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Even though the motivation to feel worthy, to be respected, and to matter to others has been identified for centuries by scholars, the antecedents, consequences, and conditions of its activation have not been systematically analyzed or integrated. The purpose of this article is to offer such an integration. We feature a motivational construct, the quest for significance, defined as the need to have social worth. This need is typically fulfilled by a sense of measuring up to the values one shares with significant others. Our significance-quest theory (SQT) assumes that the need for significance is universal, whereas the means of satisfying it depend on the sociocultural context in which one’s values are embedded. Those means are identified in a narrative supported and validated by one’s network, or reference group. The quest for significance is activated by significance loss and/or the opportunity for significance gain. It motivates behavior that aims to affirm, realize, and/or show commitment to an important value. The SQT is consistent with large bodies of prior research and supported by novel studies in multiple laboratory and field settings. It transcends prior understandings and offers guidance for further study of this essential human motivation.

Although political radicalism is one of the major societal threats, we have limited understanding of how it is formed. While there are reasons to expect that harassment experienced in adolescence increase the propensity for radicalism, this relationship has not yet been investigated. This five-wave study of Swedish adolescents ( N = 892) examined the role of peer harassment in radical political behavior. The results revealed that within-person fluctuations in harassment were positively related to fluctuations in radicalism. Individual-level (but not class-level) harassment also predicted differences between adolescents: youth who experienced more harassment had higher levels of and a more pronounced decrease in radicalism. In addition, adolescents who had more supportive teachers or parents were less affected by harassment than youth with less-supportive adults. The findings suggest that personal experiences of harassment increase the risk of radicalism but supportive relationships can mitigate their negative consequences.

Although political violence has been perpetrated on behalf of a wide range of political ideologies, it is unclear whether there are systematic differences between ideologies in the use of violence to pursue a political cause. Prior research on this topic is scarce and mostly restricted to self-reported measures or less extreme forms of political aggression. Moreover, it has generally focused on respondents in Western countries and has been limited to either comparisons of the supporters of left-wing and right-wing causes or examinations of only Islamist extremism. In this research we address these gaps by comparing the use of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and worldwide using two unique datasets that cover real-world examples of politically motivated, violent behaviors. Across both datasets, we find that radical acts perpetrated by individuals associated with left-wing causes are less likely to be violent. In the United States, we find no difference between the level of violence perpetrated by right-wing and Islamist extremists. However, differences in violence emerge on the global level, with Islamist extremists being more likely than right-wing extremists to engage in more violent acts.

The current highly polarized U.S. political culture impedes people’s ability to live and work together effectively. Here we examine one factor that may play a role: selective empathy based on shared political ideology. Across seven studies ( N = 3,476), participants read about a hypothetical politician and his political ideology, trustworthiness, or both. Participants reported their empathy for the politician after learning he was fined (Studies 1–6) or injured (Study 7). When trustworthiness alone was manipulated, liberals and conservatives expressed similar levels of empathy, with greater empathy for the more trustworthy politician. However, when the politician’s ideology alone was manipulated, participants reported greater empathy for the politician who shared their ideology. When trustworthiness and ideology were manipulated, selective empathy was observed when the politician was trustworthy. Participant ideology alone had little effect on empathy. The results suggest that empathy is sensitive to both trustworthiness and ideological match, but not ideology itself.

The present review identifies a variety of tactics that are often employed by ideologies to promote and/or justify political violence. The review builds on a social psychological framework that identifies important existential and epistemic needs that motivate individuals to become ideological extremists and discusses the mechanisms through which ideological narratives that promote political violence can serve these needs. We end the review by discussing two broad variants of ideology (religious and conservative) that should be particularly apt at implementing these tactics.

Even though taking part in elections is one of the most direct tools to influence the socio-political system, many people choose not to vote. Research shows that this problem is especially prevalent among those citizens who do not believe they have control over social and political issues, but the question remains as to what could encourage their voting behavior. We predicted that individuals who experience low levels of control can be more susceptible to ingroup norms regarding participation in political elections than those with a high sense of sociopolitical control. Across six studies we found consistent support for this hypothesis. Specifically, people who experience decreased sociopolitical control were more likely to vote when descriptive norms (measured or manipulated) were conducive to voting. The results have important theoretical and applied implications, illuminating the boundary conditions under which people deprived of control can still be motivated to participate in a political sphere.

