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Why GAO Did This Study. The 2005 BRAC round resulted in 125 closed bases with over 73,000 acres of surplus property available. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act, as amended, requires DOD and HUD to assist communities in determining the best reuse of land and facilities, balancing needs of the local economy with those of homeless individuals and families. GAO was mandated to review the extent to which DOD and HUD implemented the homeless assistance provisions while disposing of BRAC surplus property. This report addresses (1) the assistance provided as a result of BRAC 2005 and the extent to which DOD and HUD track its implementation and (2) any benefits and challenges encountered as DOD, HUD, and LRAs addressed homeless assistance provisions. GAO reviewed homeless assistance plans; interviewed DOD and HUD officials; and interviewed LRAs and homeless assistance providers from a nongeneralizable sample of 23 closed bases, selected based on size, geography, and types of assistance provided. What GAO Recommends. GAO recommends that DOD and HUD track conveyance status and provide clear information on four steps of the homeless assistance process. HUD generally concurred, and DOD either partially concurred or did not concur with these recommendations, stating its existing guidance is sufficient. GAO believes these recommendations are still valid as discussed in the report. GAO also recommends that HUD address staff resources during a BRAC round, and HUD generally concurred., Report to Congressional Committees.

GAO found that the Department of Defense (DOD) did not apply the U.S. contractor preference in accordance with the current statute from October 2010 through May 2014. The fiscal year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act directs that military construction contracts valued over $1 million and located in countries bordering the Arabian Sea, U.S. territories in the Pacific, and the Kwajalein Atoll, be awarded to a U.S. contractor unless their price is 20 percent higher than the price from a competing non-U.S. contractor with an equally responsive and responsible bid. However, DOD incorrectly applied the preference to countries bordering the Arabian Gulf, which is geographically distinct from the Arabian Sea (see figure). DOD officials were unaware the statute changed the preference from Arabian Gulf to Arabian Sea in 2002 and therefore had not updated DOD s acquisition guidance. DOD s application, however, included the geographic area in which the majority of military construction in the Arabian Sea and Arabian Gulf locations took place from October 2010 through May 2014. GAO also found that due to other factors that are also considered, such as a contractor s experience, the preference potentially only affected 2 of the 35 award decisions for military construction contracts since fiscal year 2011. DOD updated its guidance during GAO s review, but it could become outdated, again, if a congressional bill becomes effective, as the bill would change the locations subject to the preference in fiscal year 2015.

Why GAO Did This Study. GAO has designated DOD s Support Infrastructure Management as a highrisk area in part due to challenges DOD faces in reducing excess infrastructure. DOD manages a global real property portfolio of over 557,000 facilities DOD estimates to be valued at about $828 billion as of September 30, 2012. In September 2011, GAO found that DOD was limited in its ability to reduce excess inventory because OSD did not maintain accurate and complete data on the utilization of its facilities in its Real Property Assets Database. House Report 113-102 mandated GAO to review DOD efforts to improve these data. This report examines the extent to which OSD has (1) improved the completeness and accuracy of facilityutilization data in its Real Property Assets Database and the military departments use of data to identify consolidation opportunities, and (2) a strategic plan to manage DOD s real property efficiently and to facilitate the identification of unutilized and underutilized facilities. GAO analyzed OSD s real property data from fiscal years 2010 through 2013, visited 11 active DOD installations from the four services to reflect those with high numbers of buildings, and interviewed officials. While not generalizable, the interviews provided perspectives about facility utilization. What GAO Recommends. GAO recommends that OSD establish a strategic plan to identify unutilized and underutilized facilities. In written comments on a draft of the report, DOD concurred with the recommendation., Report to Congressional Committees.

According to DOD, its U.S. infrastructure is vulnerable to the potential impacts of climate change. These could affect DOD s readiness and fiscal exposure, and DOD has begun to plan for adaptation actions designed to improve infrastructure resilience. GAO was asked to assess DOD s actions to adapt its U.S. infrastructure to the challenges of climate change. This report (1) describes potential impacts identified by DOD that may affect its infrastructure; (2) evaluates DOD s efforts to conduct vulnerability assessments; (3) assesses how DOD is accounting for climate change impacts in certain planning efforts; and (4) evaluates the extent to which DOD incorporates adaptation into its infrastructure-investment efforts.GAO reviewed DOD documents on climate change, infrastructure planning, and funding processes; interviewed cognizant officials; and visited or contacted a nongeneralizable sample of 15 sites in various regions and from each military department. GAO recommends that DOD develop a plan and milestones for completing climate change vulnerability assessments of installations; provide further information to installation planners, clarifying actions that should be taken to account for climate change in planning documents; and clarify the processes used to compare military construction projects for funding, to include consideration of potential climate change impacts. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and explained how they will be implemented.

DOD relies on access to military land, airspace, sea space, and frequency spectrum to provide its forces a realistic training environment and ranges that will prepare them to face combat or complex missions around the globe. Section 366 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (as amended) required DOD to submit a comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and airspace available in the United States and overseas for training, and provide annual progress reports on these efforts through 2018. The act also mandated that GAO submit annual evaluations of DOD s reports to Congress within 90 days of receiving them from DOD. In this report, GAO determined the extent to which DOD s 2014 Sustainable Ranges Report met the legislative requirements., Report to Congressional Committees

As part of its plan to reduce its active duty force by 80,000 personnel by 2017, the Army will be inactivating 10 BCTs currently stationed in the United States and reorganizing the remaining BCTs. The Army conducted analyses of different stationing options, which included the use of its military value analysis model to compare installations based on their ability to support BCTs. GAO was asked to review the decision making process the Army used for its BCT stationing decisions, including its military value analysis model. This report does the following: (1) describes the analyses the Army conducted to make its BCT decisions, and (2) evaluates the extent to which the Army has established guidance and processes related to the use of the military value analysis model as a part of its stationing decisions. GAO reviewed the Army's stationing guidance, current and previous versions of the military value analysis model, documents on the BCT decisions, and spoke with cognizant officials. GAO recommends that the Army develop and implement guidance related to when community input should be obtained for stationing decisions, and related to the use of its military value analysis model, such as when it should be used, the level of approval required for changes to the model, and how certain training areas should be considered, as well as processes for updating and reviewing the model. The Army concurred with GAO's recommendations and explained how they will be implemented., Report to the Subcommittee on Airland, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate.

