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Terrell Carter grew up only a stone's throw from Drexel University, the institution of higher learning where the other coauthor of this Article, Rachel López, would find her academic home years later. Even as a child, Terrell remembers feeling like other institutions that were miles away, like State Correctional Institution Graterford where he would spend most of his adult life, were much more proximate. Paradoxically, he would later come to learn that behind the walls of institutions like Drexel, academics like Rachel would develop ideas and theory that would shape his fate and define his existence behind other walls. Through Participatory Law Scholarship (PLS)--legal scholarship written in collaboration with those without formal legal training, but expertise in law's injustice through lived experience--Terrell and Rachel seek to dismantle the walls upon walls that divide the ideals of law from the lived experience of it. Building from the experience of coauthoring Redeeming Justice, their award-winning article that contributed to the liberation of Terrell less than a year after its publication, this Article explores the role that participatory methods in legal scholarship can play in repairing the epistemic harm done by law and by academics to the most marginalized in our society. PLS does this by centering experiential knowing as a source of legal expertise so that those for whom the law is most consequential can see themselves reflected in it and know that they are and can be a part of the making of legal meaning. PLS strives to ensure that people who are formally educated in the law are not the only ones who are able to engage in legal scholarship and the development of legal theory. This approach to legal scholarship is grounded in the belief that the experience of being marginalized by the law uniquely positions someone to critique it. Ultimately, PLS seeks to democratize knowledge production by validating alternative ways of knowing what the law is and what changes are needed for it to realize its full potential. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "THE HEART AND HEARTBREAK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW" by Rachel López explores the story of Madame Liseby Elysé's struggle for self-determination and racial justice in the context of international law. It delves into the complexities of human rights law, highlighting its potential as a tool for Black liberation while also critiquing its limitations and perpetuation of global racial hierarchy. The narrative emphasizes the power of storytelling in challenging dominant legal constructs and advocating for marginalized communities, ultimately calling for a shift towards more participatory and inclusive approaches in international law. [Extracted from the article]

In the article "Aggression in Law's Clothing: Does Might Still Make Right?" by Rachel López, the author examines the concept of aggression in international law. The article questions whether the traditional idea of "might is right" still holds true in today's world, despite the presence of international law. The author argues that powerful states are able to use force and aggression without facing consequences, citing examples such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the United States' invasion of Iraq. The article also discusses the loopholes in international institutions and laws that allow powerful states to operate by their own rules. It highlights the limitations of international law in addressing aggression by powerful states, including the authority of the Security Council to authorize the use of force and the lack of prosecutability for nationals of powerful states. The article uses the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a case study to illustrate how powerful states can evade accountability and use international law to justify their actions. It emphasizes the limitations of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court in holding powerful states accountable for their aggressive actions. The article concludes by calling for the removal of the protective cloak of international law from aggressors in order to fully outlaw war. [Extracted from the article]

Approximately three decades ago, two of us, Terrell Carter and Kempis Songster, were sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that this sentence, effectively an order to die in prison, represented a legal determination that we were irredeemable. In this Article, with insights from our coauthor and friend, human rights scholar Rachel López, we ask: What does it mean for the law to judge some human beings as incapable of redemption? Isn't the capacity for change core to the human condition, and shouldn't that be reflected in the law?. This Article marries human rights law with our lived experience to argue that the capacity for redemption is an innate human characteristic. By documenting the dehumanizing effect of codified condemnation and the struggle for humanity after a person has been found irredeemable in a court of law, we seek to show why all humans should have a legal right to redemption--a right embedded in the Eighth Amendment through the latent concept of human dignity. The reading of the Eighth Amendment we call for would require a dramatic reimagination of the U.S. criminal legal system into one that elevates humanity, not deprives it. One that creates the opportunity for healing and human development, not denies it. One that facilitates the human capacity for redemption, not forbids it. One, in other words, that recognizes that change is always possible. Redeeming justice thus requires that legal systems not make unalterable decisions about a human being's capacity for change. At a bare minimum, this means that all sentences should be reviewable, with release possible after someone redeems herself. No person should be permanently deprived of her hope for freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gravity is frequently referenced in treaties, judicial decisions of international and regional bodies, human rights reports, and the resolutions and proclamations of various bodies of the