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Hume devised a third way between Hobbes and Locke that bolstered the former's defense of stability and the latter's defense of rebellion. This feat remains underappreciated. Hume's third way rests on the idea of the public conscience, which, like Hobbes's idea of the public conscience, derives from communication and consensus. The public conscience orients us toward the public interest, which, in Hume's theory, is the authoritative standard by which individuals and government alike must abide. In this paper, I elaborate on the moral psychological principles that underlie Hume's concept of the public conscience, which is liable to both conservative liberal and progressive liberal interpretations. And I argue that Hume's third way provides valuable insight into the logic of public political discourse in liberal societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study deals specifically with one of the most relevant issues in neuro-ethics, namely the philosophical classification of so-called memory dampening, which refers to the attenuation of traumatic memories with the help of medication. Numerous neuroethical questions emerge from this issue. For example, how is a person's identity affected by using such drugs? Does one still remain the same person? Would propranolol, for example, as a memory-dampening agent lead to a fundamental change in one's identity? Are not a person's negative memories also part of their identity and present personality? These questions are examined from the perspective of the seventeenth-century Islamic philosopher, Mullā Ṣadrā. The goal is to shed light on the neuroethical foundations of memory dampening and personal identity from an Islamic philosophical perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Amme Idaresi Dergisi is the property of Public Administration Institute for Turkey & the Middle East (TODAIE) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The issue of separation or distinction between the Church and the State has rarely been discussed. More often it has fallen prey to pragmatic solutions. When we look at the history of Church-State relations, we can observe either cooperation or hostility. The Church is looked upon with a sympathetic eye when it supports certain political solutions and with hostility when it criticizes the State. In the case of cooperation, the distinction is apparently acceptable; in the case of hostility, separation is recommended. This article primarily seeks to show the difference between separation and distinction. Both terms appeared in John Locke’s notable Letter Concerning Toleration. Unfortunately, even this philosopher failed to see the difference between the two terms. Assuming that man has many degrees of freedom within the State, the Church is needed as an institution separate from the State to help understand the profound meaning of human freedom, yet free to speak with its own voice and in accordance with its mission. The Church also needs to be aware of the fact that it is distinct from the State, being wary of any close political involvement.

John Locke is acknowledged to be one of the theoretical founders of the separation of church and state, a distinguishing feature of modern liberal democracies. Though Locke's arguments for the merits of such separation have been subject to extensive investigation, his argument for its feasibility has remained relatively unexamined. This article argues that Locke was confident that separation of church and state can successfully be implemented in all times and places because of his epistemological and psychological insights that human beings are moved to act by unease and that separating church and state removes the unease that causes religiously based political instability. We conclude by noting that Locke's understanding of unease is foundational for his larger ambition to secure political liberty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Locke's educational program has long been considered to have two primary aims: to habituate children to reason and to raise children capable of meeting the demands of citizenship that he details in his Two Treatises of Government. Yet Locke's educational prescriptions undermine citizens' capacity for honesty, a critical political virtue for Locke. To explain how Locke's educational prescriptions are self-undermining, we turn to Rousseau's extended critique of Locke's Some Thoughts on Education in his Émile. We argue that Rousseau explains why such an education allows a natural desire to dominate to flourish, rendering children who receive it dishonest and incapable of self-government. Rousseau's critique exposes how a liberal education focused solely on autonomy cannot produce the kinds of citizens a Lockean politics requires. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers an interpretation of Locke's understanding of life, challenging a familiar reading which treats him as endorsing a mechanical reduction of the living body. Against the mechanists, Locke clearly states that the internal movement constitutive of life is excited from within the organism, and he also holds that the coordination of the bodily organs (their unity of function) cannot be understood mechanically. Rather, the different parts of the organism enjoy a ‘vital union', a concept that Locke borrows from Henry More and the Cambridge Platonists. In the final part of the paper, it is shown how personhood, on Locke's understanding, partakes in this vital union and how the person is thus embodied in the human organism, or ‘Man’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates and critiques the view that Lockean prerogative power is or should be incorporated, legally or extralegally, into the American constitutional system. Some scholars argue that extraconstitutional prerogative represents a safer alternative to a broad legal reading of presidential power, as it creates fewer precedents. Others suggest that the Framers "constitutionalized prerogative." Both of these views have difficulties because ultimately, prerogative can create more dangerous precedents than legal uses of presidential power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores Spain's positioning in the shifting currents of the later Enlightenment through the polemic works of lawyer and satirist Juan Pablo Forner. Forner's attempts to prove the existence of an autochthonous tradition of Spanish pragmatism and empiricism form an index of the penetration of intra‐Enlightenment debates into Spanish thought in the late eighteenth century. Forner, profoundly aware of tensions between Cartesian rationalism and Lockean sentimental empiricism across Europe, intervenes on the side of empiricism, insisting that Cartesianism is nothing but a guise of Scholastic hyperrationalism. The article disputes scholarly perceptions of Forner as a Christian reactionary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Review of Claire Rydell Arcenas’s America’s Philosopher: John Locke in American Intellectual Life (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2023)