As U.S. forces draw down from Afghanistan and home training is expanded, the competition for training ranges may also increase. Section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (as amended) required DOD to submit a comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and airspace available in the United States and overseas for training, and provide annual progress reports on these efforts through 2018. The act also requires GAO to submit annual evaluations of DOD s reports to Congress within 90 days of receiving them from DOD. In this report, GAO examined (1) whether DOD s 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report met the legislative requirements; and (2) whether DOD acted on GAO previous recommendations to improve its submissions. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In commenting on this report, DOD stated that it agrees in general with the report., Rept. to Congressional Committees

To protect U.S. airspace, DoD performs the Aerospace Control Alert mission, which includes military forces arrayed in a rapid response posture to conduct both air sovereignty and air defense operations against airborne threats over the United States and Canada. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 required that the Secretary of Defense submit a report to Congress that provides a cost-benefit analysis and risk-based assessment of the Aerospace Control Alert mission as it relates to expected future changes to the budget and force structure of the mission. The act also requires that GAO review DoD's report and submit any findings to the congressional defense committees. In response to this mandate, GAO examined the following: (1) DoD's April 2013 reporting of a risk-based assessment and cost-benefit analysis of the Aerospace Control Alert mission as they relate to expected future changes to the budget and force structure of that mission, and (2) the extent to which DoD has reported the total cost of the Aerospace Control Alert mission. GAO reviewed DoD's April 2013 report to Congress and Aerospace Control Alert budget justification displays, and interviewed knowledgeable DoD officials. GAO recommends that DoD, as it expands its cost reporting in response to current reporting requirements, ensure that all personnel costs related to the Aerospace Control Alert mission, including those of the Army and Army National Guard, are included in DoD's budget displays. DoD concurred with GAO's recommendation., Report to Congressional Committees.

DoD may be required to meet specific statutory requirements before closing or realigning installations that are authorized to employ 300 or more DoD civilians. In light of these requirements, DoD has historically used the BRAC process for closing or realigning bases that are above statutory thresholds. However, in March 2012, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) testified that because of fiscal and strategic imperatives, in the absence of an additional BRAC round, DoD may be forced to use its existing authorities to begin to realign and close bases. Subsequently, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to review the processes that DoD uses to close and realign military installations outside of the BRAC process. This report describes the extent to which DoD has processes in place to implement installation closures and realignments within the United States, and the extent to which DoD has implemented closures and realignments outside of the BRAC process. To conduct its work, GAO examined DoD's approach to implementing basing actions and interviewed DoD officials to identify how their approach ensures compliance with 10 U.S.C. Section 2687. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In commenting on this report, DoD stated that the report, in general, explains the processes it follows to comply with requirements for closing or realigning installations outside of a congressionally authorized BRAC process., Report to Congressional Committees.

DOD used expeditionary forensics for collecting fingerprints and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) to identify, target, and disrupt terrorists and enemy combatants in Iraq and Afghanistan. The increased incidence of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other asymmetric threats has increased the demand for expeditionary forensic capabilities. Many of DoD's expeditionary forensic activities are resourced through DoD's Overseas Contingency Operations funds. DoD estimates that it cost between $800 million and $1 billion of these funds from 2005 through 2012 to support expeditionary forensics activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, as military operations are projected to draw down in Afghanistan, this funding is expected to substantially decline by the end of 2014. Consequently, DoD is taking steps to establish expeditionary forensics as an enduring capability in DoD's base budget. GAO was asked to examine DoD's expeditionary forensic capability. This report assessed the extent to which DoD has taken steps to establish an enduring expeditionary forensic capability. To address this objective, GAO reviewed relevant policy, plans, and budget estimates, and interviewed cognizant DoD officials. GAO is making four recommendations to DoD, including incorporating key elements in its strategic plan, periodically reviewing and evaluating DoD components' proposed forensic budget estimates, including expeditionary forensics, and issuing guidance on collecting and reporting forensic budget data. DoD concurred with all four recommendations., Report to Congressional Requesters.

Over the next couple of years, maintenance work available to the ship repair industrial base supporting Naval Station Mayport is expected to decrease. Section 1017 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 required the Navy to analyze the costs and benefits of stationing additional DDG-51 class destroyers at Naval Station Mayport and to include other considerations. It also required GAO to provide an assessment of the Navy s analysis. The Navy provided its analysis in a report submitted to Congress on December 31, 2012. GAO s objectives were to describe the extent to which the Navy s analysis (1) demonstrated the use of applicable best practices for an analysis of costs and benefits and (2) provided information on other considerations, as required by Section 1017. In conducting our assessment, GAO identified applicable best practices for analyzing costs and benefits and discussed the Navy s documentation and methodology with knowledgeable officials. GAO also reviewed the information in the Navy s analysis, interviewed Navy and private ship repair firm officials, and visited Naval Station Mayport. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD and the Department of the Navy reviewed a draft of this report and did not have formal comments. The Navy provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate in the report., Report to Congressional Committees