Research has shown that when control is threatened, people are more likely to turn to groups that are perceived as particularly agentic. However, the question of under what conditions control threat can mobilize individuals to join problem-focused, activist groups remains unresolved. In the present research, we propose that strength of involvement in group-based actions depends on the match between the domain of a threatened control goal and the domain in which the particular group acts. First, a match can occur when the level of control threat matches (vs. does not match) the domain in which a specific group is active. Second, a match can occur when a group operates in the same domain in which the threat to control occurs (vs. in a different domain). We tested these two cases in two countries, focusing on the context of ecological threat (i.e., the air pollution problem) and environmental activism. We did not find support for the first type of match in the data. We did find, however, partial support for another type of match. Specifically, low control participants wanted to join the group and act on its behalf only when there was a match between lack of control and the activist group domain. We interpret these results as initial evidence for the hypothesis that group-based actions among control-deprived individuals can be strategic and goal-driven.

The conflict in Syria created a dire humanitarian situation, as nations around the world struggled with how best to deal with the more than 6.6 million Syrian refugees who fled their homes to escape aggression. Resistance to granting refugee status to individuals often originates in the belief that the influx of refugees endangers national security because of the presumably extremist religious and political beliefs that refugees hold. The present research surveyed Syrian refugees residing in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq ( N = 1,000). The results revealed that the majority of surveyed refugees did not intend to migrate to the West and would rather return to their home country. More importantly, refugees most interested in moving to Western countries were the least likely to subscribe to Islamist extremism or to harbor negative sentiment toward the West. Theoretical and practical implications for addressing the current refugee crisis are discussed.

Even though goal pursuit is often conceptualized as a linear phenomenon, it consists of feedback loops and reciprocal relationships between its crucial components. To investigate this cyclical aspect, we tested the relationships between core goal properties (i.e., goal importance and expectancy of success) as well as goal-related emotions (satisfaction and stress) and goal progress over time. In longitudinal Study 1 (N = 390), across three waves and 3,156 unique goals, we found that progress on personal goals was not only positively predicted by expectancy and, less consistently, by goal importance, but also by goal-related satisfaction and, to a lesser extent, stress. Moreover, goal progress positively predicted future progress through increased importance, increased expectancy, and increased satisfaction and negatively through decreased stress, indicating an overall self-reinforcing feedback loop. In Study 2 (N = 235), we experimentally manipulated subjective progress on the weekly goal of walking and observed its positive effects on goal importance, expectancy, and satisfaction, but not stress. Once again, we demonstrated a positive indirect effect of (manipulated) goal progress on subsequent progress via increased satisfaction. These results provide insight into the mechanisms of goal-pursuit viewed as a cyclic process.

Manuscript accepted for publication at Collabra: Psychology. In this article, we provide a toolbox of recommendations and resources for those who desire to promote the uptake of open scientific practices. Open Science encompasses a range of behaviours that aim to improve the transparency of scientific research. This paper is divided into seven sections, each devoted to different group or institution in the research ecosystem: colleagues, students, departments and faculties, universities, academic libraries, journals, and funders. We describe the behavioural influences and incentives for each of these stakeholders and changes they can make to foster Open Science. Our primary goal is to suggest actions that researchers can take to promote these behaviours, inspired by simple principles of behaviour change: make it easy, social, and attractive. In isolation, a small shift in one person’s behaviour may appear to make little difference, but when combined, many shifts can radically alter shared norms and culture. We offer this toolbox to assist individuals and institutions in cultivating a more open research culture.

In the current paper, we address psychological mechanisms predicting commitment to collective action for labor rights. Specifically, we focus on factors that helped maintain engagement in a workers’ cause among participants of a failed teachers’ strike. We examined the relative role of positive and negative experiences and how they related to a sense of personal significance as motivators of further collective action after the failure of a national strike that a large group of teachers participated in. We also compared the effects of experienced emotional states with the effects of expectancy of success. The results suggest that when people experienced a boost in feelings of significance, even if the collective action failed, they were more willing to participate in a future collective action. We also found that expectancy was related to willingness to take part in another strike or other protest actions, which is in line with past studies.

