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This study examines whether and how an individual's subjective, or self-rated, popularity is related to one's structural position in the peer network, as measured by betweenness centrality and structural hole measure. Data were drawn from the original fieldwork conducted in Laos (N = 1,490; boys = 40%; M[subscript age] = 13), a low-income country in Southeast Asia. Using friendship nominations, we constructed a global network matrix based on which sociometric variables were calculated. Findings from hierarchical linear models showed that net of sociometric and other controls, "network brokers"--those who span more structural holes or bridge across more disconnected dyads pairs--indeed perceive themselves as being "more popular." Subjective, net of objective, measure of popularity should be incorporated as a critical component in the lives of young people.

Abstract Research on attitudes toward immigrants and refugees largely focuses on intergroup conflict and related threats imposed by outgroup members. This study shifts the analytic focus to intragroup conflict: a [...]

Why do some people 'cooperate' by adhering to anti‐pandemic government guidelines and mandates, while others opt to behave in more selfish ways? This study addresses this question by focusing on the concept of 'conditional cooperation'. Data were drawn from the Global Behaviors and Perceptions in the COVID‐19 Pandemic, a large online survey (N = 98,310) consisting of respondents from 63 countries fielded during the weeks of March and April of 2020. Two‐level mixed effects models were fitted. Adjusting for controls, people's compliance behaviours were significantly related to the mechanism of conditional cooperation. More specifically, those who perceived others to be more cooperative were more likely to engage in social distancing behaviour during the COVID‐19 pandemic. In contrast, subjective assessment of the infection rate was negatively associated with it. In addition, at the macro (country) level, physical mobility index negatively predicted health‐protective or disease‐avoidant behaviour, a relationship that fluctuated partly as a function of the level of perceived infection. A major implication of this study is that cross‐nationally individual decisions to contribute to the provision of public good during a global public health crisis hinge critically on both subjective and objective measures of others' willingness to cooperate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using two waves of nationally representative data, the present study shows the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated anti-outgroup and anti-ingroup attitudes among South Korean adults. To that end, in a quasi-experimental setting, it exploits the survey interview timing as a source of exogenous variation to investigate the causal influence of the COVID-19 pandemic. Data imbalance is initially corrected using the coarsened exact matching procedure. Then, a series of multilevel models, with data on 10,454 subjects nested in 34 wave–region units, are estimated with additional covariate adjustment to improve estimate precision. Results show that, first, those who are more relatively deprived became less inclined to support the granting of citizenship status to foreigners since the coronavirus outbreak. Second, the same trend was found among individuals who are more dissatisfied with the country's overall economic condition. Third, in the wake of the global health crisis, Korean natives became less willing to pay additional taxes to support conational others who are economically underprivileged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are some ingroup members (i.e., natives) more tolerant of, or hostile toward, outgroup others (i.e., immigrants)? A large volume of evidence exists attempting to address this issue. The bulk of findings from observational and experimental research focuses on the dual concept of 'realistic' and 'symbolic' threat, operationalized in terms of migrant stock or percentage of foreign-born population. According to the literature, a higher stock generally indicates a higher threat, which in turn implies greater xenophobic sentiment. Against this backdrop, the present study shifts the analytic emphasis to a novel explanatory mechanism in the US context: strength of social norms at the state level. Specifically, by drawing on the concept of cultural tightness-looseness, it asks whether American citizens in a geographic region characterized by strong social norms and stringent sanctioning of deviance are, on average, more xenophobic. Results from mixed effects models provide substantial support. Based on nationally representative data collected by the Pew Research Center (2018) during the height of Trump administration, the analysis reveals that cultural tightness has a contextual effect: net of controls, residency in a state with a higher index score is associated with greater levels of anti-immigrant prejudice and stronger preference for anti-immigration policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to critics of globalization, it has ushered in a new era of economic inequality, with some of the biggest "losers" being the majority working classes in advanced capitalist democracies. Economically aggrieved, culturally threatened, and politically excluded, they have become the bedrock of right-wing political parties in much of Europe and the United States. Integral to this phenomenon is the heightened anti-immigrant prejudice espoused by both supporters and leaders of populist movements. The present study investigates a critical issue in this context, one that has been implicitly assumed but relatively understudied: the impact of globalization on xenophobic attitudes among natives. It also examines whether and to what extent globalization moderates the effect of ethnic nationalism on their preferences for restrictive immigration and immigrant assimilation. Findings from multilevel analysis indicate that globalization, as well as the nativist backlash, plays a significant role in directly and indirectly shaping how immigration and immigrants are perceived in host societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the relationship between individual-level social capital and compliance attitudes toward health protective measures in the context of COVID-19. We drew on secondary population-based data fielded during the pandemic's initial phase (April – June of 2020). The analytic sample consists of 9124 older American adults (ages 55 and over) across 18 U.S. States and Metropolitan Statistical Areas. We estimated mixed-effects models with random intercepts and slopes. People who are better socially connected are more willing to comply with anti-pandemic government intervention. This relationship is stronger among those who are more psychologically distressed. Its magnitude also increases in more densely populated areas and places with higher numbers of coronavirus infection. Older Americans' anti-coronavirus compliance attitudes is significantly driven by preexisting interpersonal connectedness and civic engagement. The role of social capital is also contingent on the existing levels of risk factor (threat and vulnerability). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines whether and how an individual's subjective, or self-rated, popularity is related to one's structural position in the peer network, as measured by betweenness centrality and structural hole measure. Data were drawn from the original fieldwork conducted in Laos (N = 1,490; boys = 40%; M age = 13), a low-income country in Southeast Asia. Using friendship nominations, we constructed a global network matrix based on which sociometric variables were calculated. Findings from hierarchical linear models showed that net of sociometric and other controls, network brokers —those who span more structural holes or bridge across more disconnected dyads pairs—indeed perceive themselves as being "more popular." Subjective, net of objective, measure of popularity should be incorporated as a critical component in the lives of young people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In addition to causing unprecedented mortality and wreaking havoc on national economies, the coronavirus disease pandemic has significantly undermined public mental health. How has the pandemic-induced psychological and mental distress contributed to declining political trust cross-nationally? Using a large-scale global survey comprising respondents from Africa, Americas, Asia, Middle East, and Europe, the present study addresses this question. Results from multilevel analysis show that across dozens of low- as well as high-income countries, pandemic distress experienced by individuals is negatively linked with political trust (public confidence in the government's capacity and transparency). Moreover, this relationship is conditional on alternative "performance measures" or contextual moderators: Human Development Index, Corruption Perceptions Index, and Fragile States Index. Specifically, the magnitude of the association between pandemic distress and political distrust increases in countries that are less economically developed, perceived to be more corrupt, and politically more fragile or vulnerable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]