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Business is perhaps the least studied and, for many, least interesting facet of the multi-faceted career of William Morris. Wikipedia (2018) is typical in describing him as “an English textile designer, poet, novelist, translator and socialist activist”, omitting from this litany one of the most salient facts of his life: that for 35 years he was an entrepreneur, the ‘managing director’ of a socially prominent and commercially successful business venture. It is wrong to conceive the business dimension of Morris’s career simply as a means of earning a living. His firm was a pioneering vehicle for creative expression in the decorative arts, whose products and practices continue to inspire designers, craft workers, consumers and art lovers across the world. In this chapter, we suggest that business, contrary to the impression conveyed in much of the literature, was fundamental to the creative life of William Morris. It was through business that Morris, an entrepreneur of unusual creativity, imparted his most important messages with respect to the decorative arts, simultaneously shaping tastes and professional practice.

This examination of the social processes that inform cultural production asks how tastes are formed, transmitted, embedded, and reproduced across generations. These questions are explored through a study of William Morris, his working methods and products, and their impact on the decorative arts in Victorian Britain and beyond. Through the exercise of cultural leadership, Morris gave physical expression to the ideals and sentiments of Romanticism, and this in turn gave rise to a community of taste reaching across class boundaries and generations. Morrisian products and designs, through the agency of his disciples, became institutionally embedded, emblematic of refinement and good taste. A process model of taste formation is deployed to explore the economic and social dynamics at work in the Morris case and more generally.

This article is based on a prosopographical study of comparative business elites in France and Britain, drawing on the work of social theorists Pierre Bourdieu and Ezra Suleiman. The re is ev ide nce to sugge st that c rossshareholdings, at the heart of French capitalism since the 1960s, have begun to unravel, under pressure from globalisation. Yet the cultural substrata that underlie French busine ss practice s are pow erful. M ore likely than the complete undoing of cross-shareholdings is the adaptation of the national system to suit international structures. The authors argue, at least provisionally, that French shareholdings are being ceded for a stake in a wider international game, in an attempt to enable French management elites to maintain hegemonic control of leading domestic and European enterprises, in this way pre-emptively and proactively engaging with the structural logic of globalisation.

The Taff Vale Railway strike of 1900 stands as a landmark in the history of industrial relations in Britain. There is a substantial literature dealing with the strike and resulting court case. Yet relatively little attention has been paid to the underlying pressures and tensions which gave rise to the strike nor to its wider consequences: the focus hitherto has been on labour, politics and labour law rather than the dynamics of the struggle between capital and labour which raged throughout the railway industry. The strike resulted from a clash between an assertive labour movement and a beleaguered management with little financial room for manoeuvre. Victory for capital paved the way for far-reaching changes in technology and working methods without conceding the gains to labour through the agency of trade union action.

This issue of Business History not only marks 50 years since the journal's inception; it also sees the end of Charles Harvey's editorship. Charles took over as editor from Richard Davenport-Hines i...

(1990). Issues in the History of Mining and Metallurgy. Business History: Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 1-14.

(1990). The City and International Mining, 1870–1914. Business History: Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 98-119.

Managerial revolutions - which witness the appropriation of corporate power by professional managers - come in different shapes and sizes. This article builds upon existing critiques of Chandler's universal theory of the managerial revolution through reference to the French national business system, arguing that the concept of the managerial revolution is best understood within specific cultural contexts, elite ideologies and national business systems. It demonstrates, through the inclusion of original data, and a business historical case study, that the French model of capitalism is distinguished by continuing links between the state and business, by the density of its corporate networks, and the large number of elite actors with experience of working in an executive capacity in both the public and private sectors, in stark contrast to the UK.

In this chapter, we revisit the concept of corporate governance against the backdrop of the new global economy. The chapter considers the extraordinary reach of globalisation — la mondialisation as it is known in France — and the continuing internationalisation of French and UK business made possible by extensive inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI). Companies in both countries have been driven by the logic of ‘critical mass’, of having sufficient power to enable them to play comfortably on the global stage, and this has led in turn to extensive corporate restructuring across national boundaries. Fresh corporate governance challenges have emerged as rival stakeholder groups — shareholders, directors, managers, employees and governments — located in different countries, jockey for position and local advantage. Are the old, national corporate governance regimes breaking down, and if so, are we witnessing the emergence of international standards of corporate governance, in tandem with the emergence of global business elites?

