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This paper aims to study and analyze the notion of khiyar al-majlis from the viewpoints of prominent Schools of Islamic law. Khiyar al-majlis refers to an option for both contracting parties either to revoke or to continue with the contract before departing from the contracting session. This option is made lawful in Islamic law to ensure the absolute consent of the parties to the agreement and to give them adequate time to think carefully about the conclusion of the contract. However, the Hanafi and Maliki Schools do not advocate khiyar al-majlis, they advocate khiyar al-qabul (option of acceptance) instead. This study prefers the validity of khiyar al-majlis and discusses its applications. This is a qualitative study and classical references of the prominent Schools of Islamic law have been employed as the primary sources of the study. The study posits that in the case of a face to face contract khiyar al-majlis might be practical. But, in the case of online or distant contracts it is not practical because it would be difficult to determine whether the parties are continuing the session or not. Thus, in online contracts khiyar al-qabul is more practical and hence after making an offer and acceptance the contract is concluded, though the contracting session is prolonged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Al-qawā'id al-fiqhiyya are legal maxims or principles that are usually expressed in the form of terse adages, such as: al-umūr bi-maqāşidihā (acts are [judged according] to the objectives behind them); and al-mashaqqa tajlub al-taysīr (hardship brings about facilitation). Most of al-qawā'id (sg. al-qā'ida) are specific to individual schools of law, although some of them are acknowledged by all schools. The most accepted definition of al-qā'ida al-fiqhiyya is: "A predominantly valid legal determination (ḥukm aktharī) that applies to most of its particular cases (juz'iyyāt) so that their legal determinations will be known from it". Another designation of the genre is al-ashbāh wa'l-naẓāir (similitudes), referring to the similarities between cases included under the rubric of each qā'ida. The schools of law (madhāhib, sg. madhhab) are agreed on two types of qawā'id fiqhiyya: general qawā'id that apply to all or most fields of the law, which are therefore known as kulliyya (universal), and specific (khāşşa) qawā'id that apply to one or more, rather than all, fields offiqh; the latter are also known as ḍawābiţ (sg. ḍābiţ, regulators). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When studying textuality in the codification1 of Islamic legal maxims (qawā'id fiqhīyah), it is worth researching how intertextuality and hypertextuality can be used as linguistic mechanisms to help understand Qur'anic texts and how such texts cohere to form legal maxims in Islamic criminal law. An in-depth study of medieval Qur'anic exegetes reveals the length to which Muslim scholars have gone to link texts to extract contextual meanings from the Qur'an and, perhaps, to codify Islamic legal maxims. Two such approaches are intertextuality and hypertextuality. This article examines how the linguistic mechanisms defined herein complement juristic methodology in codifying Islamic legal maxims from Qur'anic exegesis. It explores several relevant exegeses, illustrates that maxims codified through intertextuality and hypertextuality are more far-reaching than those codified through textuality alone, and emphasizes these legal maxims' application to aspects of criminal law. I conclude that were it not for juristic methodologies, many objectives of Islamic law would have been misconstrued in the process of identifying the texts' meanings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This article aims to focus on legal maxims related to financial transactions to explore whether they offer any solutions for Muslims concerned with this dilemma, and to investigate how such legal maxims can be used to shape the way in which Muslims in the West perceive today's mortgage issues. Some questions raised are the following. When entering a mortgage contract, does a Muslim's intention change the ruling of the transaction under the pretext of the two maxims al-umūr bi maqāidihā ('matters considered according to intention') and hal al-ibrah fī l-uqūd bi l-maqāid wa l-maanī aw bi l-alfā wa l-mabānī ('in contracts, is effect given to intention and the meaning or expression and form')? Can one be certain that mortgages are completely arām (unlawful) when considering the maxim al-yaqīn lā yazūl bi l-shakk ('certainty cannot be repelled by doubt')? What aspects of arām are found in mortgages and can they be marginalized by the maxim al-arūrāt tubīh al-maūrāt ('necessity makes the unlawful thing lawful')? If Islam allows bay al-istinā (contract for manufacture) on the basis of urf (custom), can mortgages also be permitted under the maxim al-ādah muakkamah ('custom is authoritative')? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]