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The attack on the US Capitol on 6 January 2021 was the first such attack on the US Congress since the British-American War of 1812. It was also the event leading to the highest number of injured first responders from any single event in the US since 9/11. What led to it? To respond this question, this article places this event within the broader crisis of Western democracies and the rise of populism that has been its hallmark. It explains the attack on the Capitol as a result of the “Big Lie”, that is, the assertion that the November 3, 2020, presidential elction was stolen from Donald Trump. The remarkable resonance this unfounded claim has found among the US population, in turn, can be traced back to the huge division by race, class and geography currently affecting the United States, a division that makes for a highly polarized polity.

Summary ‘A diplomat these days is nothing but a head waiter who is occasionally allowed to sit’, the actor Peter Ustinov once quipped. The paradox is that at the height of the current phase of globalisation, diplomacy and diplomats were sidelined rather than recognised for their key roles as ‘hinges’ of this process. Will the COVID-19 pandemic, with its cutting back on travel and (most likely) the budgets of ministries of foreign affairs, and the blistering attacks of populists on diplomats lead to their further marginalisation? Looking at the newly emerging role of Chinese ambassadors, this essay argues that may not necessarily be the case.

Extracto de texto: "Un tema recurrente en los últimos años ha sido el de la presencia de actores “extra-continentales” en la región. Varios libros se están preparando sobre el tema. El próximo número de la revista Pensamiento Propio está dedicado a ello. En algunos casos, esto es tratado en forma seria, como un fenómeno más en la cambiante inserción internacional de la región. Sin embargo, en muchos medios, e incluso en algunos foros académicos, ello se plantea como algo ilegítimo ( “¿ que hacen estos entrometidos en las Américas?”), si no derechamente alarmista (“esto es una amenaza”)..."

In contrast to recent literature suggesting that the world economy might be experiencing sustained de-globalisation, this introduction to the volume puts forward the case for thinking of the current conjuncture as one in which the “dark side” of globalisation, inherent in this very process, has simply become too visible to be ignored any longer. Such an argument is rooted in the transnationalist approach in International Political Economy (IPE), which sees globalisation as a double-edged process, which necessarily involves phenomenal technological developments and economic marginalisation, the rise of hyper-integrated regional economies and the widespread de-industrialisation and pauperisation of entire regions of the globe. By taking systematically into account the economic, political and social repercussions of globalisation, its winners and its losers, within and beyond national borders, the book that this chapter introduces contributes to the recent literature that sees the global financial crisis and the rise of “populism” as part of the same historical process. In other words, while the global financial crisis undoubtedly played a role in precipitating the crisis of the liberal global order, the roots of the current anti-globalisation forces are to be sought in the dark side of globalisation.

Chile, a country that has been at the forefront of Latin America’s growing links with China, embodies a paradox in terms of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (COFDI). On the one hand, bilateral trade has thrived, increasing fourfold since the signing of a free trade agreement in 2005, turning Chile into China’s third largest trading partner in the region. On the other hand, Chinese direct investment in Chile has been low, much lower than in neighboring countries. In this article I explore the roots of this upsurge in bilateral trade while also explaining the reasons for the dearth of Chinese investment in a country traditionally considered to be attractive to foreign investors. Chile might be a victim of its own success as its economic accomplishments allow it to persist with investment policies that are currently daunting to Chinese investors.

