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Most previous research on sexual minority migrants focused on those who move from places where there are fewer legal rights for sexual minorities to where there are more. This paper distinctively fills a research gap through a focus on a subset of sexual minority migrants: sexual minority expatriates. It presents a five-year ethnographic case study of a judicial review in Hong Kong QT v Director of Immigration and other lesbian and gay couples who moved to Hong Kong, and business organisations that advocate for immigration equality. First, the analysis highlights that both subjective cultural assumptions and objective legal conditions play an important role in sexual minority expatriates' assessment of gay-friendliness of the work destination. Second, this paper uncovers the agency of gay and lesbian expatriates' impact on the local legal sexual landscape and illustrates how sexual citizenship could be reclaimed by relying on the homonormative logic that the same-sex couples are productive labour and beneficial to the economy. This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of sexual minority migration by theorising how sexual minority migrants may not only be constrained by the legal and social environments in the migration destination, but they may also actively change and shape them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the effects of retroactive community property regimes on long-term same-sex couples in the U.S. Topics discussed include the provisions of the community property or the marital property regime for the joint ownership of spouses over property created and acquired during the marriage, complication in the retroactive application of the marriage right, and possible effect of the issue of retroactivity on property, constitutional and family law.

In 2015, same-sex couples throughout the United States obtained formal marriage equality. But is the prospective ability to obtain marriage licenses sufficient to achieve Obergefell v. Hodges's promise of equality? What about individuals whose same-sex relationship did not survive--either through death or dissolution--to see marriage equality become the law of the land? Or those couples who did ultimately wed but now have a marriage that appears to be artificially short when considering just how long the couple has actually been together in a marriage-like relationship? With marriage benefits conditioned not only on the fact of marriage but also the length of marriage, individuals in both categories continue to suffer harm as a result of the unconstitutional laws that prevented them from marrying at an earlier point in time. Although some states have attempted to remedy this problem by backdating same-sex marriages, the reality is that the availability of such relief varies by state and, what is more, no state has yet formulated a test to adequately protect the interests of those individuals. This Article is the first to propose a specific solution to these problems--a solution that requires states to formulate and adopt a new equitable remedy, referred to here as "equitable marriage." Drawing on existing equitable doctrines that states have already developed to extend formal family law benefits to those in informal family-like relationships, equitable marriage would treat same-sex relationships that predated formal marriage equality as the equivalent of a legal marriage with all the attendant rights and obligations. In the case of same-sex couples who ultimately did wed, equitable marriage would require that the time the couple spent in a marriage-like relationship count as part of the formal marriage, so as to extend all marital benefits conditioned on length of marriage. To succeed, claimants would need to establish that the couple would have wed during that time period but for the unconstitutional laws depriving them of that fundamental right. Understanding the complexity of such an approach, this Article offers guidance on how courts should implement and apply equitable marriage so as to achieve full marriage equality while, at the same time, resisting impermissible gender stereotypes and heterosexist notions of how marriage "should" look. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In most states, married male same-sex couples who conceive children via gestational surrogacy using sperm from one member of the couple and donor ova must pursue adoption in order to establish legal parentage for the member of the couple who is not genetically related to the child. This is because only a minority of jurisdictions have surrogacy laws that recognize the non-biological intended parent as a legal parent in this situation, and across the United States cisgender male same-sex couples are excluded from the longstanding non-adoptive marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage currently available to both different-sex couples and female same-sex couples. Marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage, such as the marital presumption of parentage and spousal consent to assisted reproduction laws, represent the most common way to establish legal parentage in an individual other than the person who gave birth to the child. The exclusion of male same-sex couples from marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage is