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Several authors assume that evaluative conditioning (EC) relies on high-level propositional thinking. In contrast, the dual-process perspective proposes two processing pathways, one associative and the other propositional, contributing to EC. Dual-process theorists argue that attitudinal ambiguity resulting from these two pathways' conflicting evaluations demonstrate the involvement of both automatic and controlled processes in EC. Previously, we suggested that amplitude variations of error-related negativity and error-positivity, two well-researched event-related potentials of performance monitoring, allow for the detection of attitudinal ambiguity at the neural level. The present study utilises self-reported evaluation, categorisation performance, and neural correlates of performance monitoring to explore associative-propositional ambiguity during social attitude formation. Our results show that compared to associative-propositional harmony, attitudinal ambiguity correlates with more neutral subjective evaluations, longer response times, increased error commission, and diminished error-related negativity amplitudes. While our findings align with dual-process models, we aim to offer a propositional interpretation. We discuss dual-process theories in the context of evolutionary psychology, suggesting that associative processes may only represent a small piece of the EC puzzle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patients with anorexia nervosa frequently believe they are larger than they really are. The precise nature of this bias is not known: is it a false belief related to the patient's aesthetic and emotional attitudes towards her body? Or could it also reflect abnormal processing of the representation of the body in action? We tested this latter hypothesis by using a body-scaled action-anticipation task in which 25 anorexics and 25 control participants had to judge whether or not an aperture was wide enough for them to pass through. The anticipation of body-scaled action was severely disturbed in anorexic patients; they judged that they could not pass through an aperture, even when it was wide enough (i.e. they behave as if their body was larger than in reality). The abnormally high "passability ratio" (the critical aperture size to shoulder width ratio) was also correlated with the duration of illness and the degree of body concern/dissatisfaction. Our results suggest that body size overestimation in anorexia nervosa is not solely due to psycho-affective factors but rather suggest impaired neural processing of body dimensions that might take its source in parietal networks. (Contains 1 figure and 2 tables.)

A main focus in economics is on binary choice situations, in which human agents have to choose between two alternative options. The classical view is that decision making consists of valuating each option, comparing the two expected values, and selecting the higher one. Some neural correlates of option values have been described in animals, but little is known about how they are represented in the human brain: are they integrated into a single center or distributed over different areas? To address this issue, we examined whether the expected values of two options, which were cued by visual symbols and chosen with either the left or right hand, could be distinguished using functional magnetic resonance imaging. The two options were linked to monetary rewards through probabilistic contingencies that subjects had to learn so as to maximize payoff. Learning curves were fitted with a standard computational model that updates, on a trial-by-trial basis, the value of the chosen option in proportion to a reward prediction error. Results show that during learning, left and right option values were specifically expressed in the contralateral ventral prefrontal cortex, regardless of the upcoming choice. We therefore suggest that expected values are represented in a distributed manner that respects the topography of the brain systems elicited by the available options. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]