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The paper argues that rather than focusing on economic reforms in the Western Balkans, it is important to support the establishment and consolidation of the political conditions for economic development and growth. Too often, so the main argument, have the EU and other international institutions focused too strictly on liberalisation and social reform, thereby neglecting underlying political considerations that strongly hamper socio-economic progress in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In October 2010 the Bosnian peoples were asked to vote once again for a new state parliament, entity and cantonal parliaments as well as for the members for the Bosnian Presidency and the President of the Republika Srpska. While these elections resulted in a number of surprise gains by moderate candidates and parties, it is unlikely that the newly elected representatives will be able to overcome the political deadlock that has paralysed Bosnia over the last years. Too deep are the political cleavages between the parties and (more important) between the different ethnic groups and too little has been done by international actors including the European Union to push for reform and a consolidation of the state. While there is some hope that the radical rhetoric will calm down in the future, real progress and reform will need an active engagement of the EU, the USA and of Bosnia's neighbours as well as its three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats). The key for future progress is an agreement on the nature and structure of the common state of Bosnia and Herzegovina among its constituent peoples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Generally, federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is regarded as a mechanism of inter-ethnic power-sharing. It ensures autonomy for the Bosnian Serbs in the Republika Srpska and territorial autonomy for the Bosnian Croats in three of the ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Scholars of Bosnia have often blamed the flawed Dayton Constitution for the problems of political deadlock and structural deficits of Bosnia since 1995. While, however, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP) created a highly decentralized federal state, it did not create a pure ethnic federation, in which all political conflict is reduced to inter-ethnic bargaining. Instead, the GFAP created a mixture of ethnic and territorial federalism. However, it is still the practice of the Bosnian parties that reduces "Dayton-Bosnia" to inter-ethnic power-sharing and all political conflict to a conflict between the different Bosnian peoples, It is also in this context that the international peace and state builders failed in Bosnia, since they did not manage to encourage the development of a party system that offered alternatives to ethnically homogenous parties. This needs to be a key lesson learnt also for international efforts of state-building in Kosovo and elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the authors discuss the use of power-sharing instruments in the Western Balkans. While the comparison will focus on the use of power-sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, there will be occasional references to Kosovo, the third country in the region that displays elements of power-sharing. We argue that the region has been a laboratory of power-sharing instruments, with rather mixed results. While in all three cases, power-sharing was part of a larger strategy of peacebuilding, and was, therefore, successful in ending violent conflict and supporting peaceful conflict resolution, the introduction of power-sharing has also had some negative side effects. We will discuss, in particular, the consequences of complicated political systems, veto rights, as well as far-reaching ethno-territorial autonomy. Furthermore, the article will asses the risk of blockages arising from complex political arrangements and resulting international mediation. A particular focus of the article will be to distinguish between federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and alternative forms of autonomy (both territorial and non-territorial) in Macedonia and Kosovo. Rather than suggesting that power-sharing as such has failed in the region, we submit that the experience in the region suggests that: (a) there are no viable alternatives to power-sharing in the selected countries; (b) that different types of power-sharing need to be considered; and (c) that potential membership in the European Union continues to be the only incentive for the efficient implementation and application of power-sharing in the cases discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]