En este artículo argumentaré que las diferencias entre Francisco Suárez y John Locke con respecto a la naturaleza del contrato originario comportan conclusiones muy dispares en sus respectivas posiciones sobre la tolerancia. Específicamente, sostendré que la “extraña doctrina”, defendida por Locke en el Segundo tratado sobre el gobierno civil, acerca del derecho de castigar violaciones a la ley natural en el estado de naturaleza revela una posición epistemológica “neutralista”, la que a su vez está en la base de la argumentación de Carta sobre la tolerancia. Por el contrario, los argumentos suarecianos tanto a favor como en contra de la tolerancia, particularmente en De fide, pueden explicarse por una posición epistemológica “socialmente situada”, la que se corresponde con la manera en que Suárez entiende el surgimiento de la comunidad política.

O presente texto tem por objetivo apresentar um dos assuntos mais controversos da modernidade, a saber: o princípio de individuação. Em ambos os autores, John Locke e G. W. Leibniz, a questão quanto a necessidade desse princípio diz respeito à moralidade: ações, justiça e Divindade. Contudo, nenhuma dessas construções filosóficas seriam possíveis sem a fundamentação do Cogito, por René Descartes, o eu. Portanto, este artigo inicia pela caracterização do Cogito cartesiano. Em seguida, apresentaremos a compreensão lockeana da consciência como constituidora da identidade pessoal ou moral para, posteriormente, elucidarmos as críticas depreendidas por Leibniz a tal exclusividade.

