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I. INTRODUCTION There has been a resurgence of interest in constitutional theories about the role of the judge in the Anglo-American tradition in recent years. (1) Another recurrent theme in [...]

'A judiciary that publishes dissents and concurrences serves as the exemplar of justice.' (1) Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated in 2015 that the liberal wing of the United States Supreme [...]

'Rather than focusing on prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender, one might ask what work should look like.' (1) INTRODUCTION Two federal employment laws advance women's position in the [...]

V NEW ZEALAND AND SPECIALISA TION: APPL YING LEGOMSKY'S CRITERIA This Part will apply Legomsky's criteria (146) to evaluate whether a class of cases should be determined by specialist judges. [...]

In November 2013, after a series of Law Commission reports and years of academic, professional and judicial discussion, the Government introduced legislation to Parliament to replace the existing High Court commercial list with a specialist commercial panel. Whilst this panel would bring New Zealand into line with many comparable common law jurisdictions, this article argues that the case for specialisation has not been established. In particular, it notes that there is no publically available evidence to support the claim that the High Court is losing its commercial jurisdiction, or that commercial parties are choosing to resolve their disputes offshore or through alternative dispute resolution. Accordingly, this article argues that future research by the Law Commission, or other research agency, is required before specialisation can be justified. In reaching this conclusion, it also examines the issues that may arise if the Government decides to continue with its proposed reform under cl 18 of the Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013, suggesting changes along the way., I INTRODUCTION Judicial specialisation is a vexed, complicated and highly contentious issue. On the one hand, several experienced practitioners have strongly advocated moving towards increased High court specialisation. on the [...]

In recent years, a review of the Judicature Act 1908 and the introduction of the Judicature Modernisation Bill have enlivened the debate over the structure and character of the New Zealand court system. A key issue that the recent review and reforms have brought to the fore is whether greater judicial specialisation is advantageous at the High Court level. This article considers whether tax cases, in particular, warrant greater judicial specialisation. The article draws from experiences of specialised tax adjudication in foreign jurisdictions and evaluates the efficacy of existing specialisation in the New Zealand system, as well as considering whether the nature of tax law lends itself to specialisation. The conclusion is that greater judicial specialisation in respect of tax cases is undesirable., I INTRODUCTION Modern society is incredibly specialised. This reaches across most professions; doctors may specialise in microscopic facets of anatomy, engineers and manufacturers may exclusively produce tiny parts of machinery, [...]

B Australia As New Zealand's closest neighbour, our second largest trading partner and a fellow common law jurisdiction, Australia, and its level of specialisation is of particular relevance to New [...]

INTRODUCTION On August 6, 2009, then-Judge, now-Justice, Sonia Sotomayor was confirmed as the nation's first Latina Supreme Court Justice. (1) While many Latinos embraced the idea of having 'Sonia from [...]

Because courts are both conflict-resolving and lawmaking bodies, They should be both independent and accountable. This paradox of incidence and accountability cannot be resolved but only addressed by various and shifting pragmatic accommodations between independence and accountability. Prosecutors, trial courts, appeals courts, and constitutional courts are each subject to differing consideration in arriving at such accommodations. Moreover, courts, as courts of law, are not independent but are agents of statutory and constitutional lawmakers. Excessive emphasis on judicial independence creates the danger that authoritarian regimes may achieve a cloak of legitimacy for their laws by having them enforced by independent judiciaries., INTRODUCTION Among a number of global quests in search of the rule of law, due process, and legal protection of human rights has been the quest for judicial independence. The [...]

INTRODUCTION I. OVERVIEW OF THE DOCTRINAL PARADOX II. CURRENT PRACTICE A. Forays into Issue-Based Voting B. Presumption Against Interlocutory Appeals C. Statement of Reasoning D. Resolution of Cases Under Current [...]

High courts in eleven U.S. states (and a number of countries) provide advisory opinions on pending legislation when requested by the executive or legislative branch of the government. To examine the implications of the advisory mechanism for institutional behavior and for policy outcomes, we develop and compare results from two incomplete-information models of judicial-legislative interaction. One game models judicial-legislative interaction with 'ordinary' judicial review, the other models the interaction with an advisory option. We show how the advisory mechanism alters policy outcomes relative to outcomes that would be realized without the advisory option. We then identify the conditions under which legislatures request advisory opinions and when they choose to legislate without them. Finally, we consider whether the advisory mechanism is a welfare-enhancing or welfare-diminishing institution, and identify conditions that explain why some courts are willing to offer advisory opinions while ethers refuse to do so.

The author examines the tendency of the US Supreme Court to oscillate over a range of positions on major questions of statutory interpretation over time. Two principle types of cycling mechanisms, litigation mechanisms and legislative-process mechanisms, are examined and a cycling model is proposed.