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We recently discovered that some bacteriophages establish a nucleus-like replication compartment (phage nucleus), but the core genes that define nucleus-based phage replication and their phylogenetic distribution were still to be determined. Here, we show that phages encoding the major phage nucleus protein chimallin share 72 conserved genes encoded within seven gene blocks. Of these, 21 core genes are unique to nucleus-forming phage, and all but one of these genes encode proteins of unknown function. We propose that these phages comprise a novel viral family we term Chimalliviridae. Fluorescence microscopy and cryoelectron tomography studies of Erwinia phage vB_EamM_RAY confirm that many of the key steps of nucleus-based replication are conserved among diverse chimalliviruses and reveal variations on this replication mechanism. This work expands our understanding of phage nucleus and PhuZ spindle diversity and function, providing a roadmap for identifying key mechanisms underlying nucleus-based phage replication.

In Wilmot-Smith’s recent ‘Law, “Ought”, and “Can”,’ he argues that legal obligation does not imply ability. In this short reply, I show that Wilmot-Smith’s arguments do not withstand critical scrutiny. In section 1, I attack Wilmot-Smith’s argument for the claim that allowing for impossible obligations makes for a better legal system, and I introduce positive grounds for thinking otherwise. In section 2, I show that, even if Wilmot-Smith had established that impossible obligations make for a better legal system, his subsequent attack on OIC fails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Kantian moral religion, because there is a duty to promote the highest good, we are warranted in believing in God and immortality. However, this article shows that the duty to promote the highest good is incoherent, and that popular conceptualizations of the highest good cannot avoid this incoherence. After arguing, additionally, against attempts to ground Kantian moral religion on the highest good in some role other than the object of duty, it is shown that Kant seems to have been aware of the original problem, suggesting an explanation for why he abandoned the highest good around 1800. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the evolution of the streaming industry towards an oligopolistic structure driven by consumer data, leading to anticompetitive practices that disadvantage independent creators. Topics include the historical context of antitrust in the entertainment sector, the modern dominance of streaming giants, and proposals for updating antitrust laws to foster competition and protect both consumers and smaller content creators in the digital entertainment market.

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I want to distinguish between maxims at three levels of abstraction. At the first level are what I shall call individual maxims, or i‐maxims: maxim tokens as adopted by particular rational beings. At the second level are abstract maxims, or a‐maxims: abstract principles distinct from any individual who adopts them. At the third level are maxim kinds, or k‐maxims: sets of various action‐guiding principles that are grouped on the basis of their content. In this paper, I argue for the thesis that i‐maxims are the locus of assessment in Kant's ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper, Chunghyoung Lee argues that, because zygotes are developmentally plastic, they cannot be numerically identical to the singletons into which they develop, thereby undermining conceptionism. In this short paper, I respond to Lee. I argue, first, that, on the most popular theories of personal identity, zygotic plasticity does not undermine conceptionism, and, second, that, even overlooking this first issue, Lee's plasticity argument is problematic. My goal in all of this is not to take a stand in the abortion debate, which I remain silent on here, but, rather, to push for the conclusion that transitivity fails when we are talking about numerical identity of non-abstract objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his discussion of the duty of benevolence in §27 of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that agents have no obligation to promote their own happiness, for 'this happens unavoidably' (MS, AA 6:451). In this paper I argue that Kant should not have said this. I argue that Kant should have conceded that agents do have an obligation to promote their own happiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]