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In a pre-registered 2 × 2 × 2 factorial between-subject randomized lab experiment with 61 federal judges, we test if the law influences judicial decisions, if it does so more under a rule than under a standard, and how its influence compares to that of legally irrelevant sympathies. Participating judges received realistic materials and a relatively long period of time (50 min) to decide an auto accident case. We find at best weak evidence that the law matters or that rules constrain more than standards, and no evidence of a sympathy effect. (JEL K00, K13, K40, K41) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal Fictions were one of the most distinctive and reviled features of the common law. Until the mid-nineteenth century, nearly every civil case required the plaintiff to make a multitude of false allegations which judges would not allow the defendant to contest. Why did the common law resort to fictions so often? Prior scholarship attributes legal fictions to a "superstitious disrelish for change" (Maine) or to a deceitful attempt to steal legislative power (Bentham). This paper provides a new explanation. Legal fictions were developed strategically by litigants and judges in order to evade appellate review. Before 1800, judicial compensation came, in part, from fees paid by litigants. Because plaintiffs chose the forum, judges had an incentive to expand their jurisdictions and create new causes of action. Judicial innovations, however, could be thwarted by appellate review. Nevertheless, appellate review was ordinarily restricted to the official legal record, which consisted primarily of the plaintiff's allegations and the jury's findings. Legal fictions effectively insulated innovation from appellate review, because the legal record concealed the change. The plaintiff's allegations were in accord with prior doctrine, and the defendant's attempt to contest fictitious facts was not included in the record.

Since 1957, New York courts have required contingent fee lawyers to file 'closing statements' that disclose settlement amounts, lawyers' fees, an accounting of expenses, and other information. This Article provides a preliminary analysis of these data for the period 2004-2013. Among this Article's findings are that settlement rates in New York state courts are very high (84%) relative to previous studies; that very few cases are resolved by dispositive motions; that litigated cases and settled cases have almost exactly the same average recovery; that median litigation expenses, other than attorney's fees, are 3% of gross recovery; that claims are disproportionately from poor neighborhoods; and that attorneys' fees are almost always one-third of net recovery, which is the maximum allowed by law., INTRODUCTION 1972 I. RETAINER AND CLOSING STATEMENTS 1972 II. SETTLEMENT RATES 1981 III. AMOUNTS RECOVERED 1985 IV. FEES AND EXPENSES 1988 V. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF TORT CLAIMS 1989 CONCLUSION 1992 [...]

The differences between the legal systems of different countries, based on their origin in English or French law, are described. The trends of the regulation of financial markets and property holdings in these countries are discussed.