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This study examined fame-seeking mass shooters worldwide who attacked from 1999 to 2022 to identify their profiles, behaviours, influences, and trends. Quantitative analyses revealed many similarities between fame-seeking shooters in the United States and in other countries: compared to other mass shooters, they were more frequently young and more likely to target schools, commit suicide, and kill and injure many victims. Fame-seeking mass shooters who attacked outside the United States appeared more likely to have been influenced by American mass shooters than by perpetrators from all other countries, combined. Findings also showed a substantial rise in the number of fame-seeking shooters over time, along with increases in the proportion of mass shooters who sought fame and the average number of victims they killed. We discuss the implications of these disturbing trends and offer an assessment for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although several mass killings by incels have received much attention, the overall phenomenon of sexually frustrated offenders seems even larger. This study drew from a recently developed sexual frustration theory to closely examine public mass shooters in the United States from 1966 to 2021 (n = 178). Results showed that some sexually frustrated perpetrators just wanted sex, while others lusted after unavailable partners or had illegal urges that were difficult to satisfy. Quantitative analyses indicated that compared to other mass shooters, sexually frustrated perpetrators were more frequently young, male, unmarried, childless, and unemployed. They were also more likely to be misogynistic, sex offenders, and fame-seekers, and their attacks killed significantly more female victims. Concerted efforts to reduce toxic masculinity and provide better guidance to young men could help reduce this threat. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two of the worst targeted attacks on American police officers in recent history occurred within eleven days of each other. Although it seems clear their proximity was not merely attributable to chance, the connection between these incidents, and the implications for understanding copycat violence, have never been fully explored. This study analyzes the perpetrators of these attacks from a "thresholds of violence" perspective, which suggests the first actor in a sequence is more likely to be disturbed and violence prone, while subsequent actors are typically less disturbed but more socially influenced. Results suggest the thresholds model has both merits and limits. The first attacker did have more psychological problems and violence in his past, and the second did seem more influenced by violent role models. However, there were also many similarities between them, and both attacked due to a combination of internal and external factors. If this study's findings are generalizable, higher risks of becoming a copycat offender may exist for individuals who have (1) personal similarities with previous attackers, (2) a history of psychological problems, (3) a history of interest in violent actors, and (4) recent escalation in their online behavior. Recommendations are offered for future research, offender profiling, and violence prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research Summary: Public mass shootings in the United States have become substantially more deadly over time. We document this increase, offer a model to explain it, review supporting evidence for the model, and present new findings on offenders from 1966 to 2019. It appears that societal changes have led to more public mass shooters who are motivated to kill large numbers of victims for fame or attention, as well as to more shooters who have been directly influenced by previous attackers. They often spend extended time planning their attacks and are increasingly likely to acquire powerful weapons and develop specific strategies to enhance their lethality. Policy Implications: New policies should be aimed at addressing the aforementioned factors. For instance, the deadliest public mass shooters' desires for fame and attention might be countered by a change in media coverage policies. Additionally, the deadliest perpetrators' lengthy planning periods have been associated with more warning signs being reported to police, so that type of information could justify denying many potential attackers access to firearms through extreme risk protection orders and red flag laws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some psychologists consider attention seeking to be one of the most common goals of misbehavior by young people, and it can have many unhealthy consequences. Currently, however, so many Americans use the internet and social media to seek fame or attention that it may be difficult to know when intervention is necessary. This study examines the pre-attack statements and behaviors of 11 fame-seeking mass shooters and active shooters in the United States. The findings clarify which personal struggles and sources of pain these individuals commonly referenced, along with their frequency of making concerning internet/social media posts and having criminal records or histories of legal problems. Our results may guide Behavioral Intervention Teams and other concerned parties' assessments of when someone poses a serious threat. We also provide specific recommendations for how to steer fame- and attention-seeking individuals in healthier directions, particularly in the early stages of intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

More than 15 years have passed since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and a comprehensive re-examination of the 9/11 attackers is now warranted. Research on the psychology of terrorists has evolved dramatically, and there is also new information on some offenders. The present study provides the available psychological and psychiatric evidence on each of the 9/11 pilots, muscle hijackers, and thwarted hijackers who intended to participate in the "planes operation." Overall, findings suggest that the 9/11 terrorists may have had significantly more mental health problems than previously assumed, and the leaders who planned 9/11 personally approved suicide attackers with prior histories of mental illness. By widely publicizing this information, security officials may be able to more effectively delegitimize suicide terrorism and reduce the number of individuals who would consider funding, supporting, or committing these deadly attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In line with previous research on suicide and social contagion, there has been widespread speculation that mass killings-which often involve suicidal offenders-are socially contagious for up to 14 days. This study tested these claims by making comparisons (i) between observed chronological clusters of mass killings in the United States from 2006 to 2013 and clusters in 500 simulations containing 116,000 randomly generated dates, and then (ii) between observed mass killings receiving varying levels of public attention. No evidence of short-term contagion was found, although longer term copycat effects may exist. Further scholarly and policy implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research has shown that many mass shooters have explicitly admitted they want fame and have directly reached out to media organizations to get it. These fame-seeking offenders are particularly dangerous because they kill and wound significantly more victims than other active shooters, they often compete for attention by attempting to maximize victim fatalities, and they can inspire contagion and copycat effects. However, if the media changes how they cover mass shooters, they may be able to deny many offenders the attention they seek and deter some future perpetrators from attacking. We propose that media organizations should no longer publish the names or photos of mass shooters (except during ongoing searches for escaped suspects), but report everything else about these crimes in as much detail as desired. In this article, we (1) review the consequences of media coverage of mass shooters, (2) outline our proposal, (3) show that its implementation is realistic and has precedent, (4) discuss anticipated challenges, and (5) recommend future steps for consensus building and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]