Changing collective behaviour and supporting non-pharmaceutical interventions is an important component in mitigating virus transmission during a pandemic. In a large international collaboration (Study 1, N = 49,968 across 67 countries), we investigated self-reported factors that associated with people reported adopting public health behaviours (e.g., spatial distancing and stricter hygiene) and endorsed public policy interventions (e.g., closing bars and restaurants) during the early stage of the pandemic (April-May 2020). Respondents who reported identifying more strongly with their nation consistently reported greater engagement in public health behaviours and support for public health policies. Results were similar for representative and non-representative national samples. Study 2 (N = 42 countries) conceptually replicated the central finding using aggregate indices of national identity (obtained using the World Values Survey) and a measure of actual behaviour change during the pandemic (obtained from Google mobility reports). Higher levels of national identification prior to the pandemic predicted lower mobility during the early stage of the pandemic (r = -.40). We discuss the potential implications of links between national identity, leadership, and public health for managing COVID-19 and future pandemics.

How does religion influence attitudes towards science? Some theories claim that religion encourages conflict with science by narrowing people’s worldviews, whereas others claim that religious people combine insights from science and religion to understand the world. We reconcile these perspectives with a new model of science and religion, drawn from goal systems theory, that makes two key hypotheses. Studies 1-2 test a compatibility hypothesis that religious people should perceive less conflict between science and religion than non-religious people. We support this hypothesis in the U.S. (Study 1) and in a 38-nation sample (Study 2). Studies 3-6 test an instrumentality hypothesis that religious people should view science and religion as each moderately instrumental, whereas non-religious people should view science as extremely instrumental and religion as not at all instrumental. We support this hypothesis by analyzing how people explain extraordinary phenomena (Study 3), answer “life’s big questions” (Study 4), and avoid infection during COVID-19 (Study 5). Our studies also show that non-religious people underestimate religious people’s trust in science, and view science and religion as more mutually exclusive than do religious people (Study 6). These studies challenge claims about tensions between religion and science, and reconcile seemingly contradictory findings from past research. Religious people may be more open to science than non-religious people think.

Collective action is a topic that is highly relevant to the socio-political dynamics of the contemporary world. Six papers collected in the special section address different aspects of collective action. They cover a diversity of topics, methods, and samples. However, the focus on goals and needs that drive collective action and social context that facilitates commitment to social causes provides a common ground for the research presented in this section.

The authors outline a psychological model of extremism and analyze violent extremism as a special case of it. Their significance quest theory identifies 3 general drivers of violent extremism: need, narrative, and network. The theory asserts that the need for personal significance—the desire to matter, to “be someone,” and to have meaning in one's life—is the dominant need that underlies violent extremism. A violence-justifying ideological narrative contributes to radicalization by delineating a collective cause that can earn an individual the significance and meaning he or she desires, as well as an appropriate means with which to pursue that cause. Lastly, a network of people who subscribe to that narrative leads individuals to perceive the violence-justifying narrative as cognitively accessible and morally acceptable. The authors describe empirical evidence for the theory, which was tested on a wide variety of samples across different cultures and geopolitical contexts. They go on to offer a general road map to guide efforts to counter and prevent violent extremism in its various forms.

This paper considers the current state of the field in social psychology. On the one hand, we have made enormous progress in integrating our research with other disciplines, reaching out to general public and using our knowledge toward addressing major societal ills. On the other hand, social psychology has been recently mired in a crisis of confidence concerning the appropriateness of our methods and the robustness of our findings. We propose that shifting our attention to theory, method, and application, as well as away from a pervasive “outcome focus,” can extricate social psychology from its current doldrums and allow it to realize its potential as an indispensable social science.

People often seek new information and eagerly update their beliefs. Other times they avoid information or resist revising their beliefs. What explains those different reactions? Answers to this question often frame information processing as a competition between cognition and motivation. Here, we dissolve this dichotomy by bringing together two theoretical frameworks: epistemic motivation and active inference. Despite evolving from different intellectual traditions, both frameworks attest to the indispensability of motivational considerations to the epistemic process. The imperatives that guide model construction under the epistemic motivation framework can be mapped onto key constructs in active inference. Drawing these connections offers a way of articulating social psychological constructs in terms of Bayesian computations and provides a generative testing ground for future work.

