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In 25 years, research on reputation-based online markets has produced robust evidence on the existence of the so-called reputation effect, that is the positive relation between online traders’ reputations and these traders’ market success in terms of sales and prices. However, there is an ongoing debate on what the size of the reputation effect means. We argue that the rate of truthful feedback that traders leave after completed transactions is negatively related to the size of the reputation effect. The higher the rate of truthful feedback, the quicker will untrustworthy traders be screened and disincentivized to enter the market. With mostly trustworthy traders entering the market, buyers will demand smaller price discounts from market entrants without a good reputation. We test this mechanism empirically in two laboratory experiments. In both experiments, we systematically vary the probability with which information about sellers’ behavior in an economic trust game is recorded and shown to future interaction partners of these sellers. In the second experiment, we introduce competition among sellers by allowing buyers to choose one of two sellers in each interaction. We find that sellers give discounts to buyers to build or repair their reputation and that sellers who give discounts or have a good reputation are trusted more. However, we do not find support for our hypothesis that a higher feedback rate significantly decreases sellers’ propensity to give discounts. We argue and show in exploratory analyses that this is likely due to the high level of unconditional trust buyers exhibit towards sellers without a reputation. Yet, seller competition increases the propensity to offer discounts among sellers without a reputation the most.