Due in part to challenges the Department of Defense (DoD) faces in reducing excess infrastructure, DoD's Support Infrastructure Management is on GAO's High Risk List of program areas vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or are most in need of transformation. Since 1988, DoD has relied on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process as a primary means of reducing excess infrastructure or capacity and realigning bases to meet changes in the size and structure of its forces. In 1998 and 2004, Congress required DoD to submit reports that, among other things, estimated the amount of DoD's excess capacity at that time. Also, in March 2012, DoD testified that it had about 20 percent excess capacity. The methods used to develop such preliminary excess capacity estimates differ from the data intensive process -- supplemented by military judgment -- that DoD has used to formulate specific base closure and realignment recommendations. A Senate Armed Services Committee report directed GAO to review how DoD identifies bases or facilities that are in excess of its needs. The objective of this report is to discuss how DoD has estimated its excess capacity, outside of the BRAC process. To do so, GAO reviewed excess capacity estimates from 1998, 2004, and 2012; analyzed DoD's data; reviewed supporting documentation; assessed assumptions and limitations of DoD's analysis; and interviewed DoD officials. In commenting on a draft of this report, DoD stated that GAO had properly highlighted the limitations of its approach to estimating excess capacity and contrasted it with the method used to develop BRAC recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

The 2005 BRAC round was the biggest, most complex, costliest BRAC round ever. Unlike the four previous rounds, which focused on reducing infrastructure, the Secretary of Defense saw BRAC 2005 as a unique opportunity to adjust DoD's base structure to meet new challenges, such as international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and to meet future challenges, such as designating where forces returning from overseas would be located. While DoD's stated goals for BRAC 2005 included eliminating unneeded infrastructure, they also included furthering the transformation of DoD's force structure and fostering joint capabilities among the military services, resulting in recommendations of unprecedented scope and complexity. As GAO found in June 2012, BRAC implementation costs grew to about $35 billion, exceeding the initial 2005 estimate of $21 billion by 67 percent. As part of its fiscal year 2013 budget request, DoD asked for two more rounds of BRAC in 2013 and 2015. Congress has not acted on this request. As directed by the House Armed Services Committee, this report discusses lessons learned that could be applied if Congress chooses to authorize future BRAC rounds. GAO assessed the following: (1) how DoD estimated BRAC costs and savings and any ways in which its methodology could be improved, (2) OSD leadership over BRAC 2005, and (3) any legislative changes Congress may wish to make that could enhance oversight of any future round., Report to Congressional Committees.

GAO has designated DOD support infrastructure as an area of high risk and included one key related category installation support as an area for potential savings. In 2005, DOD recommended to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission combining 26 installations into 12 joint bases to generate efficiencies and cost savings and, in 2010, completed this consolidation. GAO assessed the extent to which (1) DOD developed and implemented a plan to achieve cost savings and efficiencies at the joint bases, (2) joint base common standards provide a common framework to manage and plan for installation support services, and (3) DOD has a process to consistently identify and address any implementation challenges. GAO reviewed DOD policies and guidance on joint basing, visited 3 joint bases and obtained answers to written questions from the other 9, interviewed OSD and military service officials, and analyzed performance data on joint base support services. GAO recommends that DOD take six actions, such as developing a plan to achieve cost savings, prioritizing review and revision of unclear common standards, and developing a strategy to share solutions to common challenges. DOD partially agreed with five recommendations and did not concur with the recommendation to develop a plan to achieve cost savings, because it stated that such goals are not appropriate at this time. GAO continues to believe that the recommendations are valid as discussed further in the report., Report to Congressional Addressees.

Since 2002, the United States has operated military detention facilities at its Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to hold individuals detained during overseas counterterrorism operations. In 2009 the President directed the closure of these facilities within 1 year. Since then, a number of statutes have prohibited the transfer of Guantanamo Bay detainees to the United States. GAO was asked to review existing U.S. facilities and identify factors to be considered in the event that restrictions were lifted and Guantanamo Bay detainees were transferred to the United States. This report describes the (1) current Guantanamo Bay detention facilities and infrastructure, (2) DOD corrections facilities and factors to be considered if these facilities were used to hold the detainees, and (3) DOJ facilities holding individuals charged with or convicted of terrorism-related crimes, and factors to be considered if these facilities were used to hold the detainees. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed relevant laws and policies on detention operations; visited several facilities at Guantanamo Bay and DOD and DOJ sites in the United States selected for their range of housing configurations; and interviewed officials at both agencies. GAO s review is descriptive and did not include an evaluation of whether specific U.S. facilities would be suitable for holding Guantanamo Bay detainees, nor did GAO address legal factors that are still being adjudicated. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In commenting on this report, DOJ stated that it has no plans to transfer detainees to the United States. This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in November 2012., Report to the Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate.

Why GAO Did This Study. Defending U.S. territory and citizens is the highest priority of DOD, and providing defense support of civil authorities is one of the department s primary missions. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility for homeland defense, whereas for civil support missions DOD provides assistance to the lead civilian federal agency, such as DHS, when requested by the agency or directed by the President for major disasters, emergencies, and special events. This report examines the extent to which DOD has issued current guidance, including doctrine, policy, and strategy, for its homeland defense and civil support missions. To do this, GAO analyzed DOD homeland defense and civil support guidance and plans and met with select DOD and National Guard officials. What GAO Recommends. This report makes several recommendations to address gaps in DOD s guidance for homeland defense and civil support, including for DOD to assess and, when needed, update its primary strategy; develop implementation guidance on the dualstatus commander construct; and align guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents with national-level guidance to include roles and responsibilities. In comments on the draft report, DOD concurred or partially concurred with these recommendations. DOD concurred with our strategy and dual-status commander recommendations and partially concurred with our domestic cyber recommendation. DHS concurred with our domestic cyber recommendation., Report to Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

The National Guard, with its dual federal and state roles, has been in demand to meet both overseas operations and homeland security requirements. Over the last decade the National Guard has experienced the largest activation of its forces since World War II. At the same time, the Guard s domestic activities have expanded from routine duties, such as responding to hurricanes, to include activities such as helping to secure U.S. borders. Generally, the National Guard can operate in three different statuses: (1) state status state funded under the command and control of the governor; (2) Title 32 status federally funded under command and control of the governor (Title 32 forces may participate in law enforcement activities); and (3) Title 10 status federally funded under command and control of the Secretary of Defense. Forces serving in Title 10 status are generally prohibited from direct participation in law enforcement activities, without proper statutory authorization, but may work to support civilian law enforcement. Although National Guard forces working in support of law enforcement at the southwest land border have been activated under Title 32, the Secretary of Defense has limited their Guard forces are not to make arrests. Since 2006, the National Guard has supported DHS s border security mission in the four southwest border states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) through two missions: Operation Jump Start (June 2006-July 2008) involved volunteers from the border states and from outside the border states; its mission included aviation, engineering, and entry identification, among others, according to National Guard officials. Operation Phalanx (July 2010-September 30, 2011) involved volunteer units and in-state units. The Secretary of Defense limited the National Guard mission to entry identification, criminal analysis, and command and control, according to National Guard officials.

