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We experimentally test the effects of information quality in a global game of regime change. The game features a payoff structure such that more dispersed private information induces agents to attack more often and reduces regime stability in the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. We show that subjects in the lab do not play as predicted by equilibrium theory. Instead, more dispersed information makes subjects more cautious, increasing regime stability. We show that this finding is consistent with a modified global game model in which agents engage in level- k thinking. In the level- k model, information quality affects agents’ actions through a novel channel, that enables a strategic attenuation effect. As information quality worsens, strategic complementarities between different level- k types weaken, generating a force that is capable of reversing the comparative statics from the equilibrium model.

COVID-19 has been associated with cardiac injury and dysfunction. While both myocardial inflammatory cell infiltration and myocarditis with myocyte injury have been reported in patients with fatal COVID-19, clinical-pathologic correlations remain limited. The objective was to determine the relationships between cardiac pathological changes in patients dying from COVID-19 and cardiac infection by SARS-CoV-2, laboratory measurements, clinical features, and treatments. In a retrospective study, 41 consecutive autopsies of patients with fatal COVID-19 were analyzed for the associations between cardiac inflammation, myocarditis, cardiac infection by SARS-CoV-2, clinical features, laboratory measurements, and treatments. Cardiac infection was assessed by in situ hybridization and NanoString transcriptomic profiling. Cardiac infection by SARS-CoV-2 was present in 30/41 cases: virus+ with myocarditis (n = 4), virus+ without myocarditis (n = 26), and virus- without myocarditis (n = 11). In the cases with cardiac infection, SARS-CoV-2+ cells in the myocardium were rare, with a median density of 1 cell/cm2. Virus+ cases showed higher densities of myocardial CD68+ macrophages and CD3+ lymphocytes, as well as more electrocardiographic changes (23/27 vs 4/10; P = 0.01). Myocarditis was more prevalent with IL-6 blockade than with nonbiologic immunosuppression, primarily glucocorticoids (2/3 vs 0/14; P = 0.02). Overall, SARS-CoV-2 cardiac infection was less prevalent in patients treated with nonbiologic immunosuppression (7/14 vs 21/24; P = 0.02). Myocardial macrophage and lymphocyte densities overall were positively correlated with the duration of symptoms but not with underlying comorbidities. In summary, cardiac infection with SARS-CoV-2 is common among patients dying from COVID-19 but often with only rare infected cells. Cardiac infection by SARS-CoV-2 is associated with more cardiac inflammation and electrocardiographic changes. Nonbiologic immunosuppression is associated with lower incidences of myocarditis and cardiac infection by SARS-CoV-2.

We experimentally investigate the role of two-sided reputation-building in dynamic bargaining. In the absence of outside options, rational bargainers have an incentive to imitate obstinate types that are committed to an aggressive demand, inducing delay. Outside options remove this incentive and ensure immediate agreement whenever two rational bargainers match. Our data support the hypothesis that outside options cut down on imitation and ensure timely agreements, but only if subjects share a belief about what constitutes obstinacy. Further, we find that outside options are exercised excessively and that efficiency is no better than it is in their absence. We ascribe this result to the presence of fairness preferences in the subject pool.

We investigate the effects of wages and uncertainty on political corruption as measured by rent-taking. First, our laboratory data show that contrary to standard theory, rent-taking is not independent of, but decreases with wages in the absence of popularity shocks. Second, the orthodox view that rent-taking is greater in the presence of popularity shocks, given wages, is not necessarily true. Third, we find that in the presence of popularity or ideological shocks rent-taking is increasing in the variance of the shock for given wages, and is decreasing in wages for a given variance of the shock. While our third finding is in line with the directional predictions of the Nash equilibria, the deviation from Nash is large when the variance of the popularity shock is high and wages are low. We show that the deviations can be explained using a Quantal Response Equilibrium approach and taking risk-attitudes into account.

Background: Clinical and radiologic studies investigating Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) indicate that a possible cause of severe hypoxia is marked ventilation-perfusion (VA/Q) mismatch. Published histopathology reports diffuse alveolar damage (DAD) in fatal COVID-19 is indistinguishable from other causes of DAD. We compared lung parenchymal and vascular alterations between COVID-19 and DAD of other etiologies using a multidimensional approach. Methods: This autopsy cohort consisted of consecutive COVID-19 patients (n=20) and patients with clinical acute respiratory distress syndrome and histologic DAD (n=21; non-COVID-19 viral and non-viral etiologies). Premortem chest CTs were evaluated for mosaic attenuation and vascular changes. Postmortem lung tissues were compared using histopathological, immunohistochemical, transcriptomics and computational analyses. Machine-learning-derived morphometric analysis of microvasculature was performed, with a random forest classifier quantifying vascular congestion (VSCong), in different microscopic compartments. Findings: On premortem CT, COVID-19 patients showed more mosaic attenuation (p

