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We study the effect of secondary education on criminal behavior of young men in Finland. We exploit admission cut-offs in over-subscribed programs and estimate the effect of gaining access to a) any secondary school vs no access, b) general vs vocational school, and c) selective vs less selective general school. Our results show that admission to any secondary school has a sizeable negative effect on the propensity to commit crime. There are no effects at the other two margins. The negative effects at the extensive margin are largest in the years following school admission and result in a reduction of the probability of ever committing crime rather than simply delaying the onset of crime. Our results suggest that keeping youth at school at a critical age has effects that last beyond years where effects on enrollment are observed.

We study inequality in mortality in Finland using registry data that covers the whole population for years 1990-2018. We create municipality-level indexes of regional deprivation (poverty rate), and show how age-specifc mortality rates have evolved across regions and over time. The inequality in mortality has been remarkably low over the time period for most age groups. However, among young and prime-age males the mortality rates have been persistently higher in the poorer areas. For these age groups the leading causes of death are deaths of despair (alcohol and suicides) and accidents. For the cohorts that were young during the deep early-1990's recession, we also document higher inequality in middle-age mortality than for cohorts entering the labor market in recovery periods.

Workplace downsizing and closure have been considered natural experiments that strengthen causal inference when assessing the association between unemployment and health. Selection into unemployment plays a lesser role among those exposed to severe workplace downsizing. This study compared mortality for individuals unemployed from stable, downsized, and closed workplaces with a reference group unexposed to unemployment. We examined nationally representative register data of residents of Finland aged 25–63 years in 1990–2009 (n = 275,738). Compared with the control group, the hazard ratio for substance use–related mortality among men unemployed from stable workplaces was 2.43 (95% confidence interval (CI): 2.22, 2.67), from downsized workplaces 1.85 (CI: 1.65, 2.08), and from closed workplaces 2.16 (CI: 1.84, 2.53). Among women, the corresponding estimates were 3.01 (CI: 2.42, 3.74), 2.39 (CI: 1.75, 3.27), and 1.47 (CI: 1.09, 1.99). Unemployment from stable workplaces was associated with mortality from psychiatric and self-harm–related conditions. However, mortality due to ischemic heart disease and other somatic diseases decreased for those unemployed following closure. The results indicate that selection mechanisms partially explain the excess mortality among the unemployed. However, substance-use outcomes among men and women, and fatal accidents and violence among men, might be causally associated with unemployment.

This issue of the Nordic Economic Policy Review surveys the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic and the health and economic policies introduced to minimise its impact in the Nordic countries. Although national policies were broadly similar, they also differed in many respects. Given that some enjoyed greater success than others, comparing different policies and their effects may yield valuable lessons for the future. The Nordic countries weathered the pandemic relatively well compared to most other high-income countries, both in terms of public health and economic repercussions. Infection and excess mortality rates were comparatively low in the Nordic Region, except in Sweden, where they relied more on recommendations and guidelines than mandatory measures to contain the spread of the virus. The fall in GDP was also comparatively small and short-lived in all the countries except Iceland, where tourism plays a more prominent role in the economy. Nordic Economic Policy Review (NEPR) aims to convey policy-relevant, up to date research on different economic issues. The review produces one issue per year, each time with a new topic and researchers. NEPR strives to make the latest economic research accessible to both decision-makers and a broader audience, as well as to contribute to Nordic knowledge exchange on economic policy issues and challenges.

Although there is a large gap between Black and White American life expectancies, the gap fell 48.9% between 1990 and 2018, mainly due to mortality declines among Black Americans. We examine age-specific mortality trends and racial gaps in life expectancy in high- and low-income US areas and with reference to six European countries. Inequalities in life expectancy are starker in the United States than in Europe. In 1990, White Americans and Europeans in high-income areas had similar overall life expectancy, while life expectancy for White Americans in low-income areas was lower. However, since then, even high-income White Americans have lost ground relative to Europeans. Meanwhile, the gap in life expectancy between Black Americans and Europeans decreased by 8.3%. Black American life expectancy increased more than White American life expectancy in all US areas, but improvements in lower-income areas had the greatest impact on the racial life expectancy gap. The causes that contributed the most to Black Americans’ mortality reductions included cancer, homicide, HIV, and causes originating in the fetal or infant period. Life expectancy for both Black and White Americans plateaued or slightly declined after 2012, but this stalling was most evident among Black Americans even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. If improvements had continued at the 1990 to 2012 rate, the racial gap in life expectancy would have closed by 2036. European life expectancy also stalled after 2014. Still, the comparison with Europe suggests that mortality rates of both Black and White Americans could fall much further across all ages and in both high-income and low-income areas.