The advantages of an elite education were enumerated in the previous chapter, where it was demonstrated that a large proportion of those who actually reach the top in business, especially in France, have enjoyed the benefits of attending elite schools and institutions of higher education. There is nothing mystical about the process. Graduating from a top institution with a top qualification is a rite of passage that signals to potential employers high levels of personal ability, potential and prestige. In other words, it is easier for a person with an elite education to get started on a fast track career with a ‘blue chip’ employer than for those educated at less prestigious institutions. Once in employment, moreover, other advantages come to the fore. Some stem from the inner confidence that comes from personal identification with the ruling elite, of knowing the rules of the game, of having the right instincts and cultural reference points. Others stem from the enduring value of ‘brand’ association, of being recognised by others as ‘one of them’, the product of an institution known to imbue future leaders with the right values and personal dispositions, rendering them conventionally safe, reliable and trustworthy.

This chapter examines the main theoretical ideas that underpin the analysis and discussion that follows in the remainder of the book. We draw extensively on the writings of numerous authors, notably Foucault, Bourdieu, Scott and Granovetter, and present our own theoretical perspectives on business elites and corporate governance.

The change that has taken place over the past decade in the structure of companies and their boards has been nothing short of dramatic. By 2003, ten years after the implementation of what became known as the ‘Cadbury Code’ in the UK, codes of best practice had been drawn up by a wide spectrum of countries. These embraced not only Western Europe and North America, but also former Communist nations of Eastern and Central Europe as they prepared to join the European Union (EU) in 2004, in addition to Latin America, South Asia, Africa, Australasia and the Far East.2 Global and pan-European institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Commonwealth, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), likewise jumped on the bandwagon. So too did institutional investor organisations,3 publishing their own sets of guidelines for sound standards in business and corporate practice.4 This represents a resounding endorsement of the Code of Best Practice published by the Cadbury Committee in December 1992 under the title of The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance.5

This book has compared and contrasted corporate governance in two national business systems, seeking to delve beneath the surface to examine how power and authority are exercised by business elites in France and the UK. To this end it has explored key research themes concerning elites: their education, careers, lifestyles, networks, activities and reproduction, examining corporate governance in relation to the experience, mindsets and predilections of the directors who run global corporations. The aim has been to get to the bottom of how and why the French and UK business systems function in such different ways, drawing important conclusions with respect to the future of national business systems within the new global economy.

This chapter builds upon the theoretical exploration of elites conducted in Chapter 2. The starting point for what follows in this and later chapters is the argument that business careers are the product of multiple ‘structuring structures’ and the capacity of individuals, as practical strategists, to master the rules of the corporate game. We eschew any form of determinism. Neither in France in nor the UK is it possible to predict whether someone at an early stage in life will reach the top. There are simply too many variables to contend with, many relating to circumstances, and many others relating to personal qualities. This is not to say, however, that there are no observable regularities in recruitment to the elite. Numerous studies have shown that individuals from more privileged social backgrounds, with an elite education, are more likely to succeed than less privileged individuals. Yet, even so, there is a great diversity of experience. Many high flyers have shown a remarkable propensity to overcome adversity, and our own research adds weight to the evidence that business elites are regenerated through the recruitment of individuals who have started out in life from towards the lower end of the social spectrum.2

Corporate governance is viewed here as the legitimating mechanisms and processes through which members of the business elite exercise power and authority. Power, however, is a quintessentially relational phenome¬non. The fundamental concept in social science’, wrote Bertrand Russell, ‘is power, in the same sense in which energy is the fundamental power in physics’.1 It is, according to Max Weber, the ability to enforce one’s will in the face of opposition: ‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance’.2 In short, power gives someone the means to do something they could otherwise not have done.3 The definition of elite members given in Chapter 1 may thus be refined to denote those who ‘individually, regularly and seriously have the power to affect organisational outcomes’.4

The number of database projects undertaken by historians is set to grow dramatically in the immediate future. Scholars with all kinds of specialist interests are aware of the tremendous potential of databasecentred research, both in terms of their own needs and those of a wider historical community. The emerging vision is one of the historian having ready access to a host of databases and electronic editions by way of networks and mass storage media like CD-ROM.

The idea of managing large sets of research data using a computer might seem a straightforward one, yet there is no doubt that database systems are conceptually much more sophisticated than other popular computer applications like wordprocessing and spreadsheets. Indeed, given the high-level theoretical work on which they are based, and the very considerable R & D effort required to develop them, modern systems may justly claim to be at the ‘leading edge’ of computer technology. Almost inevitably, the development of database systems has spawned a whole new set of terms and concepts, often competing or ill-defined. Although the more arcane and technical aspects of database systems — such as the mathematical reasoning that underpins modern programs, or the way that the software physically stores the data — can safely be passed over,1 the essentials must be understood before effective use can be made of the technology.