harmful, unwarranted, and unnecessary. Parenting abilities do not depend on sexual orientation or gender. Children raised by male same-sex couples fare just as well as children raised by different-sex couples and female same-sex couples, and men who function as primary caretakers to their children are as capable and effective as women who function in that role. Excluding male same-sex couples from marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage reinforces gender-based stereotypes around caretaking that harm and confine women and men both in the workplace and in the domestic sphere. Moreover, the conclusive presumption of parentage based upon the act of giving birth, which presents a major barrier to the extension of marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples, is an outdated concept that fails to reflect the realities of modern medical technology and the diverse circumstances under which children are conceived today. This Article advances a comprehensive proposal for extending marriage-based avenues of establishing parentage to male same-sex couples. If implemented, the proposal will provide a more equitable and effective legal framework for parentage establishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Assisted Reproductive Technology has become a widely used way to start a family around the world, specifically for same-sex couples. With it have also come emerging legal problems regarding parentage and birthright citizenship. Currently, for a child born abroad to be granted birthright citizenship in the United States, they must either be "born in wedlock" and have one parent who meets the subsequent requirements or be a child born "out of wedlock" and have a biological father that meets the statute requirements. The State Department, following the policies laid out in its internal Foreign Affairs Manual, has determined that a child born through Assisted Reproductive Technology to a same-sex couple qualifies as a child born "out of wedlock" because the child is not biologically related to both parents in the marriage. This Note argues that this policy raises grave constitutional concerns because it violates the rights of same-sex couples and their families under the Fifth Amendment. Thus, federal courts should apply the canon of constitutional avoidance, finding that the statute does not require a biological relationship, in order to avoid constitutional infirmity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses why the United Nations Human Rights Committee erred in its 2002 ruling in the case Juliet Joslin, et al. v. New Zealand, stating that State parties are not covered by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to allow same-sex couples to marry. It claims that the committee failed to consider ICCPR's provision on the right to equal protection and freedom from discrimination in its decision. Also noted is the need by states to allow same-sex marriage.

The article examines how the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit advanced the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ+) people in the case Fulton v. City of Philadelphia. In the case, the Catholic Social Services (CSS) sued the city for suspending their contract due to CSS' discrimination against same-sex couples as foster parents. Also cited are the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act (RFPA).

By now, most financial planners are aware that same-sex couples require special attention because they are not entitled to the legal and financial benefits of marriage. The disadvantages of not being married are grouped into five areas: legal, insurance, taxation, retirement planning, and estate planning. Clarifying examples of each disadvantage are offered as well as suggested remedies, if available. While the discussion primarily addresses same-sex couples, it also pertains to heterosexual couples who choose not to marry. Gaining a deeper understanding of the disadvantages same-sex couples face should help financial planners who deal with this segment of our society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various family law issues in America in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the Obergefell v. Hodges case which mandates equal legal marriage rights for same-sex couples in the country, and it mentions constitutional law protections for LBGQT families. Parenting rights and Assisted Reproductive Technology laws are examined, along with Idaho's adoptions laws, the legal aspects of unmarried families, and Idaho's Artificial Insemination statute.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court ruling held in the case Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission wherein a baker refused to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. Topics discussed include the baker's free exercise rights, the antidiscrimination law in the U.S., and the right of same-sex couples to marriage.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission wherein the defendant ruled that the plaintiff violated the anti-discrimination law for refusing to make a wedding cake for a gay couple due to religious beliefs. Topics discussed include the plaintiff's rights to free exercise, the defendant's lack of religious neutrality, and the decision held in the case State of Washington v. Arlene's Flowers Inc.

