desarrollo (PED), que se ocupa de los sistemas psicologicos que son objeto de desarrollo humano. Basicamente, la PED propone un modelo evolutivo de como los mecanismos psicologicos evolucionados se acaban expresando, y asume que la seleccion natural darwiniana actua sobre los organismos inmaduros no solo en terminos de ejercitacion de adaptaciones para la vida adulta (adaptaciones diferidas), sino tambien sobre comportamientos que estan especialmente bien adaptados ...

It is to the commentators’ great credit that they have managed to cull the conceptual imperfections of my article “The Natural Foundations of Afterlife Beliefs” (Bering 2002a) into a fairly coherent discussion of the “innateness” of representations of dead agents’ minds. In response to their insightful remarks, I will do my best to clarify my position on precisely this topic of the etiology of religious concepts. Unlike Barrett, who stated that “the chicken-and-egg problem of whether intuitive ideas Ž ll in explicit ones or the other way around may be moot” (p. *), I cannot think of a more important, central question for researchers to be concerned with. Still, because experimental research on the cognitive bases of religion has only recently begun in earnest (e.g., Barrett 1998; Barrett & Keil 1996; Barrett, Richert & Driesenga 2001; Bering 2002; Bering & Bjorklund 2003; Barrett & Nyhof 2001; Boyer & Ramble 2001; Evans 2001; Kelemen 1999; Norenzayan & Atran, in press; Walker 1992; Woolley & Phelps 2001), to some extent I feel it premature to forcibly argue the position

Although early comparative psychology was seriously marred by claims of our species'supremacy, the residual backlash against these archaic evolutionary views is still being felt, even though our understanding of evolutionary biology is now sufficiently advanced to grapple with possible cognitive specializations that our species does not share with closely related species. The overzealous efforts to dismantle arguments of human uniqueness have only served to show that most comparative psychologists working with apes have yet to set aside the antiquated evolutionary ”ladder.“ Instead, they have only attempted to pull chimpanzees up to the ladder's highest imaginary rung — or perhaps, to pull humans down to an equally imaginary rung at the height of the apes. A true comparative science of animal minds, however, will recognize the complex diversity of the animal kingdom, and will thus view Homo sapiens as one more species with a unique set of adaptive skills crying out to be identified and understood.

The primary causal explanatory model for interpreting behavior, theory of mind, may have expanded into corridors of human cognition that have little to do with the context in which it evolved, questioning the suitability of domain-specific accounts of mind reading. Namely, philosophical–religious reasoning is a uniquely derived explanatory system anchored in intentionality that does not clearly involve behavior. The presence of an existential theory of mind (EToM) suggests that individuals perceive some nondescript or culturally elaborated (e.g., God) psychological agency as having encoded communicative intentions in the form of life events, similar to a person encoding communicative intentions in deictic gestures. The emergence of EToM is discussed from ontogenetic and phylogenetic perspectives; autism is examined to determine whether alternate core explanatory models (e.g., folk physics) are used by those with deficits in theory of mind to derive existential meaning.

Little is known about how the minds of dead agents are represented. In the current experiment, individuals with different types of explicit afterlife beliefs were asked in an implicit interview task whether various mental state types, as well as pure biological imperatives, continue after death. The results suggest that, regardless of one's explicit reports about personal consciousness after death, those who believe in some form of life after death (and, to a certain extent, even those who do not) implicitly represent dead agents' minds in the same way: psychobiological and perceptual states cease while emotional, desire, and epistemic states continue. The findings are interpreted according to simulation constraints — because it is epistemologically impossible to know what it is like to be dead, individuals will be most likely to attribute to dead agents those types of mental states that they cannot imagine being without. Such a model argues that it is natural to believe in life after death and social transmission serves principally to conceptually enrich (or degrade) intuitive conceptions of the afterlife.

Evolutionary developmental psychology, an emerging subdiscipline of evolutionary approaches to human behavior and cognition, focuses on the adaptive nature of psychological mechanisms built into the brains of juveniles, some of which may serve immediate demands at different stages of development, and some of which serve preparatory roles for maturity. The current article reviews some of the central ideas of evolutionary developmental psychology and investigates how human educability, which is qualitatively different from the learning capacity of other species, is governed by specific adaptations of Homo sapiens' childhood that serve to orient the young child to his or her cultural environment. Evolutionary developmental psychology, we argue, can be especially informative to educational policy makers who wish to take children's natural limitations, as well as their intellectual pliability, into account when planning curricula.