To assess DoD's cost estimates of implementing BRAC 2005, we examined the initial cost estimates in the BRAC Commission's Report to the President and compared them to our analyses of data in DoD's fiscal year 2011 BRAC 2005 budget submission to Congress. In addition, we discussed with the military departments' BRAC offices the reasons for cost increases and reviewed OSD's business plans for recommendations that had the largest increases in costs to determine the reasons for the changes, and discussed them with OSD officials, and officials in the military departments and defense agencies as appropriate. To evaluate changes in DoD's projected 20-year net present value estimates from the BRAC Commission's 2005 estimates, we examined the data in DoD's fiscal year 2011 BRAC 2005 budget submission to Congress. For consistency in making comparisons to the BRAC Commission's original estimates, we applied the same formulas and discount rate of 2.8 percent that the BRAC Commission used to calculate the 20-year net present value estimates in 2005. To evaluate changes in DoD's projected net annual recurring savings from the BRAC Commission's 2005 estimates through fiscal year 2011, we used data OSD provided to us for estimated savings in fiscal year 2012 -- the year after OSD expected all recommendations to be completed. We determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of addressing the objectives of this report. We performed this work from March 2012 to June 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

To determine the extent to which DoD carried out the original scope of work for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's (NGA) Technology Center and whether the building it constructed constitutes a complete and usable facility, we reviewed budget and project documents and interviewed officials from NGA, the Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In particular, we focused our information-gathering efforts on NGA's identified need for data-storage capability, the original scope of work for the NGA Technology Center, and the final status of that construction project as of September 2011, the end of the BRAC 2005 implementation period. We also identified guidance, directives, and policies that govern the process for BRAC military construction projects and compared the process used for the NGA project to the procedures outlined in those documents. To identify the scope of work for the proposed new military construction project to fit out the third floor of the NGA Technology Center, and DoD's rationale for this project, we reviewed budget and project documents and interviewed officials from NGA, the Department of the Army BRAC Office, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense about NGA's identified need for data-storage capability and the scope of work for the new military construction project.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has committed billions of dollars to developing, maintaining, and employing warfighting capabilities that rely on access to the electromagnetic spectrum. According to DoD, electronic warfare capabilities play a critical and potentially growing role in ensuring the U.S. military's access to and use of the electromagnetic spectrum. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DoD did the following: (1) developed a strategy to manage electronic warfare; and (2) planned, organized, and implemented an effective governance structure to oversee its electronic warfare policy and programs and their relationship to cyberspace operations. GAO analyzed policies, plans, and studies related to electronic warfare and cyberspace operations and interviewed cognizant DoD officials. GAO recommends that DoD should do the following: (1) include in its future electronic warfare strategy reports to Congress certain key characteristics, including performance measures, key investments and resources, and organizational roles and responsibilities; (2) define objectives and issue an implementation plan for the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Control Center; and (3) update key departmental guidance to clearly define oversight roles, responsibilities, and coordination for electronic warfare management, and the relationship between electronic warfare and cyberspace operations. DoD generally concurred with these recommendations, except that the strategy should include performance measures. GAO continues to believe this recommendation has merit., Report to the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

DoD is the largest consumer of energy in the federal government, spending about $3.8 billion on facilities energy at more than 500 permanent military installations throughout the world in fiscal year 2010. The House Armed Services Committee directed GAO to review issues related to financing approaches for renewable energy projects on military installations. GAO did the following: (1) determined the approaches that military services are using to finance renewable energy projects and the factors the services consider in selecting an approach; (2) assessed the extent to which the services have established methods to obtain good value and advantageous contract terms and manage risks of financing approaches for renewable energy projects; and (3) identified the extent to which the services developed guidance, training, and other resources to assist officials in selecting and implementing financing approaches. GAO reviewed applicable legal authorities, guidance, and project information from selected projects and interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military services, 10 selected installations, and the Department of Energy. GAO recommends that DoD issue comprehensive guidance to ensure that key analyses are completed and that alternative financing approaches are fully considered. GAO also recommends that DoD develop a formalized communications process to share best practices on financing renewable energy projects among installations. DoD generally concurred with GAO's recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