In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that states could not, consistent with the Due Process Clause, deny same-sex couples the right to marry. To allow otherwise, said the Court, would "harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples." Thus, it was hoped that marriage equality would provide greater security for the children of same-sex couples. And the need for such protections are increasingly important given that, with advances in assisted-reproduction techniques, it is easier than ever for same-sex couples to become parents. Indeed, when it comes to procreation, same-sex marriages and opposite- sex marriages are becoming much more alike. But there remains an obvious difference between the two. Namely, same-sex couples are unable to procreate without the assistance of a third-party, meaning that although both parents in a same-sex marriage may qualify as legal parents, only one (at most) will qualify as a biological parent. But from a constitutional perspective, should that distinction matter? The Supreme Court, in both Obergefell and its recent decision in Pavan v. Smith has indicated that when it comes to the governmental benefits associated with marriage, the answer is "no." Nonetheless, within the realm of immigration law, the State Department uses the absence of biological ties against the children of same-sex marriage and, on that basis, denies them United States citizenship. Although nothing in the Immigration and Naturalization Act requires that citizens, in order to transmit citizenship, possess a biological relationship with their children born abroad, the State Department has begun denying citizenship petitions on behalf of children from same-sex couples simply because the citizen parent, despite being the child's legal parent, is not the biological parent. This Article argues that the State Department's approach is not only unreasonable and, thus, not entitled to Chevron deference, but more importantly, is an unconstitutional infringement of both the right to marry and the right to parent, as those rights have developed by the Supreme Court. In sum, the State Department's practice provides a poignant example of both the ongoing discrimination and the challenging questions that remain, post- Obergefell, in the quest for true marriage equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two key components of end-of-life planning are (1) informal discussions about future care and other end-of-life preferences and (2) formal planning via living wills and other legal documents. We leverage previous work on the institutional aspects of marriage and on sexual-minority discrimination to theorize why and how heterosexual, gay, and lesbian married couples engage in informal and formal end-of-life planning. We analyze qualitative dyadic in-depth interviews with 45 midlife gay, lesbian, and heterosexual married couples ( N = 90 spouses). Findings suggest that same-sex spouses devote considerable attention to informal planning conversations and formal end-of-life plans, while heterosexual spouses report minimal formal or informal planning. The primary reasons same-sex spouses give for making end-of-life preparations are related to the absence of legal protections and concerns about discrimination from families. These findings raise questions about future end-of-life planning for same- and different-sex couples given a rapidly shifting legal and social landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article explores striking parallels between the current battle to secure equality for transgender people and the prior battle to win marriage equality for same-sex couples. In both instances, the success of the marriage and transgender equality movements came only after years of judicial losses and depended heavily on two profound changes: increasing judicial and legislative acceptance of gender equality; as well as increasing social acceptance of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and, more recently, transgender people. As a result of those changes, defenders of state marriage bans were unable to rely on gender stereotypes or arguments about the pathology or immorality of gay people, since those arguments lacked credibility in most courts. Instead, they turned to biology, seeking to justify the restriction of marriage to different-sex couples as merely a neutral, nondiscriminatory reflection of the biological differences involved in procreation. While those arguments enjoyed some initial success, most courts-including the U.S. Supreme Court-ultimately rejected them as circular, concluding that the marriage bans were discriminatory and not simply the reflection of "natural" facts. Today, opponents of transgender equality are reviving that failed strategy. Rather than seeking to justify differential treatment of transgender people, they are once again invoking biology to argue that laws excluding transgender persons from shared restrooms merely reflect neutral biological differences between men and women, not a deliberate intention to discriminate. This Article predicts that just as biology-based arguments failed to shield marriage bans from meaningful judicial review in the past, the courts will again recognize that these renewed appeals to biology are circular and do not supply a principled basis for excluding transgender persons from full and equal participation in the public sphere-including access to the same restrooms used by others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the impact of state imposed, marriage equality laws on interstate migration prior to the 26 June 2015 U.S. Supreme Court ruling to legalize same-sex marriage in all states. Results of the estimation of a series of probit models suggest that all head of households are more likely to leave states without marriage equality. This estimated impact is significantly larger for household heads in same-sex relationships. When examining the migration choices separately by both sex and relationship type, this result remains significant for female heads of households in different-sex relationships and male heads of households in same-sex relationships. Simulations, using the results of the probit estimations, the analysis of regional trends, and recent rebellions against the Supreme Court ruling indicate that state level, marriage equality laws may be aggravating the imbalanced distribution of same- and different-sex couple households across the country. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses various aspects of the dissenting opinions that were issued by several U.S. Supreme Court Justices in the 2015 same-sex marriage case Obergefell v. Hodges, and it mentions the author's claim that the dissenting judges tried to rewrite America's legal, social, and constitutional history in connection with an effort to deny civil rights to same-sex couples. The statutory history of marriage in America and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are examined.