The third wave of democratization has meant the end of autocratic rule and oppressive state-sponsored practices in many countries around the world. Yet the transition from authoritarianism and state-sponsored terror to more open and participatory societies has its own imperatives. After autocratic rule and protracted conflicts, it is necessary to heal the wounds caused by years, sometimes decades, of mistrust, fear, and violence. Systematic violations of human rights, in the form of oppression, physical and psychological violence, and death, leave lasting individual and collective wounds. Transitional (or restorative) justice is designed to address and (hopefully) mitigate such legacies left by the previous regime. In doing so, it draws on a variety of instruments: criminal prosecutions, special tribunals, amnesties, apologies, memorials, lustrations, and truth commissions (TCs), among others. The end of the Cold War also gave a new impetus to international criminal justice. Special tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, for Rwanda, and for Sierra Leone were established, as was, most prominently, the International Criminal Court, originated in the 1999 Rome Treaty and based in The Hague. For many, this portends a major shift in international relations, one in which the traditional, Westphalian, and sovereignty-centered international system gives way to another, based on more porous units, in which individual and human rights have more sway and human rights abuses trigger a more proactive international reaction. In turn, these developments have given rise to a whole new field of study: transitional justice. This is an interdisciplinary field in which political science, law, sociology, history, anthropology, psychology, theology, and other disciplines converge. Not surprisingly, since transitional justice emerges as a result of the developments described above, it is, much like democratization and political transitions, also marked by contingency and paradox. Transitions are fluid and political action and the uses of the law find themselves under a different set of rules than under ordinary circumstances. Grasping the transformative opportunities presented by the conjuncture becomes a key test of political leadership. (1) Truth commissions have emerged as a popular tool of transitional justice, especially in cases where a delicate balance between the extant remnants of the previous regime coexist with the new dispensation. (2) TCs have come to the fore because of their flexibility, their open-endedness, and their ability to act as a bridge of sorts between an evil past and a democratic present, thus laying the foundations for a future society at peace with itself. At first, transitional justice was mainly concerned with transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. However, after the large number of internal conflicts that arose in the post-Cold War era, it has also been applied within the wider panoply of nation- and peacebuilding instruments following the end of a war or conflict. This has been especially true for Africa. Some transitional justice tools, like TCs, have shown to be so prevalent and useful for a variety of reasons that they are now deployed in advanced Western democracies, like Canada, to investigate historical human rights abuses as well as to investigate the conditions that led to the breakdown of democracy, as happened with the TC set up in Honduras after the June 2009-January 2010 crisis. Especially in Latin America and Africa, TCs as well as truth and reconciliation commissions have been deployed to come to terms with past injustices while rebuilding trust in government and among social groups, although they have also been deployed in Asia, Europe, and North America. (3) While they share a number of common features, TCs must reflect local specificities to address the crimes of the past amidst the fluid, uncertain, and challenging conditions that are the hallmark of democratic transitions. …

« Haïti fait partie de notre histoire, mais non de notre mémoire. » Régis Debray, 2004 En octobre 2010, neuf mois à peine après le séisme dévastateur qui a bouleversé Haïti, un second désastre a lieu dans le pays des Jacobins noirs. Dans une partie du monde où le choléra a été éradiqué il y a un siècle, une épidémie soudaine de cette maladie apparaît. Son origine est retracée jusqu’à la ville de Mirebalais, en Artibonite, une région souvent décrite comme le grenier d’Haïti, d’où l’épidémie s’...

Norrin M. Ripsman and T.V. Paul Globalization and the National Security State New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 296 pp. $ 29.95 (paper) ISBN 978-0-19-539391-0Globalization is a defining factor of our time. Although the literature about it is extensive, generalizations about globalization are often made in a somewhat cavalier fashion. Efforts to treat it with theoretical and methodological rigour are thus welcome. This is what Norrin Ripsman, a young and upcoming scholar at Concordia University, and T.V. Paul, a respected senior IR scholar at McGill University, do in this fine book.An important corollary of the rise of globalization, or so it has been argued, is the decline of the nation state. Yet, is this the case?Ripsman and Paul carve out a particular dimension of the nation state-national security-and proceed to test the hypothesis implied in that corollary thoroughly and systematically. On the face of it, this is an overly ambitious and almost unmanageable task. With some 200 countries in the world, how does one go about it convincingly, while keeping a measure of parsimony and conceptual elegance?By organizing their units of analysis into manageable categories-the global security environment, on the one hand, and the major powers, states in stable regions, states in regions of enduring rivalry, and weak and failing states, on the other-they solve this particular challenge. A culling of the literature on "globalization-as-the-demise-of-the state," with a special focus on security, leads them to four key propositions at the global level, and 10 at the state level. At the global level, they are: 1) interstate conflict should decline; 2) worldwide defence spending and military manpower should be declining; 3) multilateral regional and global institutions should be increasingly important in the provision of security; and 4) the incidence of global terrorism should have increased dramatically.Space does not allow a full listing of the 10 propositions they set forth at the state level, but they are along the same lines: a shift from military doctrines favouring offence to those espousing defence/deterrence; another from hard to soft balancing; a third, having military establishments changing from war fighters to police forces; with all of these topped by the privatizing of security and the pursuance of security through regional institutions.The authors then proceed to test these propositions in each of their categories, in which they pick certain countries. This testing is done with actual data wherever possible, as well as with military doctrines and "defense white papers," which presumably show actual threat assessments and thus changing perspectives on national security in a globalizing world.Ripsman and Paul ask a monumental and significant question-arguably among the most important in the field of international relations (IR) today-and are remarkably sure-footed in their detailed discussion of how it plays out around the world, thus giving strong empirical foundations to the overall gist of their argument. Some may be surprised to read, as a finding, that Pakistan has not privatized some of its security functions, given that if there is one state that has outsourced some of its most aggressive actions to terrorist groups it is precisely Pakistan, but, by and large, the authors get their regional scenarios right.Perhaps counterintuitively, they find that, far from being on the way out, if not to its demise or at least some form of early retirement, the national security apparatus of the nation state is very much alive and kicking. …

