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This monograph examines Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), the U.S. Marine Corps' latest warfighting concept. The evolutionary outgrowth of the sea services' most current white papers, OMFTS focuses on the littorals. The paper initially examines the definition of the operational level of war, and traces the history of operational art. From the Napoleonic Wars through the Russian Civil War, the tactical and strategic levels separated. The Russian military recognized the gulf between the two levels, but the American military did not grasp the importance of the operational level until after its failures in Korea and Vietnam. OMFTS weds the current Marine Corps' philosophy of maneuver warfare with the operational level. By focusing on operational objectives, the Corps will increase its tempo while it eschews the traditional build-up phase of an amphibious assault. OMFTS promises decisive results by focusing on an enemy critical vulnerability. This monograph concludes with the decision that we can support OMFTS with fires. The arsenal ships will reduce the naval surface fire support shortfall. The upgrades planned for the surface fleets' existing 5-inch guns may also have a great effect. Improvements to precision guided munitions and standoff weapons will also add to the viability of OMFTS.

This monograph examines the U.S. Navy's proposed arsenal ship and its potential for support to land forces operating in littoral regions. The undisputed platform of choice for naval surface fire support was the now deactivated Iowa class battleships. The arsenal ship will attempt to replace the battleships, while adding a new deep strike capability. The paper addresses the genesis of the arsenal ship program by tracing the history of its predecessors. From the 'long ship' of the Phoenicians, through the various ships-of-the-line, and finally to the Iowas. It examines the improvements in armor and armament along the way, and it culminates with the operational history of the Iowas. The monograph then introduces the arsenal ship program as the logical descendant of the battleship. It highlights the arsenal ship's required capabilities and concept of operations, and it attempts to compare battleship and arsenal ship capabilities. This monograph concludes with the decision that comparing the battleship and the arsenal ship is difficult at best. Their purposes are too different, and the intervening sixty years make objective assessments questionable. The arsenal ship is clearly the future of naval surface fire support, just as the battleship is clearly the past.

This study is a historical analysis of Major General Patrick R. Cleburne's Division during the Battle of Chickamauga. Cleburne's Division earned a reputation as one of the best divisions in either army. This reputation also carried with it lofty expectations. This study analyzes how Cleburne's Division performed at Chickamauga and what the effects of its actions were on the overall outcome of the battle. The Battle of Chickamauga has suffered its share of historical neglect. Fought in the forests and mountains of northern Georgia and southeastern Tennessee, the battle has not been immortalized by any stirring fictional works, nor has it inspired any feature films, but the story of the men who fought there is worth studying. Cleburne's Division did not distinguish itself at Chickamauga. It launched a confused, disjointed night attack to close out the first day of the battle, but determined leaders succeed in capturing their objectives. Day two of the battle saw Cleburne's Division attack four hours late. It was quickly repulsed while suffering horrific casualties. While the Confederate left wing routed the Union Army, Cleburne's Division nursed their wounds before finally advancing at sunset, as the Union withdrew from the battlefield.

This study is a historical analysis of Major General Patrick R. Cleburne's Division during the Battle of Chickamauga. Cleburne's Division earned a reputation as one of the best divisions in either army. This reputation also carried with it lofty expectations. This study analyzes how Cleburne's Division performed at Chickamauga and what the effects of its actions were on the overall outcome of the battle. The Battle of Chickamauga has suffered its share of historical neglect. Fought in the forests and mountains of northern Georgia and southeastern Tennessee, the battle has not been immortalized by any stirring fictional works, nor has it inspired any feature films, but the story of the men who fought there is worth studying. Cleburne's Division did not distinguish itself at Chickamauga. It launched a confused, disjointed night attack to close out the first day of the battle, but determined leaders succeed in capturing their objectives. Day two of the battle saw Cleburne's Division attack four hours late. It was quickly repulsed while suffering horrific casualties. While the Confederate left wing routed the Union Army, Cleburne's Division nursed their wounds before finally advancing at sunset, as the Union withdrew from the battlefield.

This monograph examines Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), the U.S. Marine Corps' latest warfighting concept. The evolutionary outgrowth of the sea services' most current white papers, OMFTS focuses on the littorals. The paper initially examines the definition of the operational level of war, and traces the history of operational art. From the Napoleonic Wars through the Russian Civil War, the tactical and strategic levels separated. The Russian military recognized the gulf between the two levels, but the American military did not grasp the importance of the operational level until after its failures in Korea and Vietnam. OMFTS weds the current Marine Corps' philosophy of maneuver warfare with the operational level. By focusing on operational objectives, the Corps will increase its tempo while it eschews the traditional build-up phase of an amphibious assault. OMFTS promises decisive results by focusing on an enemy critical vulnerability. This monograph concludes with the decision that we can support OMFTS with fires. The arsenal ships will reduce the naval surface fire support shortfall. The upgrades planned for the surface fleets' existing 5-inch guns may also have a great effect. Improvements to precision guided munitions and standoff weapons will also add to the viability of OMFTS.

This monograph examines the U.S. Navy's proposed arsenal ship and its potential for support to land forces operating in littoral regions. The undisputed platform of choice for naval surface fire support was the now deactivated Iowa class battleships. The arsenal ship will attempt to replace the battleships, while adding a new deep strike capability. The paper addresses the genesis of the arsenal ship program by tracing the history of its predecessors. From the 'long ship' of the Phoenicians, through the various ships-of-the-line, and finally to the Iowas. It examines the improvements in armor and armament along the way, and it culminates with the operational history of the Iowas. The monograph then introduces the arsenal ship program as the logical descendant of the battleship. It highlights the arsenal ship's required capabilities and concept of operations, and it attempts to compare battleship and arsenal ship capabilities. This monograph concludes with the decision that comparing the battleship and the arsenal ship is difficult at best. Their purposes are too different, and the intervening sixty years make objective assessments questionable. The arsenal ship is clearly the future of naval surface fire support, just as the battleship is clearly the past.