In the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges, courts and legislatures claim in principle to have repudiated the privileging of different-sex over same-sex couples and men over women in the legal regulation of the family. But as struggles over assisted reproductive technologies (ART) demonstrate, in the law of parental recognition such privileging remains. Those who break from traditional norms of gender and sexuality--women who separate motherhood from biological ties (for instance, through surrogacy), and women and men who form families with a same-sex partner--often find their parent-child relationships discounted. This Article explores what it means to fully vindicate gender and sexual-orientation equality in the law of parental recognition. It does so by situating the treatment of families formed through ART within a longer history of parentage. Inequalities that persist in contemporary law are traceable to earlier eras. In initially defining parentage through marriage, the common law embedded parenthood within a gender-hierarchical, heterosexual order. Eventually, courts and legislatures repudiated the common-law regime and protected biological parent-child relation- ships formed outside marriage. While this effort to derive parental recognition from biological connection was animated by egalitarian impulses, it too operated within a gender-differentiated, heterosexual paradigm. Today, the law increasingly accommodates families formed through ART, and, in doing so, recognizes parents on not only biological but also social grounds. Yet, as courts and legislatures approach the parental claims of women and same-sex couples within existing frameworks organized around marital and biological relationships, they reproduce some of the very gender- and sexuality-based asymmetries embedded in those frameworks. With biological connection continuing to anchor nonmarital parenthood, unmarried gays and lesbians face barriers to parental recognition. With the gender-differentiated, heterosexual family continuing to structure marital parenthood, the law organizes the legal family around a biological mother. Against this back- drop, nonbiological mothers in different-sex couples, as well as nonbiological fathers in same-sex couples, struggle for parental recognition. To protect the parental interests of women and of gays and lesbians, this Article urges greater emphasis on parenthood's social dimensions. Of course, as our common law origins demonstrate, the law has long recognized parental relationships on social and not simply biological grounds. But today, commitments to equality require reorienting family law in ways that ground parental recognition more fully and evenhandedly in social contributions. While this Article focuses primarily on reform of family law at the state level, it also contemplates eventual constitutional oversight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an analysis of the ways in which the spatial and illocutionary requirements of English marriage law - which regulate the spaces in which marriages may be solemnized and the words the parties being married must speak - have been used to maintain distinctions between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. It shows how religious opponents of same-sex partnership recognition have relied upon historically entrenched differences between the spatial and illocutionary aspects of 'civil marriage' and 'religious marriage' to argue in favour of the enactment of law that enables organized religions to exclude same-sex couples from religious premises and ceremonies that are open to opposite-sex couples for the purpose of solemnizing marriage. It extends recent international debates about how faith-based discrimination against same-sex couples is accommodated by legislators and legitimized by law, and concludes with a consideration of how English law could be amended to end discrimination based on sexual orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many same-sex couples have been in committed relationships for years, even decades. Yet until 2004 no same-sex couples in the United States had the right to marry in any state and until the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges the right was unavailable to same-sex couples nationwide. Due to this longstanding denial of the right to marry, most same-sex relationships appear artificially short when measured solely by reference to the couple’s civil marriage date. This circumstance has important legal consequences for many same-sex couples, as a number of rights associated with marriage are tied not merely to the fact of marriage, but also to its length measured either in absolute terms or relative to a legally significant event. These rights include social security benefits, immigration rights, the marital communications privilege, and the rights to division of property and awards of alimony on divorce. Moreover, a same-sex couple whose relationship ended before the legalization of same-sex marriage may not receive any rights associated with marriage. This Article is the first to explore the phenomenon of backdating marriages as a means to ensure that same-sex couples are made whole for the harms caused by their longstanding inability to legally marry. The Article demonstrates that the Obergefell decision applies not merely prospectively but also retroactively, and that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to have their marriages backdated to the date they would have married but for the existence of a legal barrier. Because such backdating can create significant short-term administrative challenges, the Article provides alternatives to actual backdating that are somewhat easier for government agencies to administer but that still provide same-sex couples with constitutionally mandated “make whole” relief. Administrative challenges notwithstanding, the Article concludes that actual backdating—or its functional equivalent—is constitutionally necessary to remedy constitutional harms to same-sex couples imposed by the preexisting discriminatory scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the decision of Arkansas Supreme Court in the case Smith v. Pavan which ruled that temporarily allowed married same-sex couples to get the names of both spouses on their children's birth certificates without a court order. It mentions children were conceived through artificial insemination by anonymous donors and the case was controlled by res judicata. It also mentions decision of U.S. Supreme Court in the case Obergefell v. Hodges.