Significance From 1990 to 2018, the Black–White American life expectancy gap fell 48.9% and mortality inequality decreased, although progress stalled after 2012 as life expectancy plateaued. Had improvements continued at the 1990 to 2012 rate, the racial gap in life expectancy would have closed by 2036. Despite decreasing mortality inequality, income-based life expectancy gaps remain starker in the United States than in European countries. At the same time, European mortality improved strongly and even those U.S. populations with the longest life spans–White Americans living in the highest-income areas–experience higher mortality at all ages than Europeans in high-income areas in 2018. Hence, mortality rates of both Black and White Americans could fall much further in both high-income and low-income areas., Although there is a large gap between Black and White American life expectancies, the gap fell 48.9% between 1990 and 2018, mainly due to mortality declines among Black Americans. We examine age-specific mortality trends and racial gaps in life expectancy in high- and low-income US areas and with reference to six European countries. Inequalities in life expectancy are starker in the United States than in Europe. In 1990, White Americans and Europeans in high-income areas had similar overall life expectancy, while life expectancy for White Americans in low-income areas was lower. However, since then, even high-income White Americans have lost ground relative to Europeans. Meanwhile, the gap in life expectancy between Black Americans and Europeans decreased by 8.3%. Black American life expectancy increased more than White American life expectancy in all US areas, but improvements in lower-income areas had the greatest impact on the racial life expectancy gap. The causes that contributed the most to Black Americans’ mortality reductions included cancer, homicide, HIV, and causes originating in the fetal or infant period. Life expectancy for both Black and White Americans plateaued or slightly declined after 2012, but this stalling was most evident among Black Americans even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. If improvements had continued at the 1990 to 2012 rate, the racial gap in life expectancy would have closed by 2036. European life expectancy also stalled after 2014. Still, the comparison with Europe suggests that mortality rates of both Black and White Americans could fall much further across all ages and in both high-income and low-income areas.

Funding Information: We thank seminar and session participants at UCL, SOFI, SOLE 2017, EALE 2018, ESPE 2019, Barcelona Summer Forum, 2020. Fredriksson gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Marcus and Amalia Wallenberg Foundation and Handelsbanken. Huttunen gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Finnish Academy. Publisher Copyright: © 2022 This paper analyses the effects of maternal age at birth on children's short and long-term outcomes using Finnish register data. We exploit a school starting age rule for identification. Mothers who are born after the school entry cut-off give birth at higher age, but total fertility and earnings are unaffected. Being born after the cut-off reduces gestation and, hence, child birth weight. The effects on birth weight and gestation are rather small, however, suggesting that the long-run impacts may be limited. Accordingly, we find no impacts on longer-term child outcomes, such as educational attainment and adolescent crime rates. Thus, using this source of variation, we find no favorable average effects of maternal age at birth on child outcomes.

This paper analyses the effects of maternal school starting age and maternal age-at-birth on children’s short and long-term outcomes using Finnish register data. We exploit a school-starting-age rule for identification. Mothers who are born after the school entry cut-off give birth at higher age, but total fertility and earnings are unaffected. Being born after the cut-off reduces gestation and, hence, child birth weight. The effects on birth weight and gestation are rather small, however, suggesting that the long-run impacts are limited. Accordingly, we find no impacts on longer-term child outcomes, such as educational attainment and adolescent crime rates. Overall, we interpret this evidence as saying that there are no favorable effects of maternal age at birth on child outcomes.

We analyse the effects of imports on employment and earnings by distinguishing between import competition in final products and firms’ use of imports in production (offshoring). We use Finnish worker-firm data merged with product-level trade data. We focus on Chinese imports and instrument them by changes in China’s share of world exports. Both types of importing increase the job loss risk for all workers and, in particular, for workers in production occupations. An increase in import competition has larger negative effects than an increase in offshoring. Production workers suffer the largest earnings losses, while for high-skilled workers the wage-effect is positive.

We analyze short and long-term effects of worker displacement. Our sample consists of male workers displaced from Norwegian manufacturing plants. We find that displacement increases the probability of leaving the labor force by 31%. The drop-out rate from the labor force is particularly high in the first years following displacement. The average earnings effects for those who remain in the labor force are moderate, a 3% loss relative to non-displaced workers after seven years. Splitting displaced workers on within- and between-firm movers, we find that the estimated earnings loss is entirely driven by between-firm movers who experience a 3.6% loss. Transfers to other plants within multi-plant firms upon displacement are quite common. Our results support the view that human capital is partly firm specific and partly industry specific. We find no evidence suggesting that human capital is plant specific.