COVID-19 has been associated with cardiac injury and dysfunction. While both myocardial inflammatory cell infiltration and myocarditis with myocyte injury have been reported in patients with fatal COVID-19, clinical-pathologic correlations remain limited. The objective was to determine the relationships between cardiac pathological changes in patients dying from COVID-19 and cardiac infection by SARS-CoV-2, laboratory measurements, clinical features, and treatments. In a retrospective study, 41 consecutive autopsies of patients with fatal COVID-19 were analyzed for the associations between cardiac inflammation, myocarditis, cardiac infection by SARS-CoV-2, clinical features, laboratory measurements, and treatments. Cardiac infection was assessed by in situ hybridization and NanoString transcriptomic profiling. Cardiac infection by SARS-CoV-2 was present in 30/41 cases: virus

We experimentally investigate the impact of strategic uncertainty and complementarity on leader and follower behavior using the model of Farrell and Saloner (1985). At the core of the model are endogenous timing, irreversible actions and private valuations. We find that strategic complementarity strongly determines follower behavior. Once a subject decides to abandon the status quo the probability that other players jump on the bandwagon increases sharply. However, there is a reluctance to lead when leading is a conditional best response. We explain this deviation from the neo-classical equilibrium by injecting some noise in the equilibrium concept. We also find that cheap talk improves efficiency.

This is the authors' accepted and refereed manuscript to the article. Electoral agency models suggest that government e¢ ciency is better when voters penalize poor performance, and party competition is balanced. Uncertainty in the electoral mechanism dillutes the incentive to produce e¢ ciently. We test this proposition on panel data on local governments. The dataset includes a broad set of indicators on service output and quality, which facilitates the measurement of cost e¢ ciency. We use historical data on local voting in national elections to measure partisan bias, while electoral volatility is measured on past variations in neighboring municipalities. The empirical analyses show that partisan bias lowers cost e¢ ciency, particu- larly in municipalities with large electoral volatility. 2, Forfatterversjon

The accepted and peer reviewed manuscript We experimentally investigate buyer and seller behavior in small markets with two kinds of frictions. First, a subset of buyers may have (severely) limited information about prices, and choose a seller at random. Second, sellers may not be able to serve all potential customers. Such capacity constraints can lead to coordination frictions where some sellers and buyers may not be able to trade. Theory predicts very different equilibrium outcomes when we vary the set-up along these two dimensions. In particular, it implies that a higher number of informed buyers will lead to lower prices when sellers do not face capacity constraints, while prices may actually increase if sellers are capacity constrained, as shown by Lester (2011). In the experiment, the differences between the constrained and non-constrained case are confirmed; prices fall when sellers are not capacity constrained but either do not fall by much or even increase when they are not. We find that prices are quite close to the predicted equilibrium values except in treatments where unconstrained sellers face a large fraction of informed buyers. However, introducing noise into the theoretical decision making process produces a pattern of deviations that fits well with the observed ones. 2. Forfatterversjon

Under the 2015 Paris climate agreement, each Party sets its own mitigation target by submitting a Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) every five years. An important question is whether including conditional components in NDCs might enhance the agreement s effectiveness. We report the results of a closely controlled laboratory experiment based on a mixed sequential-simultaneous public good game with one leader and three followers that helps answer this question. The experiment investigates how two factors infl uence the effectiveness of leadership based on intrinsically conditional commitments. Measuring e¤ectiveness in terms of followers ' and total contributions, we find that it may help if the conditional promise is credible and if its implementation in fluences followers' welfare substantially. Importantly, however, for both factors we fi nd a signi cant effect only if the leader does not reap disproportionate gains from the group' s efforts. These fi ndings have important implications concerning the future success of the Paris agreement. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Oxford Economic Papers following peer review. The version of record is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpx045

This is the accepted, refereed and final manuscript to the article We study experimentally how enforcement influences public goods provision when subjects face two free-rider options that roughly parallel the nonparticipation and noncompliance options available for countries in relation to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). Our results add to the MEA literature in two ways. First, they suggest that compliance enforcement will fail to enhance compliance in the absence of participation enforcement. Second, they indicate that compliance enforcement will boost compliance significantly in the presence of participation enforcement. Our results also add to the experimental literature on public goods provision, again in two ways. First, they reveal that previous experimental findings of enforcement boosting cooperation are valid only in settings with forced (or enforced) participation. Second, they show that subjects’ willingness to allocate costly punishment points is significantly stronger when the enforcement system permits punishment of both types of free riding than when it permits punishment of only one type. 2, forfatterversjon

We experimentally investigate buyer and seller behavior in small markets with two kinds of frictions. First, a subset of buyers may have (severely) limited information about prices, and choose a seller at random. Second, sellers may not be able to serve all potential customers. Such capacity constraints can lead to coordination frictions where some sellers and buyers may not be able to trade. Theory predicts very different equilibrium outcomes when we vary the set-up along these two dimensions. In particular, it implies that a higher number of informed buyers will lead to lower prices when sellers do not face capacity constraints, while prices may actually increase if sellers are capacity constrained, as shown by Lester (AER 2011). In the experiment, the differences between the constrained and non-constrained case are confirmed; prices fall when sellers are not capacity constrained but either do not fall by much or even increase when they are not. We find that prices are quite close to the predicted equilibrium values except in treatments where unconstrained sellers face a large fraction of informed buyers. However, introducing noise into the theoretical decision making process produces a pattern of deviations that fits well with the observed ones.

