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The last decade has challenged the paradigm of the hedge fund industry as a unique performer. In this chapter three main factors are identified that have affected the operation of hedge funds: competition from mutual funds, the market environment, and tighter regulation. Recent trends in the financial industry have moved asset managers closer to hedge funds by introducing similar underlying strategies, such as liquid alternative funds, to directly compete with hedge funds. Such strategies can achieve performance similar to that of hedge funds, thus introducing more competition for hedge funds. Moreover, it is shown that several hedge fund styles that have traditionally worked well in crisis times—even in the last decade—are also strategies that can be replicated by liquid alternatives. Together with tighter regulation and a strong market environment, these developments continue to put pressure on the hedge fund industry. The chapter’s empirical findings add to the existing debate on the performance of hedge funds and the direct competition from liquid alternatives.

With financial institutions increasingly outsourcing their activities, they face a record number of fraud and misconduct cases arising from third-party services. We survey financial institutions to better understand which governance mechanisms may improve the monitoring and management of third-party relationships. Overall, our results suggest that there are gaps in traditional governance arrangements. We find that financial institutions rely mainly on internal monitoring to detect fraud and that whistleblowing plays an important role in mitigating misconduct risks. Finally, we report evidence that vendor dependency and product complexity play a pronounced role in delaying termination of agreements.

Direct investments are the preferred vehicle for large institutional investors to have control over their portfolio investments. This chapter studies the deal structure of direct investments by sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in private equity transactions. Its analyses of direct investments are based on data from Global Corporate Venturing. It finds that SWFs shift from investing in private equity funds to originating and co-investing together with private equity funds in deals. The choice for co-investment affects deal size, risk-bearing, fees and returns. Overall, results of research conducted for this chapter show the strong interest of SWFs in direct investments in developed markets.

Plaintiffs’ lawyer fees and monetary awards have a distorting effect on shareholder value effects in US derivative cases. In this chapter we analyze the benefits of corporate litigation without these externalities using a data set for the Netherlands between 2002 and 2013. We find significant abnormal returns within a short timespan surrounding the filing and resolution of M&A-related lawsuits. Over longer horizons, resolutions have little impact on shareholder value. However, our findings suggest that longer waiting times for court resolutions are costly. The evidence from the Netherlands supports the view that in settings without strong distortions derivative style litigation may be important.