Pablo Neruda has been described by some as the most widely read poet ever. His output was prodigious and diverse. He was also very much a man and a poet of his time, that of the first three-fourths of the ‘short’ twentieth century, a time very different from our own. That raises the question: Is it possible to split the poet from his politics? A standard recommendation of literary critics is to stick to Neruda’s ‘non-political’ work and forget the rest. Yet, Neruda himself insisted that not only his poetry but also his personal life and his politics formed an indivisible whole. At a time when the rise of Asia and South America is changing the global landscape, it is especially important to come to terms with the central perspective that inspired Neruda’s oeuvre: his identification with the common man and with the South; his anti-colonial spirit (honed during his Asian sojourn) and his extraordinary grasp of what José Martí referred as ‘nuestra América’. This article explores how Neruda provides us with a vocabulary and a grammar that allows us to look at the emerging new world of the twenty-first century with fresh eyes.

The article examines conflict and terrorism in the age of globalisation. Through a range of terrorist events in South-Asia and in the Middle-East, the article evidences, explores and questions progress of global society, inviting the reader to rethink human rights, and, in particular, the framing of responsibilities that are essential to their contemporary protection. It engages with the ideas of political risks, perpetration and victimisation through terror networks and flawed governance. Considering numerous cases of Islamist terrorist attacks on India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Sri Lankan LTTE and the Nepalese Maoists, it narrates that conflicts in the age of globalisation are an outcome of socio-political processes which lie in the interface between the local and the global. Accordingly, it reasons why the dynamics of globalisation is about inclusion as well as exclusion, and argues that states and non-states should work together to overcome the dark side of globalisation.

Nine years running, the Afghan war is by now the longest in U.S. history. It is also one in which Canada has paid a high price in human lives, with some 150 fatal casualties, proportionately one of the highest of any North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country. The widely used term “AfPak”, now discarded, reflects the extension of the war theatre to both countries. This article explores India's interests in Afghanistan, the policy she has followed since 2001, and the triangular relationship between Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. We argue that India's role in Afghanistan is critical not just in terms of India's own foreign policy objectives, but also for the long-term stability of the larger Central and South Asian region. For that to obtain, however, significant changes need to occur in terms of how India's role is perceived by the United States, Canada and other NATO powers, and in Indian policy towards Afghanistan itself. Avec neuf ans d'existence, le conflit afghan est desormais le plus long de...

The creation of the G20 at leaders' level has signalled a major shift in North–South relations. Although the immediate cause for its launch was the global financial crisis of 2008, the underlying reasons relate to the existing global governance gap. Whereas globalisation — the flow of goods, services, capital, data and cultural products across national borders — has increased exponentially over the past two decades, rules and regulations governing it have lagged behind. This is also true of international institutions dealing with global governance, like the UN and the international financial institutions. A soft-law, informal group like the G20 at finance ministers' level, created in 1999, provided an ideal launching pad for a more ambitious and capacious entity that could take on the challenges of globalisation at the highest levels. Having held three meetings in 10 months and seemingly poised to replace the G7/8 (for economic governance purposes), the G20 seems well positioned to become institutionalise...

