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For decades, the ability of detergents to solubilize biological membranes has been utilized in biotechnological manufacturing to disrupt the lipid envelope of potentially contaminating viruses and thus enhance the safety margins of plasma- and cell-derived drugs. This ability has been linked to detergent micelles, which are formed if the concentration of detergent molecules exceeds the critical micelle concentration (CMC). Traditionally, the CMC of detergents is determined in deionized water (ddH2O), i.e., a situation considerably different from the actual situation of biotechnological manufacturing. This study compared, for five distinct detergents, the CMC in ddH2O side-by-side with two biopharmaceutical process intermediates relevant to plasma-derived (Immunoglobulin) and cell-derived (monoclonal antibody) products, respectively. Depending on the matrix, the CMC of detergents changed by a factor of up to ~4-fold. Further, the CMC in biotechnological matrices did not correlate with antiviral potency, as Triton X-100 (TX-100) and similar detergents had comparatively higher CMCs than polysorbate-based detergents, which are known to be less potent in terms of virus inactivation. Finally, it was demonstrated that TX-100 and similar detergents also have virus-inactivating properties if applied below the CMC. Thus, the presence of detergent micelles might not be an absolute prerequisite for the disruption of virus envelopes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1980s, virus inactivation steps were implemented into the manufacturing of biopharmaceuticals in response to earlier unforeseen virus transmissions. The most effective inactivation process for lipid‐enveloped viruses is the treatment by a combination of detergents, often including Triton X‐100 (TX‐100). Based on recent environmental concerns, the use of TX‐100 in Europe will be ultimately banned, which forces the pharmaceutical industry, among others, to switch to an environmentally friendly alternative detergent with fully equivalent virus inactivation performance such as TX‐100. In this study, a structure–activity relationship study was conducted that ultimately led to the synthesis of several new detergents. One of them, named "Nereid," displayed inactivation activity fully equivalent to TX‐100. The synthesis of this replacement candidate has been optimized to allow for the production of several kg of detergent at lab scale, to enable the required feasibility and comparison virus inactivation studies needed to support a potential future transition. The 3‐step, chromatography‐free synthesis process described herein uses inexpensive starting materials, has a robust and simple work‐up, and allows production in a standard organic laboratory to deliver batches of several hundred grams with >99% purity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some members of MIT's Consortium on Adventitious Agent Contamination in Biomanufacturing (CAACB) previously published content on the "Quality Risk Management in the Context of Viral Contamination", which described tools, procedures, and methodologies for assessing and managing the risk of a potential virus contamination in cell culture processes. To address the growing industry interest in moving manufacturing toward open ballrooms with functionally closed systems and to demonstrate how the ideas of risk management can be leveraged to perform a risk assessment, CAACB conducted a case study exercise of these new manufacturing modalities. In the case study exercise, a cross-functional team composed of personnel from many of CAACB's industry membership collaboratively assessed the risks of viral cross-contamination between a human and non-human host cell system in an open manufacturing facility. This open manufacturing facility had no walls to provide architectural separation of two processes occurring simultaneously, specifically a recombinant protein perfusion cell culture process using the human cell line, HEK-293 (Process 1) and a downstream postviral filtration unit operation (Process 2) of a recombinant protein produced in CHO cells. This viral risk assessment focused on cross-contamination of the Process 2 filtration unit operation after the Process 1 perfusion bioreactor was contaminated with a virus that went undetected. The workflow for quality risk management that is recommended by the International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) was followed, which included identifying and mapping the manufacturing process, defining the risk question, risk evaluation, and risk control. The case study includes a completed Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to provide descriptions of the specific risks and corresponding recommended risk reduction actions., (© PDA, Inc. 2023.)

Appropriate segregation within manufacturing facilities is required by regulators and utilized by manufacturers to ensure that the final product has not been contaminated with (a) adventitious viruses, (b) another pre-/postviral clearance fraction of the same product, or (c) another product processed in the same facility. However, there is no consensus on what constitutes appropriate facility segregation to minimize these risks. In part, this is due to the fact that a wide variety of manufacturing facilities and operational practices exist, including single-product and multiproduct manufacturing, using traditional segregation strategies with separate rooms for specific operations that may use stainless steel or disposable equipment to more modern ballroom-style operations that use mostly disposable equipment (i.e., pre- and postviral clearance manufacturing operations are not physically segregated by walls). Further, consensus is lacking around basic definitions and approaches related to facility segregation. For example, given that several unit operations provide assurance of virus clearance during downstream processing, how does one define pre- and postviral clearance and at which point(s) should a viral segregation barrier be introduced? What is a "functionally closed" system? How can interventions be conducted so that the system remains functionally closed? How can functionally closed systems be used to adequately isolate a product stream and ensure its safety? To address these issues, the member companies of the Consortium on Adventitious Agent Contamination in Biomanufacturing (CAACB) have conducted a facility segregation project with the following goals: define "pre- and postviral clearance zones" and "pre- and postviral clearance materials"; define "functionally closed" manufacturing systems; and identify an array of facility segregation approaches that are used for the safe and effective production of recombinant biologics as well as plasma products. This article reflects the current thinking from this collaborative endeavor. LAY ABSTRACT: Operations in biopharmaceutical manufacturing are segregated to ensure that the final product has not been contaminated with adventitious viruses, another fraction of the same product, or with another product from within the same facility. Yet there is no consensus understanding of what appropriate facility segregation looks like. There are a wide variety of manufacturing facilities and operational practices. There are existing facilities with separate rooms and more modern approaches that use disposable equipment in an open ballroom without walls. There is also no agreement on basic definitions and approaches related to facility segregation approaches. For example, many would like to claim that their manufacturing process is functionally closed, yet exactly how a functionally closed system may be defined is not clear. To address this, the member companies of the Consortium on Adventitious Agent Contamination in Biomanufacturing (CAACB) have conducted a project with the goal of defining important manufacturing terms relevant to designing an appropriately segregated facility and identifying different facility segregation approaches that are used for the safe and effective production of recombinant biologics as well as plasma products., (© PDA, Inc. 2019.)