United Nations. These documents refer to certain violations of international law as being "gross," "serious," and "grave." These terms are frequently used interchangeably but seldom defined, and it is often unclear what makes a violation particularly grave. Is it the extreme harm to the victim, the type of rights involved, who committed the violation, or rather the intent of the wrongdoer?. Despite the lack of clarity around the concept, classifying a violation as grave has significant legal consequences under international law. Gravity can determine whether an international court has jurisdiction to prosecute a crime or when a treaty monitoring body can take up an issue. States are prohibited from selling arms to other States if they commit grave violations of human rights or humanitarian law. Gravity has also been used to justify military intervention or punishing a State more harshly for its wrongful acts. This Article brings more grounding to gravity by examining the concept in all of its forms and offers the first scholarly treatment of gravity across public international law as a whole. As the legal history demonstrates, gravity is a, if not the, principal unifying force across international criminal law, human rights law, and humanitarian law. Despite the absence of a formal definition of grave violations, a close examination of gravity's jurisprudence reveals a common set of considerations that international courts and other entities typically weigh when determining that a violation is grave. Closer adherence to these determinants will result in more uniform and cohesive accountability for those violations that are of most concern to humankind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the modern era, as the cooperation between States in military and counter-terrorism efforts increases, so does the risk that a State will facilitate the grave crimes of another State through its political, military, or economic assistance. One of the most prominent recent examples is Russia's support to the Assad regime in Syria, despite the atrocities the Assad regime committed against its own people. This raises the question: What legal obligations do States have to refrain from assisting other States in committing grave international crimes?. This Article argues that much like there is an oft-cited responsibility to protect (R2P), which obligates States to protect the human rights of people in other countries when their own governments are unwilling or unable to do so, there is an analogous duty to refrain (D2R) from aiding and abetting other States who commit grave violations of human rights, like genocide and crimes against humanity. Drawing from existing sources of international law, this Article argues that D2R already constitutes a binding principle of international law. In addition, this Article makes a significant contribution to the current scholarship on State responsibility by exploring the factors that contribute to impunity for State complicity in international wrongdoing. The author contends that a narrower focus on State complicity in crimes that constitute violations of jus cogens norms would strengthen its enforcement. The Article then concludes by proposing novel ideas for more effective enforcement of D2R through bilateral agreements and the employment of sanctioning powers of the United Nations General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, when the Security Council, whose members are at times complicit in grave international crimes, is unwilling or unable to act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In societies where the state is implicated in mass violence, questions of how such unspeakable brutality could occur and vows of "never again" abound. Many advocates view the development of an enduring and shared memory of events as an essential step to healing the wounds of a rattled national conscience and preventing the recurrence of mass atrocities. While legal scholars have extolled the cathartic and formative role that legal processes (in particular trials) play in establishing collective memory in periods of transition, holding trials in the immediate aftermath of mass violence is frequently infeasible due to the political instability and judicial insecurity that precipitates such heinous crimes. In the vacuum created by state inaction, those most intimately affected by mass violence often band together and through discussion and ritual merge their fragmented recollections into a holistic narrative. Through these communal conversations, their memories are reframed so they no longer belong to the individual, but the collective. Given the legal tradition's emphasis on individualism and autonomy, when justice finally does come, victims must provide an individual recount of their experience in written statements or at a hearing. As a consequence, lawyers must deconstruct the collective memory of their clients, possibly undoing the healing that has been accomplished through dialog and community identification. During this process, there is a grave risk of re-traumatization. This article argues that human rights mechanisms and lawyers should instead endeavor to incorporate collective memory into judicial proceedings seeking to address mass violence. There are several reasons why a nuanced approach is warranted. First, recent psychological studies have found collective memory to be more accurate than individual memory, casting doubt on the judicial proceedings' preference for individual memory. Moreover, justice in the face of systematic mass violence perpetrated and normalized by the state has very different objectives than justice in societies where such crimes are anomalies. Aims such as promoting reconciliation, creating a historical record, nation-building, and instituting legal reform, may take precedence over the traditional goals of retribution and deterrence. The consideration of collective memory by tribunals would further these goals by facilitating a better understanding of the collective nature of the harm suffered, and contributing to remedies that are more narrowly tailored to the needs of recovering communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]