The war between Russia and Georgia (RGW) from 8–12 August 2008 triggered different interpretations. Although initially Western discourse and media coverage took at face value Georgia's version of the unfolding of the war, subsequent evidence has disproved the latter. Russia only reacted to an unprovoked attack on South Ossetia in the middle of the night, which caused hundreds of civilian deaths as well as those of many Russian peacekeepers. Much of the initial argument about Russia embarking on a ‘new Cold War’ does not, therefore, stand up to scrutiny. By examining the war and the developments that led to it—as well as the behaviour of Russia, the United States, the European Union and NATO—this article argues that, far from opening a new Cold War, the RGW may have been a turning point, but in a very different direction. It indicates the end of the ‘unipolar moment’ and the beginning of a new era in the international system, in which the imperative for recognition and respect of newly emerging or resurgent powers has come into its own.

"This remarkably fine book constitutes the elegant bridge between academic theorizing about globalization and the inspired anecdotage of Thomas Friedman." Tom Farer, University Professor and past Dean, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver "Indispensable reading for anyone who wants to understand the full range of contents and discontents caused by globalization." Thomas G. Weiss, Director, Ralph Bunche Institute of International Studies, CUNY; and past president, International Studies Association Seen by some as a desirable and irreversible engine of prosperity and progress, globalization is resisted by others as the soft underbelly of a corporate imperialism that plunders and profiteers in the global marketplace. Globalization has brought many benefits, including the reduction of poverty in several countries. But it also has a dark side: the unleashing of negative forces as a result of the compression of time and space made possible by modern technology. Examples include the transnational flows of terrorism, drug and human trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and global pandemics. How do these various expressions of "uncivil society" manifest themselves? How do they exploit the opportunities offered by globalization? How can governments, international organizations and civil society deal with the problem? From arms trafficking in West Africa through armed insurgencies in South Asia and the upsurge of jihad in the age of globalization, this book examines the challenges that the dark forces of globalization pose to the international system and the responses they have triggered. Written largely by authors from developing countries, the book's goal is to help maximize the beneficial consequences of globalization while muting its baleful effects.

PART I: SETTING THE SCENE PART II: THE MAIN ACTORS PART III: MODES OF PRACTICE PART IV: TOOLS AND INSTRUMENTS PART V: ISSUE AREAS PART VI: CASE STUDIES

El autor se pregunta si despues de los cambios producidos en el sistema internacional aun se puede hablar de Tercer Mundo. Para responder esto, realiza un analisis sobre el concepto y la evolucion del termino Tercer Mundo y se refiere a la situacion de los paises del Sur al termino de la Guerra Fria, afirmando que la problematica Norte-Sur continua vigente. Luego estudia el tipo de desarrollo y el papel que estos paises deben emprender dentro de la nueva institucionalidad que impera en un mundo globalizado, refiriendose especialmente a las posibilidades que enfrenta America Latina. Debido a lo anterior se concluye que se deben fortalecer los lazos Sur-Sur y renovar la agenda de las relaciones Norte-Sur.

La seria crisis economica y de gobernabilidad que esta comenzando a afectar a America Latina, y especialmente a Sudamerica, pone sobre el tapete el tema de la politica que ha aplicado Estados Unidos hacia la region durante el gobierno del presidente George W. Bush. Distinguiendo entre un "antes" y un "despues " del II de septiembre, y situando la politica hemisferica de la administracion Bush en el marco mas amplio de los debates al interior del Partido Republicano y la comunidad academica acerca de como los Estados Unidos deben asumir su hegemonia en este mundo unipolar, este articulo subraya el cambio que se da entre una etapa y otra. Mientras que al comienzo el gobierno del presidente Bush dio todo tipo de indicaciones de estar comprometido con una politica interamericana que avanzara hacia las metas fijadas en las distintas cumbres de las Americas, despues del 11-9 ha ocurrido todo lo contrario. La politica seguida hacia Argentina, Venezuela, Brasil, Mexico y Chile, entre otros casos, indica un serio retroceso en los compromisos con las causas del libre comercio y la democracia en el hemisferio. Ello hace surgir dudas respecto de que seguir insistiendo en proyectos como el ALCA sea el curso mas razonable para ios paises de la region.