It is well documented that displaced workers suffer severe earnings losses, but not why this is so. One reason may be that workers are unable or unwilling to move to regions with better employment opportunities. We study this and find that job displacement increases regional mobility but, surprisingly, we also find that displaced workers who move suffer larger income losses than displaced workers who stay in the same region. This is not a selection effect, but reflects the fact that non-economic factors such as family ties are very important for the decision to migrate. Workers are less likely to move if they have family in the region where they already live, and job loss stimulates workers to relocate with parents and siblings when they live in different regions. Looking at earnings we find that the entire post displacement income difference between displaced movers and stayers is driven by workers moving to regions where their parents live or to rural areas. Furthermore, when looking at long-run family income, we find that the difference between displaced movers and stayers is very modest. With respect to selection, we find that migrants are positively selected on average, but very heterogeneous. They seem to be drawn disproportionately both from the high and the low end of the skill distribution in the region they leave.

It is well documented that displaced workers suffer severe earnings losses, but not why this is so. One reason may be that workers are unable or unwilling to move to regions with better employment opportunities. We study this and find that job displacement increases regional mobility but, surprisingly, we also find that displaced workers who move suffer larger income losses than displaced workers who stay in the same region. This is not a selection effect, but reflects the fact that non-economic factors such as family ties are very important for the decision to migrate. Workers are less likely to move if they have family in the region where they already live, and job loss stimulates workers to relocate with parents and siblings when they live in different regions.Looking at earnings we find that the entire post displacement income difference between displaced movers and stayers is driven by workers moving to regions where their parents live or to rural areas. Furthermore, when looking at long-run family income, we find that the difference between displaced movers and stayers is very modest. With respect to selection, we find that migrants are positively selected on average, but very heterogeneous. They seem to be drawn disproportionately both from the high and the low end of the skill distribution in the region they leave.

During the 1990’s the Finnish economy experienced a rapid increase in exports and R&D activity. This paper investigates the impact of these phenomena on the skill structure of labour demand using panel data on Finnish establishments for 1988–2001. Worker’s skill level is defined by both education and age. The results indicate that despite the general shift in employment towards the highly educated and older workers, the selected technology and trade indicators – R&D intensity and export share – did not have a significant effect on the changes in the skill demand within manufacturing sector plants in Finland during the period.

This paper analyzes the effects of job displacement on fertility using Finnish longitudinal employer-employee data (FLEED) matched to birth records. We distinguish between male and female job losses. We focus on couples where one spouse has lost his/her job due to a plant closure or mass layoff and follow them for several years both before and following the job loss. As a comparison group we use similar couples that were not affected by job displacement. In order to examine the possible channels through which job loss affects fertility we examine also the effect on earnings, employment and divorce. The results show that a woman?s own job loss decreases fertility mainly for highly educated women. For every 100 displaced females there are approximately 4 less children born. A man?s job loss has no significant impact on completed fertility.

Low-wage subsidies are often proposed as a solution to the unemployment problem among the low skilled. Yet the empirical evidence on the effects of low-wage subsidies is surprisingly scarce. This paper examines the employment effects of a Finnish payroll tax subsidy scheme, which is targeted at the employers of older, full-time, low-wage workers. The system’s clear eligibility criteria open up an opportunity for a reliable estimation of the causal impacts of the subsidy, using a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach. Our results indicate that the subsidy system had no effects on the employment rate. However, it appears to have increased the probability of part-time workers obtaining full-time employment.

We study how a negative labor market shock like job loss generates health spillovers in couples. Using administrative data of all workers and firms matched to mortality and patient records, we document that male job displacement increases the mortality risk for both the man and his partner. For every 10,000 displaced men, there are 27 additional deaths over a 5-year period rising to 115 additional deaths over two decades. Of those, 60% accrue to the displaced worker but 40% are due to excess spousal mortality. Deaths from cardiovascular diseases jump up and hospitalization records show more treatments for alcohol-related disorders and mental health issues. We also find a stunning gender asymmetry: while male job displacement generates large and persistent health effects, no such dire health consequences are observed after a woman loses her job. We explore three explanations for the observed health spillovers: risk sharing through spousal labor supply; earnings losses and the role of public insurance; and the influence of gender roles and family structure.