In recent years, a particular strain of argument has arisen in response to decisions by courts or the government to extend certain rights to others. Grounded in religious freedom, these arguments suggest that individuals have a right to operate businesses or conduct their professional roles in a manner that conforms to their religious identity. For example, as courts and legislatures have extended the right to marry to same-sex couples, court clerks have refused to issue marriage certificates to such couples, claiming that to do so would violate their religious beliefs. Similarly, corporations have refused, for reasons grounded in religious identity, to participate in health insurance plans that cover certain contraceptive devices. While not always successful, these claims have typically been recognized by courts as claims of religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause. This Article draws on past work suggesting that the law should protect the individual's right to define and pursue one's own identity within a more limited, internal sphere, but that law, and not identity, should govern relationships among individuals and groups in society. It argues that these claims might be viewed as analogous to other identity-based claims and, as a result, subjected to similar limitations. The U.S. Constitution does and should protect the individual's ability to define one's own religious identity, engage in practices that reinforce that identity, and determine how one relates to the law (which may sometimes necessitate accommodation). It should not, however, be understood to protect identity when projected outward, onto nonidentifying individuals or the government in its regulation of others. Thus, protective claims of religious identity, which aim to protect identity as a personal matter--exercised with an eye toward the individual or religious community--should fall within the ambit of the Free Exercise Clause. Projective claims of religious identity, however--those that attempt to impose one's identity on others, dictate how the law relates to non-identifying individuals, or conform the law or government practices to one's internal conception of identity--should not be cognizable as constitutional claims. The protective-projective distinction is consistent with underlying themes in the Court's free exercise jurisprudence and may help to cabin claims like those described above without minimizing the significance of religious identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a ruling by the Supreme Court of the U.S. in the case Obergefell v. Hodges which deals with the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and it mentions various American state and federal litigation matters examining the constitutionality of the state regulation of interracial marriage and cohabitation. Caselaw (judge-made law) dealing with the interstate recognition of interracial marriage is assessed, along with the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment.

When the Supreme Court held in Obergefell v. Hodges that states must provide same-sex couples with equal access to the legal institution of marriage, Chief Justice Roberts did not merely disagree with the majority’s reasoning. Instead, employing a tactic more commonly associated with the late Justice Antonin Scalia, the Chief Justice used his dissent to launch a broadside casting doubt on the decision’s legitimacy. He accused the Court of “[s]tealing” the marriage issue from the people through “an act of will, not legal judgment,” and he insisted that the majority’s approach had “no basis in principle.” In addition, Roberts raised concerns about the decision’s impact on religious liberty, warning that it “[o]minously” failed to address the First Amendment’s free exercise guarantee. The Chief Justice’s harsh condemnation of the Obergefell decision has helped inspire calls for “constitutional resistance,” and that resistance movement is now playing out simultaneously with efforts to exempt religious objectors from laws requiring equal treatment of same-sex couples. Those efforts have come to dominate the conversation about religious accommodation— a conversation that has become increasingly polarized in recent years. Against that background, this Article makes three arguments. Part I contends that the Chief Justice’s dissent in Obergefell falls far short of substantiating his claim that the ruling “has no basis in the Constitution or this Court’s precedent.” Most critically, Roberts completely fails to engage the same-sex couples’ strongest equal protection argument, which was endorsed by the Solicitor General, prevailed in several lower courts, and rested on well-established precedent. Moreover, the Chief Justice’s claim that the Court has not previously interpreted the Constitution in ways that interfere with how marriage has been traditionally “defined” founders on the very definitional sources he cites. Part II contends that the full import of the Chief Justice’s discussion of religious liberty in Obergefell has been underappreciated. By invoking the Free Exercise Clause to raise concerns about the conscience rights of those who object to same-sex marriage, Roberts implicitly calls into question the Court’s landmark decision in Employment Division v. Smith. There is some irony to the Chief Justice doing so in a case where he is criticizing the majority for ignoring precedent, and a further irony in the fact that some of the most prominent supporters of the Chief’s Obergefell opinion were once ardent defenders of Smith. But the more important point is that the longstanding effort to have