Search

In many species, female reproductive investment comes at a cost to immunity and resistance to infection. Mated Drosophila melanogaster females are more susceptible to bacterial infection than unmated females. Transfer of the male seminal fluid protein Sex Peptide reduces female post-mating immune defense. Sex Peptide is known to cause both short- and long-term changes to female physiology and behavior. While previous studies showed that females were less resistant to bacterial infection as soon as 2.5 h and as long as 26.5 h after mating, it is unknown whether this is a binary switch from mated to unmated state or whether females can recover to unmated levels of immunity. It is additionally unknown whether repeated mating causes progressive reduction in defense capacity. We compared the immune defense of mated females when infected at 2, 4, 7, or 10 days after mating to that of unmated females and saw no recovery of immune capacity regardless of the length of time between mating and infection. Because D. melanogaster females can mate multiply, we additionally tested whether a second mating, and therefore a second transfer of seminal fluids, caused deeper reduction in immune performance. We found that females mated either once or twice before infection survived at equal proportions, both with significantly lower probability than unmated females. We conclude that a single mating event is sufficient to persistently suppress the female immune system. Interestingly, we observed that induced levels of expression of genes encoding antimicrobial peptides (AMPs) decreased with age in both experiments, partially obscuring the effects of mating. Collectively, the data indicate that being reproductively active versus reproductively inactive are alternative binary states with respect to female D. melanogaster immunity. The establishment of a suppressed immune status in reproductively active females can inform our understanding of the regulation of immune defense and the mechanisms of physiological trade-offs.

Marketplace vendors in the market town of Challapata, Oruro, Bolivia articulate an ideology that resembles that of neoliberalism. Entrepreneurial, competitive, and focused on their individual and immediate family concerns they have little interest in their local and national vendor organizations. Most vendors state that their priorities are those of their business and the profits they earn. This parallel with the basic tenets of neoliberalism is not simply the outcome of an explicit promotion of neoliberal ideologies in Bolivia. I argue that in order to understand vendors' political and social outlook on life we need to explore the work of selling, the relationships such work entails and the broader political economic context in which selling takes place. The data and analysis I present suggest that in examining the politics of groups of people subordinated by neoliberal economic processes we need to consider how these processes generate consensus as well as protest and resistance.

This article explores the processes influencing the retail prices set by fresh produce vendors in an open-air marketplace. I demonstrate that frameworks used by other anthropologists to understand the formation of retail prices cannot explain how vendors in Challapata, Bolivia, determine their selling prices. Using Marx's concept of commodity fetishism, I argue that in order to understand how vendors formulate their prices we have to look beyond the commodity being sold and explore the relations underlying their exchange. I suggest that the household maintenance of vendors and customers is linked through commodity transactions and that the resulting interdependence shapes the formation of retail prices in Challapata. Resume L’article explore les processus influant sur les prix de detail pratiques par les marchands de produits frais sur un marche de plein air. L’auteur demontre que les cadres utilises par les autres anthropologues pour comprendre la formation des prix de details n’expliquent pas comment les vendeurs de Challapata, en Bolivie, fixent leurs prix de vente. A l’aide du concept de fetichisme de la marchandise de Marx, il affirme que pour comprendre comment les vendeurs calculent leurs prix, il faut voir plus loin que la marchandise vendue et explorer les relations qui sous-tendent son echange. L’auteur suggere que les maisonnees des vendeurs et de leurs clients sont reliees par les transactions de marchandises et que l’interdependance qui en resulte dicte la formation des prix de detail a Challapata.

In this chapter I describe and analyze the decisions and strategies made by marketplace vendors in Challapata, Oruro, Bolivia, by presenting four detailed case studies. I demonstrate that rather than trying to simply gain a profit in order to accumulate capital, a variety of goals and objectives underlie the way in which vendors operate their businesses. These numerous goals and objectives can be recognized when vendors’ businesses are comprehended as one aspect of household maintenance activities. I conclude that when viewed from this perspective, vendors’ decisions and strategies can be understood to be shaped by moral and social obligations as well as by the rationality of the market.