There have been various reported incidents of individuals being potentially exposed to environmental hazards while on military installations. Indeed, some incidents, such as contaminated air due to burn pits in Afghanistan and Iraq and contaminated water at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, have received considerable attention, and in the case of Camp Lejeune have resulted in claims seeking billions of dollars from the government. Public Law 111-383, Section 314(2011) directed GAO to assess Department of Defense (DoD) policies regarding environmental exposures. GAO's objectives were to determine the following: (1) the extent to which DoD has policies that identify and respond to environmental exposures, (2) what programs exist to provide health care or compensation to individuals for environmental exposures, and (3) which features of other federal programs may provide options in designing future compensation programs. GAO briefed the Armed Services Committees in December 2011, to satisfy the mandate. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant documentation, visited installations, and interviewed relevant officials. GAO is making recommendations to DoD to identify and respond to limitations in its policies for responding to environmental exposures. DoD generally disagreed with GAO's recommendations, commenting that current policies are adequate. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid, as discussed in the report., Report to Congressional Committees.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has faced long-term challenges in managing and halting degradation of its portfolio of facilities and reducing unneeded infrastructure to free up funds to better maintain the facilities it still uses and to meet other needs. Costs to build and maintain the defense infrastructure represent a significant financial commitment. DOD s management of its support infrastructure is on GAO s high-risk list, in part because of the challenges DOD faces in reducing its unneeded excess and obsolete infrastructure. DOD plans to reduce force structure and the President will request that Congress authorize the base realignment and closure (BRAC) process for 2013 and 2015. The Secretary of Defense stated that the BRAC process is the only effective way to achieve needed infrastructure savings. This testimony discusses (1) key factors and challenges that contributed to BRAC 2005 implementation and results and (2) the most recent estimated costs and savings attributable to BRAC 2005. To do this work, GAO reviewed its previous work and selected documents related to BRAC 2005 such as BRAC business plans that laid out the requisite actions, timing of those actions, and DOD s estimated costs and savings associated with implementing each recommendation, briefings on BRAC implementation status prepared by the military services, and budget justification materials submitted to Congress. GAO also interviewed current and former officials from DOD and the BRAC Commission involved in the development, review, and implementation of BRAC recommendations., Testimony before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

In the 11 years since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has put forth extensive efforts to protect the nation's aviation sector and airspace. These efforts include air sovereignty alert (ASA) operations, for which the Air Force provides personnel and fully fueled, fully armed aircraft sitting on constant alert at 18 sites across the United States. In 2009, GAO found shortcomings in the Department of Defense's (DoD) management of ASA operations, leading to a number of GAO recommendations. For this report, GAO examined the extent to which the following recommendations have been met: (1) the Air Force has implemented GAO's 2009 recommendations, (2) DoD has implemented a risk-based management approach for ASA operations, and (3) the Air Force has accurately identified expenditures for ASA operations. To do so, GAO analyzed relevant strategies, planning documents, guidance, and expenditure data; and interviewed North American Aerospace Defense Command, Air Force, National Guard Bureau, and other DoD officials. Congress may wish to consider requiring the Air Force to fully implement GAO's 2009 recommendations. In addition, GAO recommends that DoD improve its risk management of ASA operations and improve the Air Force's ability to accurately identify ASA expenditures. DoD fully or partially agreed with all of GAO's recommendations., Report to Congressional Requesters.

GAO has designated the Department of Defense's (DoD) management of support infrastructure as a high risk area, in part because of challenges in reducing excess infrastructure. Operating and maintaining excess facilities consumes resources that could be eliminated from DoD's budget or used for other purposes. In response to direction in House Report 111-491, GAO reviewed DoD's achievements in the following areas: (1) progress toward meeting demolition program targets for fiscal years 2008 through 2013; (2) facility utilization information -- a source for identifying additional excess facilities; and (3) plans for managing and disposing of excess facilities after fiscal year 2013. GAO analyzed information on excess facilities, completed demolitions, and underutilized facilities in DoD's real property inventory database; reviewed DoD's plans for demolition after the on-going program ends; and conducted site visits to selected military installations. To better focus and manage its future disposal efforts, GAO recommends that DoD calculate and record complete and accurate utilization data for all facilities and develop strategies and measures to enhance the management of excess facilities after the current demolition program ends. In written comments on a draft of this report, DoD generally agreed with GAO's recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

The Department of Defense (DOD) paid active duty military personnel over $18 billion in housing allowances in fiscal year 2010. DOD sets housing allowance rates annually based on market costs of rent, utilities, and renter's insurance. Also, DOD has identified 26 installations significantly impacted by expected growth in personnel due to various rebasing actions. The Senate report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (S. 3454) directed GAO to review DOD's rate-setting process, among other issues. GAO determined (1) whether there are enhancements to strengthen DOD's rate-setting process and (2) whether service members have encountered challenges in obtaining off-base housing. GAO reviewed program documents, including a 2010 DOD report to Congress, analyzed data, and interviewed DOD officials and subject matter experts. GAO is recommending that DOD (1) provide information on the costs that comprise the housing allowance to installation officials and service members, (2) assess the benefits and drawbacks of revising the definition of "available" properties for data collection, (3) improve its processes to estimate allowance costs for the budget, and (4) develop a formal process for installations to share information on housing tools., Report to Congressional Committees.

Since established as a naval base in December 1942, Naval Station Mayport, Florida, as grown to become the third largest naval fleet concentration area in the United States and the second largest on the East Coast. During this time, the base has served as the home port for multiple types of Navy surface ships--reaching a peak of over 30 ships including two conventional carriers in 1987. The most recent conventionally powered carrier to be homeported there--the USS John F. Kennedy--was decommissioned in 2007. Prior to the USS John F. Kennedy's retirement, the Department of Defense's (DOD) 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review called for the Navy to provide more warfighting assets more quickly to multiple locations, and, to meet this requirement, the Navy made a preliminary decision to homeport additional surface ships at Mayport. The Navy subsequently prepared an environmental impact statement to evaluate a broad range of strategic home port and dispersal options for Atlantic Fleet surface ships in Mayport and on January 14, 2009, issued its decision to pursue an option that would include the first-time homeporting of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport. The Navy's decision was reviewed as part of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which in its report supported the Navy's decision to homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport, indicating that homeporting an East Coast carrier in Mayport would contribute to mitigating the risk of a terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster occurring in Norfolk, Virginia, where currently all of the nuclear-powered aircraft carriers on the East Coast are homeported.