the Court reconsider Smith may now have a very powerful new ally. Part III contends that the Court should reconsider Smith and restore some measure of constitutional protection against generally applicable laws that impose incidental burdens on religious practices. While powerful arguments have been made that judicially administered exemption regimes have proven unworkable and unprincipled in the past, those regimes have almost all utilized the language of strict scrutiny, and that language creates inevitable problems. Those problems need not attend a regime in which the Court applies only modestly heightened scrutiny to protect against incidental burdens on religion that the government could easily lift without compromising significant state interests. Such an approach would guarantee a meaningful constitutional floor of religious exemption rights in situations where accommodation would not substantially interfere with government operations or the rights of third parties, and championing the restoration of such a floor has the potential to bring some unity of purpose to the conversation rather than more division along ideological and political lines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A literary criticism of the book "Professing Selves: Transsexuality and Same-Sex Desire in Contemporary Iran" by Afsaneh Najmabadi is presented. It explores the international visibility of transsexuals, their legal and medical needs alongside the criminalization of same-sex sexual acts in Iran. It also examines Najmabadi's conceptualization of the self-conduct.

Scholars frequently focus on the relative merits of one regulatory regime or another, or the comparative merits of one category of treatment or another. Little attention is paid, however, to the process of transitioning from one legal category to another and the experience--socially, psychologically, and legally--of that move. This Article takes the historical occasion of the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges to consider a particularly salient example of this kind of change--what I call relational migration, the process of shifting from one relationship status to another. Since the Obergefell decision, at least 123,000 same-sex couples have married in the United States. Although it is difficult to specify with certainty, many of these couples were in longstanding relationships when they got married, often in relationships for decades before getting legally married. The process of legal status change to secure the constitutional right of marital recognition brings with it a host of legal and social considerations. It is critical to recognize and address these experiences--especially during times of legal transition--in order to foster resilience of migrating individuals and their relationships, and to safeguard valuable substantive rights more fully. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article, part of a colloquium on the Supreme Court's 2015 case Obergefell v. Hodges, which guaranteed a right of same-sex couples to marry, makes two principal contributions to our understanding of constitutional "liberty," both with significance for family law. The first contribution is analytic. This Article joins the debate among the Obergefell Justices, including the four dissenters, about whether Fourteenth Amendment liberty only protects against interference by the state or whether it can also compel affirmative support or government action. On close inspection, this debate not only obscures complexities that defy a clear-cut binary but also camouflages diverse conceptions of liberty found in the majority opinion itself. Analysis of four different readings of "liberty" in Obergefell's majority opinion reveals that marriage--the substantive issue in the case--and its distinctive features account for much of this messiness and multiplicity. This Article also makes a theoretical contribution by exploring the relationship between constitutional law and family law that the Court's liberty rulings have forged. The usual approach emphasizes the impact of constitutional doctrine on family law, specifically how the Court's liberty rulings have required substantive changes in laws governing the family. By contrast, this Article turns to the unexamined mirror image, exposing and theorizing how family law principles, assumptions, and values have infiltrated and shaped constitutional doctrine, including doctrine disputed in Obergefell. A survey of the constitutional case law limiting obligations owed by the state reveals that these precedents are "all in the family," in the sense that they all raise issues of concern to family law. These cases, along with those applying the Constitution to expand access to marriage and divorce, suggest the influence of family law's policy of identifying private sources of support for dependent members of society. Had the Obergefell majority explicitly acknowledged and embraced this family law policy in recognizing a constitutional right to marry for same-sex couples, it could have avoided some of the criticism and confusion that the opinion has sparked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article focuses on the dignity jurisprudence in the context of the fight for marriage equality with the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the cases United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges on same-sex marriages. It mentions that the dignity jurisprudence and the resulting marriage equality with the focus from procreation and heteronormative gender-roles to an expression of mutual support to accommodate same-sex couples.

