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Prior to the 2011 political unrest in the Middle East, Al-Qaeda had been the hegemon in the global jihadism until its offspring the Islamic State in Iraq shot into fame through their spectacular military successes in Iraq and Syria, throwing a challenge to Al-Qaeda. The feat of the Islamic State attracted a lot of foreign fighters to join them. The relationship between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State became more acrimonious when the Islamic State rebranded and called itself the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As was expected, these developments caused concerns among leaders of Al-Qaeda who felt their monopoly over global jihad was slipping out of their hands. Though the affiliates of these two groups fought each other in every theater they met, their Sahel affiliates, Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) in Northwest Africa had a cooperative relationship until 2019. While Al-Qaeda embarks on preaching Islam to the people in its areas of jurisdiction, ISIS focuses on seizing territories. This series of events has created problems between the two prominent terrorist groups of which none is ready to accept the other's supremacy., Brigadier General, Ghana Army, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

The oil-producing Niger Delta has been wrought with conflict for generations, resulting in the deaths of thousands and the decrease in oil production for Nigeria. In 2009, President Yar’Adua introduced the Presidential Amnesty Program (PAP) in hopes of bringing enduring peace to the region. The PAP provided stipend payments, professional training, and the promise of job placements for militants. In the first five years of the program, violent deaths in the Niger Delta dropped by 75% and oil production levels were restored. However, in the subsequent years, violent deaths have risen, and oil production has fallen well below pre-amnesty levels. This research evaluates the successes and failures of Nigeria’s PAP to determine why the program was initially successful but has become increasingly ineffective with the passage of time. The research finds that the PAP initially succeeded in pacifying militants by providing financial incentives and bringing them into the newly created PAP network. However, the PAP failed to build enduring peace because it neglected large swaths of the population, and with the passage of time, the economic incentives for former militants dwindled due to the effect of inflation on militant’s stipends. As a result, both the wider population and former militants have turned to widespread oil theft as a means to compensate for their economic plight., Major, United States Marine Corps, Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

Nigeria and Angola demonstrate a similar set of motive and permissive conditions for piracy based on the variables identified in the existing literature, yet the two countries have experienced very different levels of piracy. This thesis borrows from recent patrimonialism research that identifies the effect of rent management practices on developmental outcomes. In a similar fashion, this thesis engages in a qualitative, most-similar-systems comparative case study of Nigeria and Angola to investigate the role of a previously unexamined variable: the degree to which elite rent management strategies and patronage structures foster or inhibit a permissive environment in which piracy can flourish. Specifically, this thesis argues that decentralized rent management practices heighten the incentives for piracy in Nigeria, while highly centralized rent management discourages piracy in Angola. These results suggest that levels of piracy will remain high in Nigeria and low in Angola., Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy, Approved for public release. distribution is unlimited

Nigeria and Angola demonstrate a similar set of motive and permissive conditions for piracy based on the variables identified in the existing literature, yet the two countries have experienced very different levels of piracy. This thesis borrows from recent patrimonialism research that identifies the effect of rent management practices on developmental outcomes. In a similar fashion, this thesis engages in a qualitative, most-similar-systems comparative case study of Nigeria and Angola to investigate the role of a previously unexamined variable: the degree to which elite rent management strategies and patronage structures foster or inhibit a permissive environment in which piracy can flourish. Specifically, this thesis argues that decentralized rent management practices heighten the incentives for piracy in Nigeria, while highly centralized rent management discourages piracy in Angola. These results suggest that levels of piracy will remain high in Nigeria and low in Angola.

This thesis analyzes Libya's historic 2003 decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and normalize relations with the West. Despite the political and scholarly claims at the time, this thesis shows that the effectiveness of any specific policy instrument is best evaluated in the dynamic domestic and global geopolitical and economic contexts within which they are exercised. A within case comparison of the 2003 reversal and two other Libyan policy reversals allows us to hold a number of key variables constant, while allowing U.S. coercive instruments to vary. This thesis generally finds that U.S. policy instruments were most effective when they worked to magnify or exacerbate an antecedent condition. Specific lessons learned from the Libyan case could apply to counter proliferation efforts vs. Iran as well as future U.S. policy in Africa., http://archive.org/details/thelibyconversio109455379, US Marine Corps (USMC) author, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

