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A commentary on the 2024 article "Affect, Values and Problems Assessing Decision-Making Capacity," by J. Hawkins is presented. Topics covered include the strengths and weaknesses of Hawkins' approach to the difficult cases, incorporating welfare considerations into decision-making capacity assessments and the issues that Hawkins' proposal will need to deal with as she further develops the model.

Most jurisdictions that allow euthanasia and assisted suicide (AS) regulate it through the medical profession. However, the extent and nature of how medicine should be involved are debated. Swiss AS practice is unusual in that it is managed by lay AS organizations that rely on a law that permits AS when done for nonselfish reasons. Physicians are not mentioned in the law but are usually called upon to prescribe the lethal medications and perform capacity evaluations. We analyzed in-depth interviews of 23 Swiss AS experts including ethicists, lawyers, medical practitioners, and senior officials of AS organizations for their views on AS. Although there was agreement on some issues (e.g., need for better end-of-life care), the interviewees' preferred model for AS, and the nature of preferred medical involvement, varied, which we categorized into five types: preference for AS practice as it occurred prior to lay AS organizations; preference for the current lay model; preference for a modified lay model to increase autonomy protections while limiting medical AS normalization; preference for various types of more medicalized models of AS; and, ambivalence about any specific model of medical involvement. The rationales given for each type of model reflected varying opinions on how medicine's role would likely impact AS practice and demonstrated the experts' attitudes toward those impacts. The dynamics within the Swiss AS regime, as reflected in the varying views of Swiss AS experts, shed light on the dilemmas inherent to medical scope and involvement in AS, which may have implications for debates in other jurisdictions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author comments on the lesson from an exchange between Daryl Pullman and his commentators about medical assistance in dying (MAID). Topics include the use of the slippery slope metaphor in Pullman's article to explain the increasing numbers of MAID in Canada, the fact that Canadian MAID law does not require that MAID be a last resort option, and possible ways that interlocutors from disparate standpoint might find some minimal common ground.

Background: Irremediability is a key requirement for euthanasia and assisted suicide for psychiatric disorders (psychiatric EAS). Countries like the Netherlands and Belgium ask clinicians to assess irremediability in light of the patient's diagnosis and prognosis and 'according to current medical understanding'. Clarifying the relevance of a default objective standard for irremediability when applied to psychiatric EAS is crucial for solid policymaking. Yet so far, a thorough examination of this standard is lacking. Methods: Using treatment-resistant depression (TRD) as a test case, through a scoping review in PubMed, we analyzed the state-of-the-art evidence for whether clinicians can accurately predict individual long-term outcome and single out irremediable cases, by examining the following questions: (1) What is the definition of TRD; (2) What are group-level long-term outcomes of TRD; and (3) Can clinicians make accurate individual outcome predictions in TRD? Results: A uniform definition of TRD is lacking, with over 150 existing definitions, mostly focused on psychopharmacological research. Available yet limited studies about long-term outcomes indicate that a majority of patients with long-term TRD show significant improvement over time. Finally, evidence about individual predictions in TRD using precision medicine is growing, but methodological shortcomings and varying predictive accuracies pose important challenges for its implementation in clinical practice. Conclusion: Our findings support the claim that, as per available evidence, clinicians cannot accurately predict long-term chances of recovery in a particular patient with TRD. This means that the objective standard for irremediability cannot be met, with implications for policy and practice of psychiatric EAS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Challenges to the legitimacy of mental capacity over the past 10 years have been spearheaded by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the treaty body for the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). This challenge has been asserted to have produced a 'paradigm shift'. In this article, we examine why that interpretation has had such limited traction in the legal policy arena, and whether it should have traction. We also analyse whether the Committee has subtly but importantly shifted its position. We then develop an argument that the true goal, compatible with the CRPD, is the satisfactory determination of whether a person has or lacks mental capacity to make or take a relevant decision. Our article contextualises multi-disciplinary, research-informed guidelines designed as a contribution to satisfactory determination. While our article is based upon the position in England and Wales, we suggest that our conclusions are of wider application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]