El artículo discurre sobre la Sentencia C-683/15 de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia acerca de la restricción del derecho de adopción a las solas personas heterosexuales.

The State of Israel determined by legislation that matters of personal status including marriage and divorce are subject to personal law, namely religious law. Since the applicable law is personal and not territorial, it varies from person to person and is not uniform as under civil law. This simply means that Israel has no separation of religion and state in matters of divorce and marriage. Religion is the only determining factor in these matters. Thus, marriages prohibited by religious law do not take place in Israel. This is true for all four major religions in Israel: Christianity, Islam, the Druze religion, and Judaism. The discussion of same-sex couples under Israeli law should have ended here: marriage and even sexual relations between same-sex partners are prohibited by the four religions in Israel. Therefore, they have no place in a state in which religious law prevails in matters of status. However, the Israeli courts have more of a civil orientation than a religious one and look for ways to bridge the gap between religious law and reality as they understand it. In some cases, they have recognized the status of same-sex couples. The change started by providing material economic rights, such as the right to a benefit given to an employee's spouse by an employer, mutual inheritance rights, and more. The courts did not stop there but continued granting rights both on the public level and in matters of legal status. For example, same-sex couples can now be registered as a married couple in the Registry Office if they were married overseas, and they can adopt children just as heterosexual couples can. Some argue that today there is no longer any meaning to the law which states that marriage shall be determined only by the personal religious law of each individual. The decisions made in these matters are sharply disputed and reflect the constant prevailing tensions regarding Israel not only as a Jewish state but also as a democratic state. Although the Basic Laws stipulate that Israel is both, in practice these values conflict and often collide. This tension is clearly reflected in and may be analyzed through the issue of same-sex couples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges gave same-sex couples the right to marry in all fifty states, correcting the injustice that non-marital legal statuses like domestic partnerships were intended to remedy. Now that same-sex couples can marry nationwide, the federal government and states that created domestic partnerships are considering how to treat couples in those statuses--specifically, whether to treat domestic partners like spouses and whether to continue to offer non-marital legal statuses at all. Three states face a particularly thorny question post-Obergefell: what should be done with domestic partnerships made available to elderly same-sex and straight couples at a time when same-sex couples could not marry. This Article examines why California, New Jersey, and Washington opened domestic partnerships to elderly couples. Although domestic partnerships in these states primarily responded to the needs of gay couples who could not marry, legislators also saw the elderly as sympathetic: unfairly prevented from remarrying for fear of losing benefits from a previous marriage. This Article drills down on three specific obligations and benefits tied to marriage-- receipt of alimony, Social Security spousal benefits, and duties to support a partner who needs long-term care under the Medicaid program-- and shows that entering a domestic partnership rather than marrying does not benefit all elderly couples; rather, the value of avoiding marriage varies by wealth and benefit. The Article concludes that as pressure mounts to fold domestic partners into marriage after Obergefell, legislators should examine whether domestic partnerships have become a province of the wealthy, undercutting the impetus for maintaining a second, collateral status. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article traces the role of family in the politics of Asian American exclusion in the U.S. and its role in the construction of gay and lesbian Americans as sexual model minorities with reference to the US Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges on equal rights for same-sex couples.