In order to understand variation in post-transition levels of democracy, this thesis undertakes a comparative case study of Mali and Niger. Despite similarities, Mali had substantially more success with democratization than Niger. This thesis employs a detailed process tracing of the decisions of political and civil society leaders in Mali and Niger at critical junctures when democratic institutions were put to the test to evaluate the empirical validity of existing explanations. It seeks to validate (or invalidate) the causal mechanisms linking political culture and democratic success. The evidence however, suggests something different. There is a remarkable parallel in the behavior of political and civil actors in the two countries, which invalidates the hypotheses. The most likely alternative explanation is the role of key individuals. The analysis indicates that "good guys" in Mali may have had a part in encouraging the forthright application of the rule of law, as they accepted rulings that ran counter to their agendas, whereas "bad guys" in Niger who, to varying degrees, engaged in actions that were arguably illegal,l as they ran counter to the respective Niger constitutions, may have had a part in encouraging the abandonment of the rule of law., http://archive.org/details/disparityindemoc109455021, US Marine Corps (USMC) author, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The debate about whether sub-state actors have an interest in conducting a WMD attack using chemical or biological weapons is embedded within escalation theory, which holds that in order to maintain credibility terrorist groups must demonstrate a continued ability to conduct operations and inflict significant numbers of casualties on their enemy, maintaining a consistent, if not escalating, level of violence. This thesis uses E. coli in produce and foot and mouth disease in livestock case studies to evaluate U.S. Systems' ability to contain such an agroterror attack and to estimate likely results of such attacks. The analysis shows that neither a FMD attack on livestock nor an E. coli attack on produce is likely to cause sufficient casualties, economic disruption, and/or fear and panic to constitute escalation from recent conventional attacks for an established international terrorist organization, and therefore agroterror attacks are not likely to be particularly attractive for such organizations., http://archive.org/details/agriculturalterr109453171, US Air Force (USAF) author., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Since the nineteen-eighties, HIV prevention programs around the world have continuously expanded in attempts to meet challenges in the fight against HIV/AIDS. These programs are generally based on primary prevention, which uses Information Education and Communication (IEC) to modify individual behavior. In Africa, as in many underdeveloped countries, various country-specific studies report that a majority of the population is knowledgeable about HIV/AIDS, and how to prevent transmission. Yet while studies show a relatively strong link between education and behavior modification in developed countries, that link appears to be much weaker in less developed regions, including Africa. The literature identifies social and economic factors, especially gender inequalities and poverty, as significant obstacles to behavior change. This thesis assesses the impact of these factors in the Copperbelt region in Zambia, finding significant evidence that both social and economic factors operate as fundamental obstacles to behavior change. These findings suggest that HIV interventions need to go beyond IEC to deal with broader community development challenges. Gender imbalances play a particularly large role, and the findings suggest a desperate need for gender specific interventions targeting men., http://archive.org/details/hivaidspreventio109452810, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

In July 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) began operations as the primary international institution for the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide or international crimes. During the 1990s, the United Nations Security Council authorized international war crimes tribunals for conflicts in the Balkans and in Rwanda. Despite the important developments that these institutions made in international criminal law, these courts have not contributed to the longterm capacity of post-conflict states to operate under the rule of law. In the late 1990s the United Nations started to use new types of hybrid tribunals designed to prosecute international crimes in post-conflict states that combined the power and expertise of the international community with the indigenous law and legal community. This thesis will use case studies to make a detailed evaluation of the institutions and the options facing the individual states and the international community when designing policies or authorizing a tribunal to try international crimes in a post-conflict environment., http://archive.org/details/postconflictjust10945922, Major, United States Marine Corps, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This thesis undertakes a comparative study of Mali and Niger to determine possible differences that may have influenced the path of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion. Specifically, it seeks to determine if (1) the degree of governmental decentralization achieved after multiple peace agreements led to less government control in one country over the other, and (2) the counterinsurgency strategies applied by each country during previous rebellions could have led the rebels to believe Mali would be a softer target to attack than Niger. The evidence indicates that despite an earlier start and an intense public relations campaign, Mali did not achieve a significantly different level of decentralization than Niger by 2011, removing it as a possible influence on the 2012 rebellion. Both countries created new community level governments charged with administering all aspects of civil services but lacked the revenue to operate without international assistance. The difference in counterinsurgency strategies between the two countries, however, is stark. Malis habitual willingness to compromise with past rebel groups contrasts greatly with Nigers insistence on seeking a military solution to conflicts, giving the 2012 rebels a logical indication of where success would be more likely.