One of the most important factors influencing the success or otherwise of historical database projects is the choice of software. The research team must ensure at an early stage that a DBMS is selected which has the functionality to cope efficiently with the nature, form and volume of the data to be stored and accessed. Many types of software package are advertised as DBMSs, though they vary widely in their general characteristics, and some at least do not really qualify as such. It is worthwhile to differentiate between the major types of data management programs on the market. To begin, we can differentiate between software packages in terms of the type of platform required and the range of facilities available.

We are concerned in this chapter with simple yet valuable techniques for bringing a database project to a successful conclusion. Without adequate planning and management, projects can become excessively costly, and worse still may not properly support the research. A disciplined and systematic approach to database planning and development, therefore, should pay a handsome dividend. It may not be necessary for researchers handling small, unified data sets to trouble too much about the intricacies of database design: common sense and the support of a good database management system will probably suffice to ensure the success of the project. However, this is unlikely to be so if the projected database is large in scale and scope, perhaps involving complex data relationships. There are many reasons why the planning of historical projects might prove difficult. It is not always easy to define a precise set of project aims and objectives; it is often hard to specify the precise form of the data and its volume; the reconciliation of available resources and project aims can be problematic; and the researcher may have little or no knowledge of the technology best suited to the project, beyond a general awareness that a computer solution is likely to be desirable.

Database management systems offer powerful tools for the storage, organisation and retrieval of historical data. However, the benefits they offer are only attainable if the data are properly organised. All too often little thought is given to issues of database design, with the result that more complex types of queries cannot be answered and the desired information retrieved from the system. This danger is often acute in historical research because of the inherent complexity of the data and the circular nature of the research process. Database design describes the two related stages of data analysis and data modelling essential to the creation of correctly structured databases. Over the years, computer professionals have devoted much attention to the development of structured methodologies in order to reap the theoretical benefits of modern database management software and cope with the practical problems of database design. The general purpose is to produce a conceptual model that can be implemented using a database management system. It must be developed according to correct principles, otherwise the resulting system will not function efficiently in terms of either data entry, storage and update, or speed and quality of information retrieval.

One of the greatest joys of modern database systems is that they make straightforward what was once complicated. Before the database revolution, the manipulation of large historical datasets generally required the writing of customised computer programs. Days and weeks of hard work were needed to achieve substantial results, and, correspondingly, even small mistakes could prove very costly. This, of course, is no longer entirely true. Database technology is remarkably tolerant of error. Mistakes can quickly be rectified and changes of mind readily accommodated. The potent combination of generic data structures and powerful query languages frees the historian from tedious programming to concentrate on the real task at hand: that of working with data to extract meaningful information.

The last few years have witnessed a growing appreciation among students of international business of the extensive British involvement in overseas mining in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In examining the leading role of the City of London in mining finance and speculation, van Helten has shown that between 1880 and 1913 some 8,408 companies were registered in Britain for mining and mine exploration abroad. Many of these companies were of little consequence, and it is hard to estimate with any precision the amount of cash actually invested, as Harvey and Taylor have demonstrated in their work on foreign direct investment in Spain.^ Nonetheless, it is clear that the overseas mining investment boom was of great consequence and that Australia, Africa, Europe, Asia, North America and South America all proved attractive to British mining entrepreneurs and investors. British-owned companies, for example, accounted for 60 per cent of the world's output of gold in 1898, and by 1914 '20 of the world's largest copper mines, a quarter of the tin output of the Straits Settlement and Malay States and 60 per cent of the Chilean nitrate industry was owned and controlled by British-based firms.'"* McCarty estimates the rate of investment in companies operating overseas to be around £9 million a year in the 1880s, £20 million a year in the 1890s, and £10.5 million a year in 1902-14.'* The thrust of scholarship has been towards explaining why British mining entrepreneurs and investors moved overseas so vigorously. However, while considerable attention has been paid to the resource needs of British industry and to finance, speculation, and the activities of prominent businessmen, relatively little attention has been paid to the people whose technical skills made possible expansion on a global scale. Much remains to be said about the activities of British mining engineers abroad: about their training, recruitment, movements, careers, rewards, and professional standing. This article explores these topics, and in particular focuses on the emergence.

Ses travaux en temps qu'ingenieur et directeurs dans diverses compagnies de transport (chemins de fer, tramways, avions, bâteaux). En Grande-Bretagne

(1986). William Morris and the Marketing of Art. Business History: Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 36-54.