Det eksisterer en rekke formelle modeller av politisk korrupsjon i demokratiske regimer. Modellene kan ikke forklare at korrupte makthavere overlever valg i en verden uten informasjonssvikt og ideologisk polarisering. En observerer samtidig at apenbart korrupte politikere kan overleve valg etter valg i velfungerende demokratier med moderat polarisering. I artikkelen skriver vi ned en svaert enkel modell som kan forklare en slik observasjon. ∗Norwegian School of Management, Nydalsveien 37, 0442 Oslo. E-mail: leif.helland@bi.no; rune.sorensen@bi.no.

Politicians bias public policies to favor particular election districts. According to the traditional common pool model, districts facing low tax shares should receive relatively large government projects. We suggest a swing-voter model where the number of voters on the ideological cut point, lack of party identification and number of district representatives per voter determine project sizes. We analyze the allocation of state road investments in Norway from 1973–1997 exploiting unique data on characteristics of voters, legislative representation and tax prices in 19 election districts. Geographical representation to parliament is biased, mostly due to an ancient constitution. Shares of swing voters and legislative over-representation lead to higher levels of road investments, while high levels of party identification reduce investments.

The costly lobbying model of Potters and van Winden is confronted with data on lobbying interactions between local assemblies and the national assembly in Norway.A total of 239 interactions are studied.Survey responses by a large number of voters and politicians, as well as registry data on fiscal standing,demographics and elections are utilised.Two of the main predictions of the costly lobbying model gain support in the data. The probability of obtaining substantial discretionary funding from the central level increases: with decreasing conflict of interest between local and central politicians;and with the lobbying cost incurred by local politicians. For a given conflict and cost, however, the rate of lobbying success depends crucially on structural characteristics of the municipality. In particular, the success rate is significantly higher for poor municipalities located in national electoral districts with many seats per voter than for rich municipalities located in districts with few seats per voter.

A formal analysis of a possible adjustment in the present voting institutions of the Norwegian parliament is conducted. The analysis is confined to three unitary players in a minority situation. It is argued that such a set-up represents a fairly accurate description of the present political situation in the Norwegian budget process. The proposed adjustment in the voting institutions leads to something that resembles a de facto constructive vote of no confidence in the budget process. Such an instrument is often said to strengthen a minority government. The formal ana-lysis shows that the adjusted voting institution selects a Condorcet winner if such a winner exists. If, however, no such winner exists, the minority government is always defeated. The latter finding implies that if a cycle in preferences is present, the adjusted voting institution will amplify the inherent instability. This is in stark contrast to the common claim that institutions help break cycles.

This article investigates strategic coordination in four elections to the Norwegian Storting (1909–18). The elections were held under a majority-plurality dual-ballot system, with unrestricted participation in the second-ballot. The focus is on elections with Conservative, Liberal and Labour candidates as main contenders. Supported by historical and theoretical arguments, the authors assume universally sincere voting in the first-ballot. Given this assumption, second-ballot elections can be analyzed as regular plurality elections. Hypotheses about behavior are formed using the game theoretic framework of Myerson and Weber (American Political Science Review 87 (1993) 102–114). It is found that while voters follow the predictions of theory fairly closely, the extent of coordination present at the candidate level can be questioned.  2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

This is the authors’ accepted and refereed manuscript to the article Emerging literature explores experimental platform selection games. These games con- verge rapidly on the superior platform under a wide range of conditions. We replicate the remarkable results of Hossain and Morgan (2009) in which such a game tips almost perfectly to the superior platform. Next, we show that platform coordination fails when seemingly innocent increases in out-of-equilibrium payo¤s are introduced. The in ated payo¤s keep the best reply structure unchanged and do not in uence players security levels. Our de- sign allows control for the explanatory force of risk dominance. We nd that equilibrium selection theory is unable to account for coordination failure while observed behavior is con- sistent with non-rational learning. Furthermore, and contrary to the literature, we nd that e¢ ciency su¤ers when an inferior platform is granted initial monopoly. 2014-04-01 2, Forfatterversjon

This is the authors’ final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the article Models of electoral agency address the levels of discipline and selection that voters can acheive in elections. The models are demanding in terms of individual belief-formation and consistency of behavior. We investigate a baseline model of electoral agency in a controlled laboratory environment. This baseline model, although simple, forms the central plank of more complex electoral agency models. Our design seeks to limit the behavioral impact of social preferences. We nd little support for the baseline model in our data. However, simple (nonrational) learning rules explain behavioral patterns well. Simulations indicate that non-rational learning drives behavior most forcefully towards equilibrium in situations that are favorable to Bayesian updating.