The universal theory of state formation, as discussed by Weber, Tilly and others, is relevant and appropriate to Africa when properly applied. Africa has her own unique history and the variables affecting state development, such as land tenure, remain the same. The value of these variables is what differs from the European experience. As such, state development in Africa remains strikingly similar throughout its history. It is a struggle between the center and the periphery in which the center is hindered by three commonalities: lack of centralization, communal land ownership and patron-client systems. These commonalities worked against centralization, each building on the other and helping the periphery maintain a degree of independence rarely seen in other regions of the world. To understand modern Africa is to look at her past and see how remarkably constant her society has been. After reviewing the available literature, this thesis delves into Africaαs past and shows how important it is to the understanding of her present condition. In the end, it will draw out both domestic and international policy implications for sub-Saharan Africa., http://archive.org/details/statedevelopment109455836

Terrorist havens are an imortant policy problem today. The policy and academic literature has generally concluded that failed states are more likely to be terrorist havens, but some have begun to question this conventional wisdom. While the link between state failure and terrorist havens is fairly clear, it does not tell the entire story. This thesis borrows from an aspect of social mobilization theory to try to explain why some havens are more resilient to outside pressure than others. It argues that a shared collective identity between the group providing haven and the havened terrorist group makes the havening group less likely to buckle under outside pressure. To test this theory, the thesis compares the frames that define al Qaeda's collective identity with those of the Sudanese National Islamic Front and the Afghan Taliban to see if observed variation in haven resiliency can be explained by the levels of shared collective identities in each case. The findings suggest that the theory can account for the variation in resiliency, while raising new questions for future research., http://archive.org/details/theresiliencyoft109452448, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

In order to understand variation in post-transition levels of democracy, this thesis undertakes a comparative case study of Mali and Niger. Despite similarities, Mali had substantially more success with democratization than Niger. This thesis employs a detailed process tracing of the decisions of political and civil society leaders in Mali and Niger at critical junctures when democratic institutions were put to the test to evaluate the empirical validity of existing explanations. It seeks to validate (or invalidate) the causal mechanisms linking political culture and democratic success. The evidence however, suggests something different. There is a remarkable parallel in the behavior of political and civil actors in the two countries, which invalidates the hypotheses. The most likely alternative explanation is the role of key individuals. The analysis indicates that "good guys" in Mali may have had a part in encouraging the forthright application of the rule of law, as they accepted rulings that ran counter to their agendas, whereas "bad guys" in Niger who, to varying degrees, engaged in actions that were arguably illegal,l as they ran counter to the respective Niger constitutions, may have had a part in encouraging the abandonment of the rule of law.

This thesis analyzes Libya's historic 2003 decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and normalize relations with the West. Despite the political and scholarly claims at the time, this thesis shows that the effectiveness of any specific policy instrument is best evaluated in the dynamic domestic and global geopolitical and economic contexts within which they are exercised. A within case comparison of the 2003 reversal and two other Libyan policy reversals allows us to hold a number of key variables constant, while allowing U.S. coercive instruments to vary. This thesis generally finds that U.S. policy instruments were most effective when they worked to magnify or exacerbate an antecedent condition. Specific lessons learned from the Libyan case could apply to counter proliferation efforts vs. Iran as well as future U.S. policy in Africa.

The debate about whether sub-state actors have an interest in conducting a WMD attack using chemical or biological weapons is embedded within escalation theory, which holds that in order to maintain credibility terrorist groups must demonstrate a continued ability to conduct operations and inflict significant numbers of casualties on their enemy, maintaining a consistent, if not escalating, level of violence. This thesis uses E. coli in produce and foot and mouth disease in livestock case studies to evaluate U.S. Systems' ability to contain such an agroterror attack and to estimate likely results of such attacks. The analysis shows that neither a FMD attack on livestock nor an E. coli attack on produce is likely to cause sufficient casualties, economic disruption, and/or fear and panic to constitute escalation from recent conventional attacks for an established international terrorist organization, and therefore agroterror attacks are not likely to be particularly attractive for such organizations.