I argue that Robert Nozick, in his well-known book "Anarchy, State, Utopia", is working with Locke's notion of the natural right to property merely instrumentally. I use the term "instrumentally" in the sense that the pieces of the source are not used within the context of the original work but are used atomically to support one's argument or theory. Instrumental use of Locke's theory causes incoherence in his theory. This paper introduces the incoherence in the question and explains how this incoherency is inherent to Nozick's interpretation and usage of Lockean Proviso. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From Debtor to Friend. How Parents Can Establish a Successful Relationship with their Adult-Children according to Aristotle and John Locke A lot of parents and children struggle to maintain a successful parent-child-relationship, once the children have grown-up. Since this struggle is not limited to the 21st century, but can be encountered throughout history, as evidenced by the remarks of Aristotle and Locke, a look at the thoughts of the aforementioned pedagogues can help us not only better understand the struggle, but also to find a practical solution to this problem. Both Locke and Aristotle provide meaningful insight to the difficulties parents face during the transition of their child from the role of being their child to the role of an independent adult, but also outline an effective method for parents to initiate the beginning of a fulfilling relationship with their adult children. A method, that can best be described as: Transforming an unequal friendship between debtor and creditor into an equal friendship between friends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that Hans Sloane conceived of museums as an aspect of what the laity could achieve in the field of promoting Christian knowledge. This was considered, upon Lockean terms, as being founded in reason. Sloane's scientific endeavours were, like Robert Boyle before him, an effort towards rebuilding the nation upon a shared vision of a 'natural' faith. This example is contrasted with a spoof museum closely associated with Sloane's circle, Don Saltero's Coffee House, which was founded upon a lampoon of a Catholic reliquary and satirised the concept of the cabinet of curiosities. This argument runs counter to prevailing views of museums as post-Enlightenment institutions intended to oppose the role of faith in society and replace them with secular alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the methods that Locke advocated in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding to evaluate manuscript evidence from five different schemes and two drafts of the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, to thereby determine what role, if any, John Locke had in writing it, and in advocating for slavery and absolutism. It focuses on the influential claims put forward by David Armitage 20 years ago, that Locke was responsible for actively promoting slavery in Carolina’s Fundamental Constitutions. It enables the reader to view, and judge, the relevant evidence. The author concludes, and invites the reader to conclude, that Armitage’s main claims lack foundation in the manuscript evidence. That evidence instead points towards the legal power of those who owned Carolina, the Lords Proprietors, and to the crown, which granted Carolina’s charter, and to the logic of a different theory of government, patriarchalism, for the rationale behind both slavery and absolutism. The central ideas behind slavery and colonization were epitomized, as Locke understood, by Sir Robert Filmer, who wrote the book to which Locke responded in his Two Treatises of Government. Filmer’s ally, Sir Henry Spelman, like Filmer a deeply committed royalist who believed in the king’s unlimited prerogatives, composed the original 1629 Carolina charter that shaped the Fundamental Constitutions. Misattributing the authorship of particular clauses to Locke is a symptom of a larger failure to distinguish the impact of momentous debates over authority and race in the seventeenth century. Locke’s theories did, in practice as well as principle, reject the theory of domination put forward by Filmer, and argued instead for human rights and democracy that were inclusive and capacious. The manuscript evidence has the potential to reshape how modern democratic theory is understood in the present.

A review of John Colman’s recent book Everyone Orthodox to Themselves: John Locke and His American Students on Religion and Liberal Society (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2023)

Scholarship on Shelley's economic thought has long acknowledged his embrace of the labour theory of value. This essay offers a more probing account of the poet's investigations into the origins of economic value. Focusing on Queen Mab (1813), it situates Shelley's value theory in relation to competing theories and examines his engagement with his cited sources, including works by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and William Godwin. It argues that Shelley moves beyond this work to encompass unacknowledged sources, including John Locke's theory of property rights and Adam Smith's discussion of value in the Wealth of Nations, enabling him to formulate his own version of the pure labour theory of value. The essay thus provides a richer examination of the philosophical foundations of Shelley's early economic thought, connecting these ideas to aspects of his ethics and epistemology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Teorija in Praksa is the property of Teorija in Praksa and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this article is to connect the dots between contemporary efforts to ban "dangerous" reading material and Western narratives about childhood innocence that rose to prominence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Understanding these narratives is important, because they underlie common misapprehensions about how children consume and process literature. By illuminating the history of beliefs about childhood and reading that are used to justify censorship, as well as alternatives to them, this article will provide librarians with useful context for our contemporary moment and perspectives that may prove beneficial when they face book-banning efforts in their communities. By illuminating the history of beliefs about childhood and reading that are used to justify censorship, as well as alternatives to them, this article provides librarians with useful context for our contemporary moment and perspectives that may prove beneficial when they face book-banning efforts in their communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

So much human suffering is self-imposed. One important aspect of philosophical practice is helping clients see how they cause their own suffering and to show them how to stop doing so. Perhaps the most fertile ground for the arising of suffering is our beliefs about reality. The folk theory of truth accords with the standard correspondence theory of truth, and is thus what our clients adhere to. This way of looking at truth and knowledge leads to much suffering because it implies a direct relationship between statements/beliefs and reality. A more beneficial way of looking at truth is in a pragmatic way: as that which works, and not as beliefs that reflect how things "really" are. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Matthew Leisinger (2020) argues that previous interpretations of John Locke’s account of akrasia (or weakness of will) are mistaken and offers a new interpretation in their place. In this essay, we aim to recapitulate part of this debate, defend a previously articulated interpretation by responding to Leisinger’s criticisms of it, and explain why Leisinger’s own interpretation faces textual and philosophical problems that are serious enough to disqualify it as an accurate reconstruction of Locke’s views. In so doing, we aim to shed further light on Locke’s views on the various ways in which humans are prone to err in their pursuit of happiness.

