The implementation of financial policy relevant to the exhibition industry, which is emulated and learned from each other by local governments, has been recognized as a necessary requirement for competition among exhibition industries in different cities. However, research on exhibitions has mainly focused on the behavior of exhibitors and buyers, the economic impact of exhibitions, and residents' attitudes towards exhibitions. There is a lack of empirical research that evaluates the effectiveness of financial policies in China' s exhibition industries. Therefore, this study specifically focuses on the analysis and evaluation of this kind of policy, and has both theoretical and practical significance. The exhibition industries in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Dongguan represent high status levels in China. Furthermore, all three cities have implemented distinctly different financial policies regarding their exhibition industries. It is for this reason that these cities have been chosen as case studies in this research. The evaluation models and methods for policy effect used by Everton Vedung (1997), Chen Zhenming (2003), Xie Ming (2004) and Zhou Lianshi (2006) show that it is beneficial to evaluate policy from the perspectives of stakeholders. As a result, in this research, semi-structural stakeholder interviews were conducted among local governments, organizers, exhibitors, and exhibition industry associations between August 2009 and April 2010. This study mainly discusses the perceptions and attitudes of organizers and exhibitors, who are the target groups of the financial policies. Moreover, both the rent-seeking theory and subsidy theory are applied to evaluate the effect of the policies from the view of the healthy development of the whole industry. The findings of the study are as follows: 1) The tax reform policy reflects both equity and efficiency. The policy efficiently reduces the tax burden of all the organizers. 2) The rental subsidies offered to the organizers result in a paradox. On the one hand, the organizers of mature brand projects are "indifferent" to subsidies, for the subsidies mean little to them when compared with the assets of the company. On the other hand, for the organizers of new projects, the subsidy is indispensable. However, they are turned away because of a threshold that they cannot reach. 3) A subsidy is a double-edged sword. It reduces costs for companies so that more funds are available for their development; however, it also contributes to a company' s reliance/dependancy, which may make the with drawal of funds difficult in the long term. 4) The current financial policies are in effective and do more harm than good. First, subsidies to exhibitors have little positive effect, and even induce adverse effects. Second, the phenomenon of rent-seeking not only reduces the efficiency of special funds but causes a great waste of social resources. Third, policies lack fairness. The allocation of capital tends to flow into enterprises with brand projects, while weaker ones do not benefit. In the long term, mediocrity may be gradually eliminated because of path dependence, and this harms the industry as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]