Since the nineteen-eighties, HIV prevention programs around the world have continuously expanded in attempts to meet challenges in the fight against HIV/AIDS. These programs are generally based on primary prevention, which uses Information Education and Communication (IEC) to modify individual behavior. In Africa, as in many underdeveloped countries, various country-specific studies report that a majority of the population is knowledgeable about HIV/AIDS, and how to prevent transmission. Yet while studies show a relatively strong link between education and behavior modification in developed countries, that link appears to be much weaker in less developed regions, including Africa. The literature identifies social and economic factors, especially gender inequalities and poverty, as significant obstacles to behavior change. This thesis assesses the impact of these factors in the Copperbelt region in Zambia, finding significant evidence that both social and economic factors operate as fundamental obstacles to behavior change. These findings suggest that HIV interventions need to go beyond IEC to deal with broader community development challenges. Gender imbalances play a particularly large role, and the findings suggest a desperate need for gender specific interventions targeting men.

Terrorist havens are an imortant policy problem today. The policy and academic literature has generally concluded that failed states are more likely to be terrorist havens, but some have begun to question this conventional wisdom. While the link between state failure and terrorist havens is fairly clear, it does not tell the entire story. This thesis borrows from an aspect of social mobilization theory to try to explain why some havens are more resilient to outside pressure than others. It argues that a shared collective identity between the group providing haven and the havened terrorist group makes the havening group less likely to buckle under outside pressure. To test this theory, the thesis compares the frames that define al Qaeda's collective identity with those of the Sudanese National Islamic Front and the Afghan Taliban to see if observed variation in haven resiliency can be explained by the levels of shared collective identities in each case. The findings suggest that the theory can account for the variation in resiliency, while raising new questions for future research.

In July 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) began operations as the primary international institution for the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide or international crimes. During the 1990s, the United Nations Security Council authorized international war crimes tribunals for conflicts in the Balkans and in Rwanda. Despite the important developments that these institutions made in international criminal law, these courts have not contributed to the longterm capacity of post-conflict states to operate under the rule of law. In the late 1990s the United Nations started to use new types of hybrid tribunals designed to prosecute international crimes in post-conflict states that combined the power and expertise of the international community with the indigenous law and legal community. This thesis will use case studies to make a detailed evaluation of the institutions and the options facing the individual states and the international community when designing policies or authorizing a tribunal to try international crimes in a post-conflict environment.

On April 6, 1994, the airplane returning the President of Rwanda home was shot down. After appearing to have achieved a negotiated end to the countries ongoing civil war, the nation was now plunged into an ethnically motivated genocide with horrendous results. What led the extremist elements of the Presidents ruling elite class to view this alternative as a plausible solution to the loss of power and prestige they would incur with implementation of the peace accords? To answer this question, this thesis examines how Rwanda's two ethnic groups were manipulated to ethnically stratify the country. After independence and a reversal of ethnic control, the new regionally based elites consistently returned to an ethnically divisive strategy to unite the population and maintain their narrow base of power over other regional elites. The onset of civil war in 1990 by exiled Tutsi refugees, coupled with international pressure for democratic reforms ultimately led to the Arusha Accords. The Accords in due course failed both because of extremist fears of the loss of their power and prestige, and the failure of the international community to back the vital provisions of the accords.

The universal theory of state formation, as discussed by Weber, Tilly and others, is relevant and appropriate to Africa when properly applied. Africa has her own unique history and the variables affecting state development, such as land tenure, remain the same. The value of these variables is what differs from the European experience. As such, state development in Africa remains strikingly similar throughout its history. It is a struggle between the center and the periphery in which the center is hindered by three commonalities: lack of centralization, communal land ownership and patron-client systems. These commonalities worked against centralization, each building on the other and helping the periphery maintain a degree of independence rarely seen in other regions of the world. To understand modern Africa is to look at her past and see how remarkably constant her society has been. After reviewing the available literature, this thesis delves into Africaαs past and shows how important it is to the understanding of her present condition. In the end, it will draw out both domestic and international policy implications for sub-Saharan Africa.