Few prior studies have examined the extent to which the behavior and characteristics of political extremists are related to their position within radical groups. In this paper we concentrate on one of the most fundamental distinctions in groups: that between leaders and followers. Our main goal is to investigate the comparative propensity of leaders and followers to engage in political violence. In a sample of individuals who have committed ideologically motivated political crimes in the United States (N = 1,331) we found that even though leaders were more ideologically committed to the group’s goals and ideologies, they were at the same time less likely to engage in violent acts. Moreover, we found that leaders in radical criminal organizations shared many characteristics with leaders in noncriminal organizations. Specifically, in comparison to followers, they were more often male, older, and they were more likely to belong to an ethnic majority. We consider implications for future research and policy of the fundamental conclusion that compared to leaders, followers in terrorist organizations are more likely to engage in violent acts.

In the present study, we applied the quest for significance model of radicalization to explain the use of political violence. According to the model, when people experience loss of personal significance (e.g., due to social rejection, achievement failures, or abuse) the motivation to restore significance may push them toward the use of extreme means. We tested this prediction in a sample of individuals who have committed ideologically motivated crimes in the United States (n = 1496). We found that experiences of economic and social loss of significance were separate and positive predictors related to the use of violence by perpetrators of ideologically motivated crimes. We also found evidence that the presence of radicalized others (friends but not family members) in the individuals' social network increased their likelihood of using violence.

A unique advantage of Psychological Inquiry’s format is that it encourages a free exchange of ideas allowing authors to “drill down” on points of disagreement and clarify possible misunderstandings...

Reactions of losers and winners of political elections have important consequences for the political system during the times of power transition. In four studies conducted immediately before and after the 2016 US presidential elections we investigated how personal significance induced by success or failure of one’s candidate is related to hostile vs. benevolent intentions toward political adversaries. We found that the less significant supporters of Hillary Clinton and supporters of Donald Trump felt after an imagined (Study 1A) or actual (Study 2) electoral failure the more they were willing to engage in peaceful actions against the elected president and the less they were willing to accept the results of the elections. However, while significance gain due to an imagined or actual electoral success was related to more benevolent intentions among Clinton supporters (Study 1B), it was related to more hostile intentions among Trump supporters (Studies 1B, 2, and 3).

We outline a general psychological theory of extremism and apply it to the special case of violent extremism (VE). Extremism is defined as motivated deviance from general behavioral norms and is assumed to stem from a shift from a balanced satisfaction of basic human needs afforded by moderation to a motivational imbalance wherein a given need dominates the others. Because motivational imbalance is difficult to sustain, only few individuals do, rendering extreme behavior relatively rare, hence deviant. Thus, individual dynamics translate into social patterns wherein majorities of individuals practice moderation, whereas extremism is the province of the few. Both extremism and moderation require the ability to successfully carry out the activities that these demand. Ability is partially determined by the activities' difficulty, controllable in part by external agents who promote or oppose extremism. Application of this general framework to VE identifies the specific need that animates it and offers broad guidelines for addressing this pernicious phenomenon. (PsycINFO Database Record

Reflecting on Roy Baumeister’s guidelines for a general theory of motivation, we relate his ideas to our own perspectives and interests. In those terms we consider, among others, the role of motivation in cognitive processes, the emergence of motives from basic needs, the mental representation of motives in memory, and the issue of free will. Roy’s paper compellingly demonstrates the indispensability of motivation to psychological phenomena writ large, and it aptly identifies critical junctures where further motivational research is needed.

The issue of attitude-behavior relations is revisited in light of recent work on motivation and the psychology of goals. It is suggested that for object-attitudes to drive a specific behavior, a chain of contingencies must be realized: Liking must be transmuted into wanting, wanting must evolve into a goal, the goal must be momentarily dominant, and the specific behavior must be chosen as means of goal pursuit. Our model thus specifies a set of mediating processes that transpire between attitudes and behavior. Prior theories of attitude-behavior relations are examined from the present perspective, and its conceptual and empirical implications are noted.