This is the originally published version of the article, as published in the journal, available here: www.ejge.org (Open Access) Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects.

This is the authors’ final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the article. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com Representative democracy does not necessarily eliminate political corruption. Existing models explain the survival of rent-taking politicians by ideological divisions in the electorate and/or informational asymmetries. The current paper demonstrate that rent extraction can persist even if voters are fully informed and ideologically homogenous. We show that in such an environment, voters may gain by persistently reelecting a rent-taker that limits his rent extraction. Such an equilibrium occurs when voters and politicians do not discount the future too heavily, and the share of honest candidates is relatively small.

We present an electoral agency model that, in a stylized way, captures the public –nancestructure of Norwegian municipal governments. It drives the following main implication: in-creasing partisan bias in favor of the incumbent reduces e¢ ciency in public production, andmore so the higher the variation of random popularity shocks in voting. This implication istested on panel-data regressions for the period 2001-2009, including more than 400 Norwegianlocal governments per year. Local governments are insitutionally similar, and produce wel-fare services subject to a –xed amount of revenue. Utilizing exogenous sources of variation toconstruct our measures of random shocks and partisan bias, we –nd strong statistical supportfor the model implication. Furthermore the e⁄ects of electoral agency on e¢ ciency are bothplausible and sizable in economic terms. BI Norwegian Business School, Department of Economics, NO-0442, Oslo. Phone +47 46 41 05 79; E-mail:leif.helland@bi.no (corresponing author).y

We report results from a dictator game experiment with nurse students and real estate broker students as dictators, and Amnesty International as the recipient. Although brokers contributed substantial amounts, nurses contributed significantly more, on average 76% of their endowment. In a second part, subjects chose between a certain repetition of the experiment and a 50–50 chance of costly exit. About one third of the brokers and half of the nurses chose the exit option. While generosity was indeed higher among nurses, even when taking exits into account, the difference cannot readily be attributed to different degrees of altruism.

This is the author’s final, accepted and refereed manuscript to the article. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com The arcticle explores the political business cycle in Norway from the early 1980s onwards. It is shown that unemployment growth is related to uncertainty about likely parliamentary majorities, and to the level of political conflict between such majorities. Data indicate that voter expectations are formed on the basis of likely majority winners in votes, not in seats. Unemployment growth is unrelated to sudden and unpredictable changes in the composition of government. This suggests that the instruments in uencing unemployment growth are within the domain of the legislative, not the executive, power.

We provide experimental evidence of self-serving fairness ideals in a dictator game. Our design includes treatments where funds can be transferred in two ways to the one player and in one way to the other. Two methods for transferring funds to the recipient produce generosity levels similar to those of the regular dictator game. However, two methods for transferring funds to the dictator reduce her generosity substantially. Hence, the fairness ideal adopted by dictators appears to be equal share per individual in the former case (as in the regular dictator game), and equal share per transfer method in the latter case.

Models of electoral agency address the amount of discipline and selection that can be achieved by voters in elections. The models are demanding in terms of individual belief-formation and consistency of behavior. We investigate a baseline model of electoral agency in a controlled laboratory environment. This baseline model, although simple, form the core of more complex electoral agency models. Our design seeks to limit the behavioral impact of social preferences. We find little support for the baseline model in our data. However, simple (non-rational) learning rules explain behavioral patterns well. Simulations indicate that non-rational learning pushes behavior most forcefully towards equilibrium in situations that are favorable to bayesian updating.

Why does budgetary balance vary over time within the same country? And what causes the balance to vary over a group of countries at a certain time? A rapidly growing body of positive political economy offers explanations to these questions.87 Until the early nineties, however, fiscal constitutions were largely overlooked as determinants of fiscal discipline.88 This may seem odd, since it has long been known that in strategic models of budgeting, equilibrium behavior is typically non-robust to changes in the rules of the game. That is to say, rules seem to matter at least in theory.89

The notion of renegotiation-proof equilibrium has become a cornerstone in non-cooperative models of international environmental agreements. Applying this solution concept to the infinitely repeated N-person Prisoners' Dilemma generates predictions that contradict intuition as well as conventional wisdom about public goods provision. This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to test two such predictions. The first is that the higher the cost of making a contribution, the more cooperation will materialize. The second is that the number of cooperators is independent of group size. Although the experiment was designed to replicate the assumptions of the model closely, our results lend very little support to the two predictions.