A introdução da propriedade privada é um ponto de inflexão na história hipotética traçada por Rousseau. As relações sociais, já iniciadas, são completamente reconfiguradas por esse advento. Mais especificamente, é apenas devido à marcada desigualdade econômica que segue a partição das terras entre proprietários e supranumerários que uma conflitualidade exacerbada se instaura entre os homens, tornando imperativo a celebração de um contrato que estabilize o convívio social pela via da ereção de um poder político soberano. Dada a centralidade do problema, Rousseau não poderia deixar de investigar a questão da propriedade também sob um prisma moral-normativo. Para o genebrino, seria possível admitir uma regulação pré-política das relações de propriedade? Haveria critérios de legitimação da propriedade privada anteriores ao estado civil e ao direito positivo? A posse factual poderia ser reivindicada como direito já no estado de natureza? O presente artigo busca responder tais perguntas por meio de um diálogo entre Rousseau e o principal representante da tradição jusnaturalista no que que concerne a essas questões – John Locke.

RESUMO Neste artigo, proponho que o exame da resposta de Locke ao ceticismo requer que consideremos ao menos três sentidos distintos em que o ceticismo surge no horizonte do Ensaio. O ceticismo é abordado, direta ou indiretamente, (i) como um resultado geral da investigação filosófica, (ii) como decisão metódica de duvidar e ainda (iii) como resultado de um problema particular que desafia a pretensão de conhecimento. Penso que, por meio do exame de como Locke reage a tais questões, obtemos uma imagem mais precisa e nuançada da relação de Locke com a filosofia cética.

In Locke’s philosophy money is ‘naturalised’ and thus ostensibly removed from political contestation. Locke has been criticised for marginalising monetary politics, and thus downplaying the conventional character of money that could potentially allow for democratic monetary reform. Drawing on Marx’s writings, this paper shows that money is indeed a social convention, but its inherent economic functioning restricts its susceptibility to political contestation. There are limits to the democratic reform of money in a capitalist economy that spring from money’s own nature.

Locke’s short essay, “Venditio,” offers a series of thought-provoking examples of prices that might or might not be viewed as just. Locke writes as though these examples and his comments about them point to a coherent doctrine about which agreed-to prices are morally acceptable and which are morally unacceptable. However, despite the acuity of some of Locke’s observations, no such coherent doctrine emerges from Locke’s discussions of these examples. Indeed, many of the conclusions Locke reaches as he moves from example to example are implausible in themselves or inconsistent with one another. Nevertheless, not all is lost. Locke’s observations can be viewed as thought experiments on his part which, in conjunction with insights from Locke’s other economic writings, indicate what features a doctrine of acceptable and unacceptable prices needs to possess. I show how a line of argument which appears almost as a sidebar within “Venditio” offers a doctrine that provides those needed features. That doctrine affirms both “the common law of traffic” and “the common law of charity” and a view about when the latter takes priority over the former.

O presente artigo tem como objetivo analisar o conceito de propriedade na teoria de Arthur Schopenhauer, contida principalmente na obra Parerga und Paralipomena e a teoria de John Locke, expressa no Segundo tratado sobre o governo civil e estabelecer relações entre os conceitos, de modo a demonstrar as semelhanças enquanto direito natural e suas diferenças enquanto direito positivado na teoria dos dois filósofos.