Sudan is currently ruled by a government that was put in place by a 1989 military coup that overthrew a democratically elected government. The U.S. considers Sudan an Islamic Fundamentalist regime because National Islamic Front (NIF) members hold key positions in the government In 1993 the U.S. imposed unilateral diplomatic and economic sanctions against Sudan for allegedly harboring terrorist organizations. This thesis assesses U.S. policy towards Sudan with respect to terrorism. It reviews current policies and argues that key strategic interests are being neglected. The U.S. tends to equate Islamic Fundamentalism with its more radical element terrorism, which significantly influences U.S. policy towards Sudan. Currently the terrorism policy of the US is based on countering state-sponsored terrorism while the more significant threat is from a new breed of well-funded terrorists who operate independently of states. Instead of isolating Sudan for harboring such individuals, the U.S. should take advantage of Sudan's influence with loosely knit Islamic groups. America's inability to effectively deal with the evolving terrorism threat as reflected in its policy toward Sudan, re resents a serious vacuum in its ability to provide for its national security.

Sudan is currently ruled by a government that was put in place by a 1989 military coup that overthrew a democratically elected government. The U.S. considers Sudan an Islamic Fundamentalist regime because National Islamic Front (NIF) members hold key positions in the government In 1993 the U.S. imposed unilateral diplomatic and economic sanctions against Sudan for allegedly harboring terrorist organizations. This thesis assesses U.S. policy towards Sudan with respect to terrorism. It reviews current policies and argues that key strategic interests are being neglected. The U.S. tends to equate Islamic Fundamentalism with its more radical element terrorism, which significantly influences U.S. policy towards Sudan. Currently the terrorism policy of the US is based on countering state-sponsored terrorism while the more significant threat is from a new breed of well-funded terrorists who operate independently of states. Instead of isolating Sudan for harboring such individuals, the U.S. should take advantage of Sudan's influence with loosely knit Islamic groups. America's inability to effectively deal with the evolving terrorism threat as reflected in its policy toward Sudan, re resents a serious vacuum in its ability to provide for its national security., http://archive.org/details/usterrorismpolic1094513435, U.S. Air Force (U.S.A.F.) author., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

On April 6, 1994, the airplane returning the President of Rwanda home was shot down. After appearing to have achieved a negotiated end to the countries ongoing civil war, the nation was now plunged into an ethnically motivated genocide with horrendous results. What led the extremist elements of the Presidents ruling elite class to view this alternative as a plausible solution to the loss of power and prestige they would incur with implementation of the peace accords? To answer this question, this thesis examines how Rwanda's two ethnic groups were manipulated to ethnically stratify the country. After independence and a reversal of ethnic control, the new regionally based elites consistently returned to an ethnically divisive strategy to unite the population and maintain their narrow base of power over other regional elites. The onset of civil war in 1990 by exiled Tutsi refugees, coupled with international pressure for democratic reforms ultimately led to the Arusha Accords. The Accords in due course failed both because of extremist fears of the loss of their power and prestige, and the failure of the international community to back the vital provisions of the accords., http://archive.org/details/rwandreconsidere1094510937

This thesis undertakes a comparative study of Mali and Niger to determine possible differences that may have influenced the path of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion. Specifically, it seeks to determine if (1) the degree of governmental decentralization achieved after multiple peace agreements led to less government control in one country over the other, and (2) the counterinsurgency strategies applied by each country during previous rebellions could have led the rebels to believe Mali would be a softer target to attack than Niger. The evidence indicates that despite an earlier start and an intense public relations campaign, Mali did not achieve a significantly different level of decentralization than Niger by 2011, removing it as a possible influence on the 2012 rebellion. Both countries created new community level governments charged with administering all aspects of civil services but lacked the revenue to operate without international assistance. The difference in counterinsurgency strategies between the two countries, however, is stark. Malis habitual willingness to compromise with past rebel groups contrasts greatly with Nigers insistence on seeking a military solution to conflicts, giving the 2012 rebels a logical indication of where success would be more likely., http://archive.org/details/decentralization1094527919, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.