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First, I will examine the fiscal costs of executing the Iraq and Afghanistan COIN campaigns. Additionally, I will look at the opportunity costs -- what elements of the existing national defense strategy the United States had to forego or curtail to marshal the necessary resources to execute those COIN campaigns. Secondly, I will attempt to make the case that in light of the looming economic trends for the United States, it is not fiscally feasible for the U.S. military to sustain the standing forces required to execute COIN campaigns, nor is it fiscally feasible to deploy and employ those forces in protracted COIN campaigns. Ultimately, I am endeavoring to add value to the dialogue on America's future national defense strategy. This thesis will attempt to convince the reader that spending an inordinate amount of resources in executing a relatively narrow segment of our national defense interests -- COIN -- will undermine America's future national security. It is against the canvas of this larger fiscal backdrop that the author offers the following prescriptions for re-setting U.S. national defense strategy. Consistent with the definition of strategy in part II of this thesis, the prescriptions will be focused on the ends, ways, and means of U.S. national defense strategy: (1) Redeploy U.S. military forces to approximately match their pre-9/11 global posture; (2) Reconsider returning to the 1-4-2-1 strategic planning construct; (3) Re-balance the DoD investment portfolio; (4) Reduce the end strength of the services to pre-9/11 levels -- and beyond; (5) Review the affordability of U.S. military operational concepts; and (6) Re-write FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency doctrine to balance the interaction of ends, ways, and means., Published in Small Wars Journal, October 25, 2011.

The horrific terrorist attacks of September ii, 2001 on the U.S. homeland highlighted the threat that terrorism poses to U.S. national security. DoD operates globally a large network of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets which could be brought to bear in the effort to combat terrorism. The geographic Commander's-in-Chief(CINCs) set the priorities for the intelligence networks in their Areas of Responsibility (AORs) according to their interpretation of the strategic guidance from the National Command Authority (NCA). A key tenet of the new strategic setting is the grave threat to national security posed by terrorism, potentially using Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or Enhanced High Explosive (CBRNE) weapons. This fact, coupled with the new strategic mandate that sets defense of the homeland as the highest priority for the U.S. military, dictates that each of the geographic CINCs set combatting terrorist use of CRBRNE weapons as the highest priority for their intelligence networks. The success or failure of this operational intelligence effort could have major strategic effects., The original document contains color images.