In response to my paper on possible phylogenetic divergence in the case of theistic percepts, Gallup and Maser argue that an alternative — and more heuristic — approach to studying religious phenomena can be found in neuroanatomical mapping of cognitive functions that seem to play some role in this category of thought. On the one hand, the argument is sound and will probably come to be prescient; cognitive neuroscience should begin to emerge as an increasingly important player in the newly overlapping Ž elds of cognition and comparative religion. Indeed, initial strides have already been taken in just this area (Shaver & Rabin 1997). But on the other hand, it is somewhat misguided in that it implies that neurological methods are alternative rather than complementary ways to go about seriously studying the cognitive foundations of religion. The representational systems outlined in my article are inherently brain-based, and there is, as Gallup and Maser point out, reason to assume some degree of localization of the general aspects associated with them. Until comparative neuropsychologists are able to discern the seemingly subtle differences in the brains of humans and our closest living relatives, however, we can produce only admittedly speculative hunches as to the unique adaptive functioning of the neuroanatomical regions in question. However, it is worth pointing out that there are considerable morphological differences between humans and chimpanzees in precisely the area of the brain that is presumed responsible for allowing the attribution of mental states. The human prefrontal cortex has expanded substantially over the past 5-8 million years, is signiŽ cantly larger than homologous structures of the African great apes, and occupies more of the cerebral mantle (Povinelli

The present theoretical article addresses the empirical question of whether other species, particularly chimpanzees, have the cognitive substrate necessary for experiencing theistic and otherwise non-natural (i.e., non-physical) percepts. The primary representational device presumed to underlie religious cognition was viewed as, in general, the capacity to attribute unobservable causal mechanisms to ostensible output and, in particular, a theory of mind. Drawing from a catalogue of behaviors that may be considered diagnostic of the secondary representations involved in theory of mind (or at least theory of mind precursors), important dissimilarities between humans and other species in the realms of the animate-inanimate distinction (self-propelledness versus mental agency of animate beings), imaginative play (feature-dependent make-believe versus true symbolic play), and the death concept (biological death conceptualization versus psychological death conceptualization) were shown. Differences in these domains support the claim that humans alone possess the foundational and functional representations inherent in religious experiences.

Deferred imitation of object-related actions (e.g., picking up a cloth with a set of tongs) was assessed in 3 enculturated juvenile orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and 3 enculturated juvenile chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). For each task, animals were given 4 min to explore the objects (baseline), followed by a demonstration of the target behavior, and 10 min later, were re-presented the objects (deferred phase). Each animal displayed deferred imitation on at least one trial, with each species demonstrating deferred imitation on approximately half of all possible trials. The findings were interpreted as reflecting cognitive abilities in juvenile great apes that permit deferred imitation under humanlike rearing conditions.

Changes in deferred imitation of novel actions on objects were assessed over a 2-year period in two enculturated, juvenile great apes (one chimpanzee, Pan troglodytes, and one orangutan, Pongo pygmaeus). Both apes displayed deferred imitation, and both displayed improve- ments in deferred imitation over the 2-year period, although the magnitude of improvement was greater for the chimpanzee. This is, to our knowledge, the first experimental demonstration of longitudinal improvements of deferred imitation in great apes. The results were interpreted as reflecting maturationally paced cognitive differences consistent with other cognitive accomplish- ments in these species, and as demonstrating the influence that a species-atypical rearing environment can have on cognitive abilities in juvenile great apes. fl 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Dev Psychobiol 37: 229-237, 2000

Children aged from 4;10 to 12;9 attending either a Catholic school or a public, secular school in an eastern Spanish city observed a puppet show in which a mouse was eaten by an alligator. Children were then asked questions about the dead mouse's biological and psychological functioning. The pattern of results generally replicated that obtained earlier in an American sample, with older children being more apt to state that functions cease after death than younger children (11- to 12-year-olds > 8- to 9-year-olds > 5- to 6-year-olds), and all children being more likely to attribute epistemic, desire, and emotion states to the dead mouse than biological, psychobiological, and perceptual states. Although children attending Catholic school were generally more likely to state that functions continue after death than children attending secular school, the pattern of change with regard to question type did not differ between the Catholic and secular groups. The results were interpreted as reflecting the combined roles of religious instruction/exposure and universal ontogeny of cognitive abilities on the development of children's afterlife beliefs.