In a momentous decision, a divided U.S. Supreme Court ruled on June 26, 2015 that same-sex couples can marry in all states and that states must recognize a same-sex marriage performed in another state. Written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court decision was the culmination of extensive public discussion about homosexuality that began in the last quarter of the 20th century, from its declassification as a mental disorder by the American Psychiatric Association in 1973 to its social acceptance as a variant form of sexuality by the end of the century. Many lesbian and gay people started to lead more open lives with their biological families and work associates, and same-sex couples became more public about the families they had established through previous heterosexual marriages or adoptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Obergefell v. Hodges related to the same-sex marriage and extends the right to marry to the same-sex couples. It mentions that the decision provides no direct legal authority to claims for protection from discrimination in employment or access to other forms of accommodation. It also mentions that decision is based on the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Although the recognition of the adoptive rights of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender) couples is a socially salient topic, cross-national variation regarding this issue has been largely underexplored in social science research. With the aid of configurational analysis, this article fills this gap and shows the conditions that explain the recognition of the adoptive rights of homosexual couples in the countries of the EU-27. It is argued that two different paths led to this outcome. All countries where adoptive rights were recognized had higher degrees of secularization and lower levels of social homophobia. In addition, in Northern European countries, the Protestant background and absence of conservative governments for a certain time period seemed to be the determinant. However, for the remaining European countries that recognized these rights, rising levels of gender equality appeared to have a more salient role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article analyzes the word "spouse" in the European Union's Family Migration Directives in detail, focusing on the treatment of married bi-national same-sex couples. Through these directives, the European Union exercises significant authority over family-based immigration and internal migration, expressly providing immigration rights to the "spouses" of E.U. citizens and legal residents. However, family law, including the familial status of "spouses" is governed by individual E.U. member states. While a growing number of member states authorize same-sex marriage, the majority still do not. The E.U., therefore, must determine how to treat migrating couples who are legal spouses in one member state, but not in another. This issue echoes the choice the U.S. faced in 1996 and again in 2013: should federal law determine spousal status based on the law of the jurisdiction where a marriage was celebrated or where the couple resides, or should it create its own independent federal definition? The two U.S. approaches, a federal definition and a place-of-celebration choice-oflaw rule, may help Europeans as they develop their own answer. This Article describes and rigorously applies the European Court of Justice's five methods of directive interpretation (textual, systematic, historical, teleological, and comparative analyses) to the directives, concluding that the best interpretations of the directives result in an autonomous definition of "spouse" that includes same-sex spouses or in a member-state-of-celebration choice-of-law rule. This exercise provides some insight for European courts and scholars about the various paths the European Court of Justice may take to interpret the word "spouse" in the Family Migration Directives. It also provides an introduction to European family-based immigration and an example of the interpretation of directives generally, for judges, attorneys, scholars, and students from outside of the E.U. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the legal uncertainty lurking in various areas of state regulation concerning Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) with insurance implications for the procedures and discusses the specific challenges same-sex couples face regarding utilization of ARTs.

In United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act definition of marriage as "between one man and one woman," heralding its subsequent recognition, in Obergefell v. Hodges, of a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Windsor cleared the way for same-sex couples to be treated as married under federal tax laws, and the Obama administration promptly announced that it would recognize same-sex marriages for tax purposes. Academics, policymakers, and activists lauded these developments as finally achieving tax equality between same- and different-sex married couples. This Article argues that the claimed tax equality of Windsor is illusory and that the only way to achieve actual equality is to eliminate taxation on the basis of marital status. Focusing on the taxation of women in same-sex marriages, the Article explores what lies beneath the putative equality gains that result from according same-sex married couples the same status as different-sex married couples. The Article predicts, based on demographic statistics and other sociological and economic research relating to income levels, wealth holdings, child rearing, and employment patterns, that women in same-sex marriages will be less likely than other married people to reap the benefits, and more likely to suffer the detriments, of marriage taxation. In analyzing why women in same-sex marriages are likely to suffer adverse consequences from their new tax status as married, the Article builds on prior critical and feminist tax literature showing how the tax law--though purportedly neutral in its treatment of married couples--privileges traditional marriages in which men are the primary income earners and wealth holders, and adversely affects married women's incentives and abilities to be workers, income producers, and wealth holders. The Article argues that the tax law, through the fictitious construction of the married couple as an irreducible economic unit, continues to reward this anachronistic model of marriage and to penalize other, more egalitarian models of marriage. The Article proposes that taxation on the basis of marital status be curtailed through the abolition of the joint return and through other reforms. More broadly, the Article demonstrates how taxation is a powerful tool by which the state regulates intimate relationships, and it highlights the need for a careful and critical evaluation of other marriage laws as they extend their reach to same-sex relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]