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The purpose of this article is twofold. Our first goal is to make explicit an institutionalist theory of European integration. This theory is based on the concept of "conditional agenda setting," which we argue has played an important role in European integration. According to this theory, the fact that Commission proposals are more easily accepted than modified by the Council has accelerated the pace of integration. This finding brings us to the second goal of this article which is to investigate, by studying the history of EU institutions, whether or not these institutions were the result of conscious planning. We demonstrate that while some of the founding fathers (Hallstein, Spaak) and opponents of the EU (de Gaulle) had an accurate understanding of the institutional structures created in Rome, later participants in the integration process did not. In particular, the arguments surrounding the Single European Act indicate a lack of understanding of the full implications of the institutions selected.

Building on the existing research on the European Commission's agenda‐setting powers, this study examines the relationship between the policy priorities of the Commission and those of the other key policy actors in the European Union to determine the impact of other EU institutional actor preferences on the success of Commission priority initiatives. By using new and existing datasets to compare the European Commission's Work Programmes with European Council Summit Conclusions, the European Parliament's own initiative reports and Council Presidency Work Programmes, we are able to analyse the effect of policy priority congruence on the Commission's success and measure the autonomous policy influence of the Commission more accurately. Our results demonstrate that the Commission's priority initiatives are significantly more likely to result in legislative outcomes when they address policy topics already highlighted (whether fortuitously or as a result of Commission efforts) by the other key EU institutions. They also suggest that interpretations of the EU political system that ascribe the role of political executive to the Commission misconstrue its role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at the development of the two main features of the party system in the European Parliament (EP): the organization of the party groups, and the nature of competition between these groups. On the organizational side, we examine the foundation of the party groups in the Common Assembly and the evolution of party organization from the appointed to the elected Parliament. On the competition side, we focus on the main axis of competition: the relationship between the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the European People's Party (EPP). We develop a set of competition propositions about PES-EPP collusion, and test these arguments in a statistical analysis of PES and EPP roll-call voting since 1979. We conclude that, contrary to what might be expected, the party system in the EP has become more consolidated and more competitive as the powers of the EP have increased.

In this article, the authors address the rationalist-constructivist debate head on. They start by discussing a significant empirical phenomenon in contemporary EU politics: the changing pattern of political competition in the European Parliament (EP), from a 'grand coalition' of the two main parties in the 1994-1999 EP, to a new structure of left-right competition in the 1999-2004 EP. The authors then illustrate how rational choice and constructivist assumptions offer competing explanations of this shift in the 'culture of competition' in the EP, which in turn generate competing empirically testable hypotheses. These propositions are tested using a logistic analysis of more than 400 roll-call votes in a period from the 1994-1999 and the 1999-2004 parliament. The authors conclude that neither basic theoretical framework performs well and that the best explanation needs to incorporate assumptions from both frameworks. Keywords: European Parliament; coalitions; rational choice theory; constructivist theory.

Research on representation within the European Union (EU) often assumes that partisan policy preferences are mediated primarily through the European Parliament, while the European Council and Council of the EU (Council) represent national interests. This assumption obfuscates the potential for divergent policy preferences within Council delegations, the majority of which are coalitions comprised of ideologically diverse parties. Such divergent preferences within national governments provide an incentive for coalition partners to pursue policy outcomes at the EU level that diverge from those of their coalition. This research assesses the existence of such policy shirking by members of the Council utilizing the DEU III dataset, party manifestos, and a new dataset on the partisan characteristics of individual Council members. This analysis provides insights into the factors that affect variations between national positions (as measured by the DEU III) and coalition member preferences (as reflected in party manifestos). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the influence of the European Parliament (EP) within the legislative process of the European Union. Although debate over the impact of the cooperation and co-decision I procedures continues, this article argues that, in part, the current theoretical debate is a false one that has caused many of the other important variables that affect EP legislative influence to be ignored. This article briefly revisits the current debate, then proceeds to an analysis of the success of more than 1,000 EP amendments under the cooperation and co-decision procedures. This evidence suggests that numerous other variables, such as internal EP unity and type of amendment made, have a significant impact on EP success, even controlling for procedure. In addition, this comparison points out some empirical differences between the two procedures that have been largely ignored in the theoretical debate bat that nonetheless have a significant impact of EP success and merit further study.

This article analyzes coalition formation within the European Parliament (EP) under the cooperation procedure through the analysis of a random sample of 100 roll call votes. The authors find that generally, coalitions form on the basis of ideology, not nationality, although they are able to identify some national groups that occasionally vote against the majority of their party group. More interestingly, they find that the political initiative within the EP belongs to the Left and that the majorities required at different stages affect not only the outcomes of votes but also the coalitions that will form. Finally, a slight variation is found in coalition building depending on the subject matter. On the basis of these findings, the authors suggest an alternative interpretation of the conflicts between the Council and EP based on an ideological conflict about more (EP) or less (Council) regulation, as opposed to more or less integration.

This article examines the conditions under which the European Parliament (EP) effectively exercises its informal agenda setting powers to directly influence the content of the European Union's policy agenda through the use of 'own initiative reports' or EPOIR. We test three models of EPOIR influence (salience, linkage and ideology) utilizing a newly created dataset of all substantive references to EPOIR within Commission pre‐legislative communications and legislative proposals produced between 2000 and 2017. These references serve as the dependent variable in our analysis, which seeks to identify the traits of EPOIR that increase their likelihood of exerting agenda influence. Our findings suggest not only that EPOIR can and do help to shape the EU policy agenda, but that salience and inter‐institutional linkage are the most effective attributes in explaining when this type of EP agenda setting effort via EPOIR is most likely to be successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Setting the political agenda is a critical and usually powerful aspect of policy making. However, the ability to set the agenda, without any significant decision-making powers, can undermine this influence, leaving a technical agenda setter without substantive political influence. This research examines the difference between technical and political agenda setting through an analysis of the policy impact of the Commission of the European Union (EU). Using two newly developed databases on Commission policy priorities and all adopted EU legislation, as well as the Decision Making in the European Union (DEU II) dataset, we investigate the ability of the Commission to shape EU legislative outcomes to reflect its policy preferences between 2000 and 2011. Our analyses highlight the comparative weakness of the Commission’s policy influence, despite its formal monopoly of legislative initiation. In this way, we argue for a need to carefully differentiate between technical and political agenda setters when evaluating the policy influence of different political actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]