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3 results on '"Jonathan Matheson"'

1. Normative Defeaters and the Alleged Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects.

Author

Melis, Giacomo

Subjects
THEORY of knowledge, DUALISM, APOLOGETICS (Rhetoric)
Abstract

One emerging issue in contemporary epistemology concerns the relation between animal knowledge, which can be had by agents unable to take a view on the epistemic status of their attitudes, and reflective knowledge, which is only available to agents capable of taking such a view. Philosophers who are open to animal knowledge often presume that while many of the beliefs of human adults are formed unreflectively and thus constitute mere animal knowledge, some of them—those which become subject of explicit scrutiny or are the result of a deliberative effort—may attain the status of reflective knowledge. According to Sanford Goldberg and Jonathan Matheson (2020), however, it is impossible for reflective subjects to have mere animal knowledge. If correct, their view would have a number of repercussions, perhaps most notably the vindication of a dualism about knowledge, which would frustrate attempts to provide a unified account of knowledge-attributions to human adults, very young children, and non-human animals. I discuss Goldberg and Matheson's proposal, outline some of the ways in which it is insightful, and argue that it is ultimately unsuccessful because it neglects the inherent temporal dimension of knowledge acquisition. While the article is pitched as a reply to Goldberg and Matheson, its primary aim is to highlight significant connections between the debates on the relation between animal and reflective knowledge, propositional and doxastic justification, and the theory of epistemic defeat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Published
2023
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2. Epistemic Duties

Author

McCain, Kevin and Stapleford, Scott

Subjects
Andrew Reisner, Anne Meylan, Anthony Robert Booth, belief, Clayton Littlejohn, dialogical foundationalism, doxastic dilemma, doxastic duties, Ema Sullivan-Bissett, epistemic duties, epistemic normativity, epistemic obligation, epistemic tension, epistemology, evidence, functions, implicit bias, Jennifer Lackey, Jonathan Matheson, Kevin McCain, Lindsay Rettler, Lisa Bortolotti, Luis Oliveira, Mark T. Nelson, Matthias Steup, Miriam Schleifer McCormick, obligation, open-mindedness, ought to believe, ought to reflect, Philosophy, Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge
Abstract

There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.

Published
2021
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3. Chapter 14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief

Author

Peels, Rik

Subjects
Andrew Reisner, Anne Meylan, Anthony Robert Booth, belief, Clayton Littlejohn, dialogical foundationalism, doxastic dilemma, doxastic duties, Ema Sullivan-Bissett, epistemic duties, epistemic normativity, epistemic obligation, epistemic tension, epistemology, evidence, functions, implicit bias, Jennifer Lackey, Jonathan Matheson, Kevin McCain, Lindsay Rettler, Lisa Bortolotti, Luis Oliveira, Mark T. Nelson, Matthias Steup, Miriam Schleifer McCormick, obligation, open-mindedness, ought to believe, ought to reflect, Philosophy, Philosophy: epistemology and theory of knowledge
Abstract

There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductions of epistemic requirements to moral or prudential requirements, the biological foundations of epistemic requirements, extensions of the scope of epistemic requirements to include such things as open-mindedness, eradication of implicit bias and interpersonal duties to object, to new applications such as epistemic requirements pertaining to storytelling, testimony, and fundamentalist beliefs. Anyone interested in the nature of responsibility, belief, or epistemic normativity will find a range of useful arguments and fresh ideas in this cutting-edge anthology.

Published
2021

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