The Military Construction Authorization Act, 1984, established the Military Family Housing Leasing Program, commonly referred to as the Section 801 housing program. This authority provided a mechanism for DOD to contract with private developers to build new rental housing on or near military installations. The Section 801 program is also referred to as a build-to-lease program. The program permitted contracts entered into under its authority to allocate responsibility for operating and maintaining the units to either the government or the contractor, and required that units be constructed to DOD standards, initial leases be for a period not in excess of 20 years (excluding construction), and, upon termination of the lease period, that the government have the right of first refusal to acquire the facilities constructed and leased under the contract. The Section 801 program was initially authorized as a pilot program for approximately two years, under which the number of housing units to be built could not exceed 300 per contract, with a maximum of two contracts per military department. Subsequent legislation renewed the program, expanded the number of units that could be constructed, and increased the number of contracts allowed by each service. The housing constructed under the Section 801 housing program was available to all members of the armed forces who are eligible for assignment to military family housing. Between 1985 and 1996, under the Section 801 program, DOD awarded eight contracts to private developers to construct approximately 3,100 military family housing units-a combination of two-, three-, four-, and five bedroom units-on seven military installations. Also, under the Section 801 authority, DOD built numerous housing units off-base, located near approximately 20 military installations.

As summarized in table 1, the Army is currently implementing several major force structure and infrastructure initiatives that collectively result in a large number of personnel movements and changes in the size and shape of the Army's domestic installation infrastructure. As a result of the initiatives, many installations will experience significant population growth, which results in the need for new or renovated facilities to accommodate the additional soldiers and their families. Figure 1 identifies the Army installations expected to experience the largest population growth for fiscal years 2003 through 2016.

The Department of Defense (DoD) consumes about 60 percent of all energy used at federal government facilities. To encourage an increased use of energy from renewable sources, such as solar and wind power, (1) the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (the 2005 Act) directs DoD to consume at least 3 percent of its total electricity from renewable resources starting in fiscal year 2007; (2) Executive Order 13423 (the 2007 Executive Order) directs that an amount equal to half of the statutorily required renewable energy be generated by sources placed into service in 1999 or later; and (3) the 2007 Defense Authorization Act directed that at least 25 percent of electricity consumed by DoD come from renewable sources in fiscal year 2025. GAO was asked to examine the following: (1) DoD's progress toward these three key goals for consuming renewable energy in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, (2) challenges to DoD meeting those goals, and (3) DoD's plans to meet the goals. GAO reviewed relevant laws and DoD and Department of Energy (DOE) policy, plans, and data; interviewed agency officials; and visited DoD facilities. GAO makes 5 recommendations to DoD, including that DoD accurately report progress toward the goals and develop a long-term, DoD-wide plan to address challenges and meet goals. DoD concurred with 4 recommendations and partially concurred with 1, agreeing with its intent but stating that it is a service responsibility., Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

Our objective for this review was to determine the extent to which the Army has addressed the intended purposes set forth in the ASPI authorizing legislation. Additionally, in response to congressional interest, we have provided information in enclosure 2 of this report that discusses other available authorities that the Army uses or could use to improve the viability of its manufacturing arsenals. In response to direction by the conferees to conduct a business case analysis that examines the cost, return on investment, and economic impact of the ASPI program, the Congressional Budget Office expects to submit its report later this year. Accordingly, our review did not address those aspects of the ASPI program., Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate and the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

Because the military faces obstacles in acquiring new training lands, the preservation and sustainment of its current lands is a priority. Sustainable training range management focuses on practices that allow the military to manage its ranges in a way that ensures their usefulness well into the future. As required by section 366(a) of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (as amended),1 DOD was to submit a comprehensive plan for using existing authorities available to the department to address training constraints caused by limitations on the use of worldwide military lands, marine areas, and airspace to Congress in fiscal year 2004 with annual progress reports beginning in fiscal year 2005 and extending through 2013. As part of the preparation of this plan, the Secretary of Defense was to conduct an assessment of current and future training range requirements and an evaluation of the adequacy of DOD's current range resources to meet those requirements. The plan was also to include: proposals to enhance training range capabilities and address any shortfalls in resources identified pursuant to that assessment and evaluation; goals and milestones for tracking planned actions and measuring progress; projected funding requirements to implement planned actions; and a designation of an office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and in each of the military departments responsible for overseeing implementation of the plan. This report discusses (1) DOD's progress to date to address the elements of section 366 and (2) improvements incorporated in DOD's 2009 annual sustainable ranges report as well as DOD's plans for its 2010 report submission. In accordance with the mandate, we are submitting this report to you within 90 days after having received DOD's 2009 sustainable ranges report on August 3, 2009.

The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to increase the U.S. military presence on Guam by more than two-and-a-half times the island's current military population of 15,000 by 2020. To keep pace with this growth, DOD has determined that substantial upgrades to the island's existing utilities infrastructure are required for electric power, potable water, wastewater treatment, and solid waste disposal to meet future utility needs. GAO was asked to examine (1) the condition and capacity of the existing utilities' infrastructure on Guam, the military's estimated utility requirements, and potential solutions for meeting the increased demand on the island's utility systems as well as (2) the extent that DOD has developed a comprehensive plan to address any challenges it faces in its planning for new utility systems. GAO reviewed and analyzed plans and studies within DOD, the services, and several stakeholders on implementing new utility services associated with the Guam military buildup.

While DLA has taken steps to minimize potential disruptions to depot operations as a result of its planned consolidation efforts and has made progress in implementing the SS&D consolidation actions, the most difficult tasks still lie ahead, posing challenges for DLA in completing those actions. DLA has taken steps in its plans to mitigate risks to the depots mission by implementing a number of key actions several of which are considered best practices for organizational transformation such as ensuring that leadership drives the transformation and involving military stakeholders in decision making. Senior DLA officials we spoke to told us that they will consider consolidation actions complete when the agreed-upon SS&D functions, personnel positions, and associated personnel have been transferred from the military service to DLA and when related applicable military and DLA inventories have been physically consolidated. As of May 2009, the Air Force had completed the transfer of all positions and associated personnel at all 3 of its affected depots; the Navy had completed transfers at 4 of its 5 locations, and the Marine Corps and the Army had not yet begun to transfer positions. In addition, as of May 2009, DLA had not physically consolidated any inventories and the first is not scheduled to occur until August 2009, which represents a 3-month slippage from the milestones set forth at the beginning of our review. DLA does not currently plan to consolidate any inventories at 5 of the 13 locations 3 Army and 2 Marine Corps locations because, according to DLA and military service officials, neither of these services have any applicable inventories to consolidate.