Two child groups (5-6 and 8-9 years of age) participated in a challenging rule-following task while they were (a) told that they were in the presence of a watchful invisible person ("Princess Alice"), (b) observed by a real adult, or (c) unsupervised. Children were covertly videotaped performing the task in the experimenter's absence. Older children had an easier time at following the rules but engaged in equal levels of purposeful cheating as the younger children. Importantly, children's expressed belief in the invisible person significantly determined their cheating latency, and this was true even after controlling for individual differences in temperament. When "skeptical" children were omitted from the analysis, the inhibitory effects of being told about Princess Alice were equivalent to having a real adult present. Furthermore, skeptical children cheated only after having first behaviorally disconfirmed the "presence" of Princess Alice. The findings suggest that children's belief in a watchful invisible person tends to deter cheating.

Tattling, defined as the reporting to a second party of norm violations committed by a third party, is a frequent but little-studied activity among young children. Participant observation and quantitative sampling are used to provide a detailed characterization of tattling in 2 preschools (initial mean age = 4.08 years, N = 40). In these populations, tattling represents the majority of talk about peers' behavior to third parties. It is usually truthful, it rarely refers to transgressions committed against other individuals, it is not often ignored by adults, it is performed more frequently by dominant children, and it correlates with teacher reports of relational aggression. These exploratory results suggest several new avenues of research into children's developing understanding of social norms.

This chapter highlights that the study of metacognition sheds light on some fundamental issues about consciousness and its role in behavior. It analyzes the long-standing issue of the cause-and-effect relation between consciousness and behavior. The chapter emphasizes the work on metacognition within the area of adult memory research. It examines questions on metacognitive judgments, emphasizing its implications for issues concerning consciousness; in particular, the genesis of subjective experience, the function of self-reflective consciousness, and the cause-and-effect relation between subjective experience and behavior. These questions explore the bases of metacognitive judgments, validity of subjective intuitions, the processes underlying the accuracy and inaccuracy of metacognitive judgments and strategic regulation of learning and remembering. In conclusion, the chapter comments on how the research on metacognition relates to some of the fundamental issues regarding consciousness and its role in behavior.

The present article examines how people's belief in an afterlife, as well as closely related supernatural beliefs, may open an empirical backdoor to our understanding of the evolution of human social cognition. Recent findings and logic from the cognitive sciences contribute to a novel theory of existential psychology, one that is grounded in the tenets of Darwinian natural selection. Many of the predominant questions of existential psychology strike at the heart of cognitive science. They involve: causal attribution (why is mortal behavior represented as being causally related to one's afterlife? how are dead agents envisaged as communicating messages to the living?), moral judgment (why are certain social behaviors, i.e., transgressions, believed to have ultimate repercussions after death or to reap the punishment of disgruntled ancestors?), theory of mind (how can we know what it is “like” to be dead? what social-cognitive strategies do people use to reason about the minds of the dead?), concept acquisition (how does a common-sense dualism interact with a formalized socio-religious indoctrination in childhood? how are supernatural properties of the dead conceptualized by young minds?), and teleological reasoning (why do people so often see their lives as being designed for a purpose that must be accomplished before they perish? how do various life events affect people's interpretation of this purpose?), among others. The central thesis of the present article is that an organized cognitive “system” dedicated to forming illusory representations of (1) psychological immortality, (2) the intelligent design of the self, and (3) the symbolic meaning of natural events evolved in response to the unique selective pressures of the human social environment.

The evolution of human cooperation remains a puzzle because cooperation persists even in conditions that rule out mainstream explanations. We present a novel solution that links two recent theories. First, Johnson & Kruger (2004) suggested that ancestral cooperation was promoted because norm violations were deterred by the threat of supernatural punishment. However, this only works if individuals attribute negative life events (or a prospective afterlife) as intentionally caused by supernatural agents. A complementary cognitive mechanism is therefore required. Recently, Bering and Shackelford (2004) suggested precisely this. The evolution of “theory of mind” and, specifically, the “intentionality system” (a cognitive system devoted to making inferences about the epistemic contents and intentions of other minds), strongly favoured: (1) the selection of human psychological traits for monitoring and controlling the flow of social information within groups; and (2) attributions of life events to supernatural agency. We argue that natural selection favoured such attributions because, in a cognitively sophisticated social environment, a fear of supernatural punishment steered individuals away from costly social transgressions resulting from unrestrained, evolutionarily ancestral, selfish interest (acts which would rapidly become known to others, and thereby incur an increased probability and severity of punishment by group members). As long as the net costs of selfish actions from real-world punishment by group members exceeded the net costs of lost opportunities from self-imposed norm abiding, then god-fearing individuals would outcompete non-believers.