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This article contributes to debates on business power, noisy politics, and right-wing populism. The populist right weakens strategies of quiet politics, which many suggest has led to a steep decline of business power. I challenge this view and argue that a combination of innovative strategies and ample financial resources allow business associations to exercise power in this environment. Drawing on new empirical evidence, the article makes three central contributions. First, I suggest that the failure of Remain business advocacy in the 2016 Brexit referendum resulted from the constraints of administrative legislation (the PPERA), weaknesses in campaigning strategies, and the CBI leadership's decision to not register as a campaign organization. Second, while my regression analysis provides some support for Culpepper's quiet politics argument, the Swiss business federation Economiesuisse has won 90% of the referendum campaigns it has led, including many referendums with high issue salience against right-wing populists. Third, Economiesuisse shows that business strategies of 'loud voice' can be successful. With money and innovative public-facing campaigning strategies, business organizations can win in noisy environments and against right-wing populists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This piece recounts the efforts by NGO Sign of Hope (SoH) to rectify human rights violations in South Sudan, which manifested themselves as drinking water pollution by the oil industry. Committed to exposing and remediating this water contamination, SoH was able to prompt the automobile company Daimler's CSR to engage in extended dialogue with the oil industry stakeholders in Unity State. Despite a tactful use of various methods ranging from cooperation to confrontation, SoH's campaign did not lead the oil producers to reverse the harm inflicted on the people of Unity State. When SoH tried to hold these companies accountable, SoH had the impression that it was hitting an elastic wall. This piece identifies lessons which may help to counter corporate human rights violations and compensate for the weakness of CSR in fragile states and in the face of corporate irresponsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some business associations mobilize, engage in collective action, and take public stands against the populist right while others do not? This article examines business mobilization against the populist right in Germany, which is heavily export-oriented and reliant on the European and global market order. Drawing on interviews with three business associations, the article presents three key findings. First, economic self-interest is a powerful driver of business mobilization: perceived threats and vulnerability spurred two German associations to act collectively against right-wing populism. However, mobilization is driven not by declining revenues or profits but by a mixture of values and material interests. Second, business associations that mobilize stress the need to reform the system, democratize the European Union, and address those who feel "left behind." Third, medium-size, export-oriented manufacturers are the core business constituency supporting liberal democracy and the European Union. The article shows that some business factions can play a role in defending the liberal international order against right-wing populism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Holger Backhaus-Maul, Christiane Biedermann, Stefan Nahrlich and Judith Polterauer (eds.) Corporate Citizenship in Deutschland: Bilanz und Perspektiven Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, 2008, 541 pp paper THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS [...]

What are the prospects for the upward harmonization of regulatory standards, and why do governments support or oppose more stringent supranational regulation? To answer these questions, this paper examines an important case of upward regulatory harmonization, the European Union's non‐financial disclosure Directive 2014/95/EU, which requires large firms to report on their social, environmental, and human rights impacts. In spite of favorable circumstances, the Directive's opponents watered down the Commission's proposal during the course of the negotiations. Upward regulatory harmonization is difficult because of the adjustment costs it imposes on the private sector. The paper provides an in‐depth analysis of countries' positions in the negotiations: Germany was the most hardline opponent, France the strongest supporter, and the United Kingdom was somewhere in‐between. For most countries, private sector adjustment costs determine government support and opposition for upward harmonization at the supranational level, but the analysis shows that partisan politics and varieties of capitalism also matter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do countries with high corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance support more stringent supranational regulation? Following this logic, existing scholarship claims that Nordic countries push for tougher regulations to sharpen their competitive advantage. On the basis of an examination of the negotiations over the EU Directive 2014/95/EU, a corporate transparency law that requires firms to report on their social, environmental, and human rights impacts, this paper argues that strong CSR performance does not necessarily entail strong support for regulation. Nordic companies perform well when it comes to sustainability, but except for Denmark, Nordic governments' support for the Directive was lukewarm. To explain why, I examine the dynamics between CSR leaders, business associations, and party politics. I find that business associations are key for explaining this outcome. While some Nordic CSR leaders provided support, business associations, in which SMEs with lower CSR performance comprise the bulk of the members, were forceful opponents of regulation, unless domestic regulations are in place, in which case these associations support supranational regulations to level the playing field. I also stress the importance of partisan politics and extend the analysis to mandatory human rights due diligence. In sum, Nordic countries are much more heterogeneous than what the literature often suggests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global spread of corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices is widely explained in institutional-isomorphic terms: Corporations worldwide adopt CSR in reaction to isomorphic pressures exerted on them by a pro-CSR global environment, including normative calls for CSR, activist targeting, civil regulation frameworks, and educational activities. By contrast, this article considers the proactive agency of corporations in CSR diffusion, which is informed by nonmarket strategies that seek to instrumentally reshape the political and social environment of corporations. Applying a "channels-of-diffusion" perspective, we show that in the initial phase of CSR's transnational diffusion—as exemplified by the cases of Venezuela (1962-1967) and Britain (1977-1981)—CSR traveled through learning exchanges between business elite "exporters" and "importers" whose engagement in diffusion addressed crisis-enhanced political threats and opportunities in the receiving country. The focal agents established national CSR business associations, which disseminated among local corporations CSR practices adapted to confront the challenges at hand. We identify the features of such "business-led cross-national diffusions of CSR"; formulate propositions regarding their conditions, dynamics, and effects; and suggest that further research of this mode of diffusion would advance a more nuanced and balanced understanding of CSR's globalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the neoliberal revolution in industrial relations with regard to the book "Varieties of Capitalism" (VoC) by Peter Hall and David Soskice. The VoC reportedly provides a framework for understanding developed countries' institutional similarities and differences. Also discussed are the institutional forms of capitalism, countries' neoliberal transformation, and the liberalization process.

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