In response to challenges the Department of Defense (DoD) was facing to repair, renovate, and construct military family housing, Congress enacted the Military Housing Privatization Initiative in 1996. The initiative enables DoD to leverage private sector resources to construct or renovate family housing. As of March 2009, DoD had awarded 94 projects and attracted over $22 billion in private financing. DoD plans to privatize 98 percent of its domestic family housing through 2012. Since GAO's last housing privatization report in 2006, major force structure initiatives have placed new demands on DoD for housing. GAO was asked to assess the following: (1) the progress of DoD's housing privatization program, (2) the occupancy rates of the housing projects, (3) the impact of various force structure initiatives and DoD's efforts to mitigate any challenges, and (4) the effect of financial market turmoil on some projects. To perform this work, GAO visited 13 installations with privatization projects; analyzed project performance data; and interviewed DoD officials, real estate consultants, and private developers. GAO recommends that DoD provide more current information on investment caps and the impact of the current financial market on projects in its semiannual report to Congress. In response to a draft of this report, DoD concurred with GAO's recommendations., Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.

The concurrent implementation of several major Department of Defense (DoD) force structure and infrastructure initiatives has stressed the ability of traditional military construction to provide enough permanent living and working space for service members and other DoD personnel. As a result, the services are using some movable -- or relocatable -- facilities as barracks, administrative offices, medical facilities, dining halls, and equipment maintenance facilities to meet short-term needs. In Senate Report 110-77, the Senate Committee on Armed Services directed GAO to review the subject. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is providing oversight of the services' use of relocatable facilities to meet physical infrastructure needs, and (2) DoD has a strategy for managing such facilities. GAO assessed data reported to OSD on relocatable use and cost as well as visited seven defense installations selected from those identified as having a sizeable number of relocatable facilities. GAO is making recommendations to improve OSD's oversight and management of the services' use of relocatable facilities by clarifying its definition of these facilities; developing a mechanism for collecting data on them; and developing a strategy for using, disposing of, and redistributing them. DoD generally agreed with GAO's recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

Recently, the Army forecast that it would experience a 4.5-million-acre training land shortfall by 2013 and proposed to purchase additional land adjacent to certain existing training ranges. In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's approach for acquiring training land. This report (1) evaluates the Army's approach to the acquisition of training land, (2) describes the Army's consideration of alternatives and assessment of the environmental and economic effects, and (3) analyzes the Army's effectiveness in communicating its approach for making decisions to pursue these acquisitions before the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD) approval. GAO reviewed the Army strategic plan for training lands and other relevant documents, and focused on all five land acquisitions since 2002 at Fort Irwin, California; three training sites in Hawaii; and the proposed expansion of the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site in Colorado. GAO recommends that (1) the Army develop and implement a process to update periodically its strategic plan for training ranges to reflect current needs and (2) OSD and the Army jointly review their strategies for communicating major land acquisitions and agree on a common practice that would address concerns about early disclosure and provide the Army and the other services some flexibility to engage the public. DOD generally agrees with the recommendations., Report to Congressional Requesters.

In 2007, the Army announced that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) had approved its request to expand its Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site, Colorado, by acquiring up to an additional 418,577 acres. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 required the Army to address 29 provisions related to the expansion in a report to Congress. In July 2008, the Army reported that, although it had revalidated the requirement for at least 418,577 additional acres at the maneuver site, in response to community, cost, and other concerns it now proposed to limit the acquisition of additional training land to 100,000 acres. The act also required GAO to review the Army's report and the justification for the proposed expansion. This report examines the extent to which the Army's report (1) addresses the provisions of the mandate and (2) explains the selection of the 100,000-acre site. GAO compared the mandate requirements with the responses in the Army's report, met with Army officials to discuss the expansion, and visited the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site and Fort Carson. GAO recommends that the Army provide Congress with additional information explaining (1) six of the responses to the mandate and (2) the rationale for selecting the 100,000 acres for the proposed expansion. DOD partially agreed with the recommendations., Report to the Congressional Committees.

While the fiscal year 2009 overseas master plans generally reflect recent changes in U.S. basing strategies and the challenges DOD faces in their implementation, as well as address most of our prior recommendations, DOD provided the plans to Congress in May 2008, 3 months after the February 2008 budget submission, even though both the Senate and conference reports accompanying the fiscal year 2004 military construction bill require DOD to issue the plans with the military construction budget submission. The master plans contain information on current defense basing strategies and infrastructure requirements overseas and the challenges that DOD faces in implementation of the plans. The plans also generally address our prior recommendations except that the U.S. Pacific Command plan does not provide details of training challenges for the Air Force in South Korea, despite our prior recommendation that it should describe these challenges and their potential effects on infrastructure and funding requirements. DOD officials said that since last year the South Korean government and the U.S. Air Force have taken several steps to address these training challenges. However, DOD has submitted the plans to Congress after the annual budget submissions even though the congressional reporting requirement directed DOD to provide updates of the master plans with each yearly military construction budget submission. According to DOD officials, OSD's most recent efforts to incorporate last-minute changes in basing plans and projects contributed to providing Congress the fiscal year 2009 plans 3 months late.

Although many land use planning authorities currently exist that permit the Secretary of Defense, the secretaries of the military departments, or both to make more efficient use of real property under their control, such as authorities to outlease or convey certain real property, our analysis of service data showed that the most frequently used of these authorities is Section 2667 of Title 10, leasing of nonexcess property of military departments. The services reported that this authority was used a total of 744 times during fiscal years 2005 through 2007 and its use was spread among the real property controlled by the services. The services reported that Section 2667 of Title 10 was used for both traditional leases and longer-term, more financially complex enhanced use leases. The majority of agreements executed under Section 2667 of Title 10 are traditional nonenhanced use lease agreements. During fiscal year 2007, the services reported that 222 new agreements were signed pursuant to Section 2667 of Title 10 and that approximately $51 million in revenue was earned. In addition, under the same authority, the services reported that more financially complex, longer-term enhanced use leases are being executed. These leases are usually for a term of longer than 30 years and payment is typically in in-kind services, such as new construction, rather than cash. The Army and the Air Force reported that 14 of these enhanced use leases were entered into on land under the control of the respective departments, and they project that the leases will bring in more than $1.1 billion in value over their lives. Furthermore, the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy are currently considering pursuing several additional enhanced use leases.

The Navy has not identified voyage ship repair requirements for surface vessels operating near Guam for 2012 and beyond, although some information is available for developing estimated requirements for use in planning. Navy officials stated that they do not have enough information on which to base such an assessment. Nonetheless, while the Navy has plans for an increased ship presence in the Pacific and can generally predict the number and types of vessels likely to operate near Guam for the next 2 years, the Navy has not determined precisely how changes to its force structure for 2012 and beyond will impact ship repair requirements in Guam. Furthermore, the Marine Corps has not finalized its plans for additional vessels at Guam, or for the potential frequency and duration of visits to Guam anticipated for amphibious vessels which are currently home-ported in Japan, but that may be moved to Guam by 2014 to support Marine Corps units being moved there. In addition, MSC expects changes to its force structure operating at or near Guam. Officials stated that the timeline is uncertain for these changes, and thus the timing of future voyage repair requirements remains uncertain. While the Navy, Marine Corps, and Military Sealift Command have not made final force structure decisions or operational plans for vessels operating at or near Guam, information is available to support estimations of ship repair requirements as part of the multiyear planning and budgeting process. Moreover, DOD guidance requires that maintenance programs be clearly linked to strategic and contingency planning. Previous ship repair records and certain other information exists that could support development of at least estimated requirements.

To reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence on Japanese communities while maintaining a continuing presence of U.S. forces in the region, in 2005 and 2006 the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative outlined the effort to relocate American military units in Japan to other areas, including Guam. The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to move 8,000 Marines and an estimated 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by the 2014 goal. GAO was asked to discuss the planning effort for the buildup of U.S. forces and facilities on Guam. Accordingly, this testimony addresses (1) DOD's planning process for the military buildup on Guam, (2) potential challenges for DOD and the government of Guam associated with the buildup, and (3) the status of planning efforts by the government of Guam to meet infrastructure challenges caused by the buildup. This testimony is based largely on findings of a September 2007 GAO report on DOD's overseas master plans and prior work on issues related to the U.S. military presence in Okinawa. It is also based, in part, on preliminary observations from an ongoing GAO review of DOD's planning effort to address the challenges associated with the military buildup on Guam and on other GAO work on the effects of DOD-related growth on surrounding communities in the continental United States., Testimony before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate.

The Department of Defense (DoD) manages and operates about 577,000 structures worldwide, valued at about $712 billion. DoD has worked for several years to develop models that can reliably estimate the installation support funds needed to sustain these facilities, and plans to spend over $55 billion to support these facilities and operate its bases in fiscal year 2008. Because GAO has identified support infrastructure as a high-risk area that affects DoD's ability to devote funds to other more critical needs, GAO initiated this review under the Comptroller General's authority. This report discusses the following: (1) the reliability of the annual funding estimates produced by the facilities sustainment model, (2) DoD's progress in meeting funding goals for facility sustainment and recapitalization, (3) the extent to which DoD has addressed deferred facility sustainment funding needs, and (4) the status of DoD's efforts to develop a new installation services model. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the accuracy and support for the model's key inputs, analyzed pertinent documents, and visited eight selected installations. GAO recommends that DoD take several actions to increase the facilities sustainment model's reliability, address deferred facility sustainment funding requirements, and advance progress in implementing the installation services model. DoD generally agreed with the recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

In January 2007 the President announced an initiative, referred to as Grow the Force, to increase the end strength in the Army by more than 74,000 by 2013 and the Marine Corps by 27,000 personnel by 2011 to enhance U.S. forces, reduce stress on deployable personnel, and provide necessary forces for success in the Global War on Terrorism. The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that it will need more than $17 billion for facilities to accommodate the planned personnel increases. GAO was asked to review (1) the process the Army and Marine Corps used to develop construction projects associated with Grow the Force, (2) the extent to which the projects submitted in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 support the initiative, and (3) whether the Army and Marine Corps plan to use temporary facilities while construction projects are completed. GAO reviewed the construction projects associated with Grow the Force in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, reviewed stationing documents, and interviewed officials at Army and Marine Corps headquarters and six installations on the process used to develop projects. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with GAO's assessment that 1 Army project and 12 Marine Corps projects do not support Grow the Force but did not provide sufficient documentation that existing capacity issues would be exacerbated by additional personnel., GAO Report to Congressional Committees.

Why GAO Did This Study: A fundamental principle of military readiness is that the military must train as it intends to fight, and military training ranges allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to accomplish this goal. According to DOD officials, heightened focus on the application of environmental statutes has affected the use of its training areas. Since 2003, DOD has obtained exemptions from three environmental laws and has sought exemptions from three others. This report discusses the impact, if any, of (1) environmental laws on DOD's training activities and military readiness, (2) DOD's use of statutory exemptions from environmental laws on training activities, (3) DOD's use of statutory exemptions on the environment, and (4) the extent to which DOD has demonstrated the need for additional exemptions. To address these objectives, GAO visited 17 training locations; analyzed environmental impact and readiness reports; and met with officials at service headquarters, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, federal regulatory agencies, and nongovernmental environmental groups., Report to Congressional Committees.