Citizens United has stimulated a cottage industry of legal scholarship on corruption. A prominent stream of this literature is self-consciously atheoretical and suggests that the current state of corruption jurisprudence suffers from a misconceived reliance on liberal political theories and a rejection of the public good. We argue that it is impossible to understand specific acts of corruption without a political theory explaining why such actions are wrong. We show that the current jurisprudence relies on a mistaken intellectual history of the public good and a political theory of American constitutionalism that commodifies citizenship and treats political participation as a market good. Pace Teachout, we cannot draw the bright lines many legal scholars desire without a better political theory of the primary goods we want to protect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges the colonial reading of Thomas Hobbes's use of America. Firstly, by analysing all the references and allusions to America in Hobbes's writings, I claim that Hobbes simply uses America to support his central theory of the state of nature, showing the fundamental significance of a large and lasting society to our being and well-being. Secondly, I argue that Hobbes's use of America does not serve a second purpose that is similar to Locke's justification of English land appropriation. Even extending such a Lockean colonial theme from Hobbes's theory would fail due to Hobbes's unique property theory. Lastly, with a more nuanced contextual analysis of Hobbes's involvement in the Virginia Company and relevant textual analysis, I propose that Hobbes is not only not a supporter of English colonialism, but rather an opponent of the Virginia Company, imperial expansion, and colonial conquest. I am not denying the fact that later thinkers like Locke develop Hobbes's notion of the American state of nature to justify European colonization in America. However, the received history should not be confused with Hobbes's own writing purpose. Nor should we ignore Hobbes's opposition to imperial expansion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While "anger" or "angry" are words often used to describe today's societies and politics, they are not the ones that commentators of Locke use when talking about his political theory. This article argues that anger is in fact very much at the heart of his political outlook, and that focusing on this passion helps us to see an important aspect of the state. Since little has been said in relation to Locke and anger, this article starts by examining how he defined, viewed, and justified anger. It shows how Locke conceptualised a problematic component of anger, revenge, in terms of retributive punishment, which, when proportionate, can be viewed positively. The article then shows how Locke placed and tamed anger in the state's hands to resolve the problems in the state of nature caused by anger. In this way, this article sheds light on the state's role as an anger manager. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the educational theories of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, highlighting their views on individual development and the role of education. The objective is to examine how each philosopher perceives the development of human capacities, focusing on their contributions to morality, autonomy, and the learning process. The methodology is based on textual and interpretative analysis of Locke's main works, such as Some Thoughts Concerning Education, and Rousseau's, especially Émile, or On Education. The study compares their approaches regarding the role of reason, emotions, and experience in childhood education, as well as their critiques of formal education. The central hypothesis suggests that, despite their differences, both philosophers advocate for an education aimed at developing a moral and autonomous human being, albeit through different methods: Locke supports moral and rational teaching from an early age, while Rousseau emphasizes a sensitive and natural education that respects the spontaneous development of the child. Results indicate that, for Locke, education should shape virtuous and reasonable individuals, prepared for societal life, while Rousseau proposes an education that prioritizes sensitive reason and preserves inner freedom to protect the individual from social corruption, although Emile's formation shall direct him to a virtual life in society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early iterations of his political thought, The Elements of Law and De Cive , Hobbes proposed a new account of the nature of the people. In Section 2 I describe Pufendorf's critical response. Pufendorf's theory of the people is a neglected aspect of the political argument of the De Jure. Just as neglected is Locke's theory of the people in Two Treatises of Government , though there is better reason for neglect in Locke's case, in so far as he fails in his major work of political philosophy to present anything resembling a theory of the people at all. In Section 3 I bring Locke's thinking about the people into clearer focus. In the concluding Section 4 I explore some of the weaknesses of his position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Copyright of Zeitschrift für Politische Theorie is the property of Verlag Barbara Budrich GmbH and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Christian apologists argue that the testimony of the miracles of Jesus provide evidence for Christianity. Hume tries to undermine this argument by pointing out that miracles are said to occur in other religious traditions and so miracles do not give us reason to believe in Christianity over the alternatives. Thus, competing miracles act as an undercutting defeater for the argument from miracles for Christianity. Yet, before Hume, Locke responds to this kind of objection, and in this article I explain and defend his response. In short, Locke argues that God will ensure that there is more evidence for Christianity (if true) and this greater evidence is an undercutting defeater for Hume's competing miracles defeater (i.e. it is a defeater-defeater). If so, then, as Locke argues, competing miracles do not weaken the evidence from miracles for Christianity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between theology and property in the works of John Locke, focusing on his teleological system of justice. The author argues that Locke sees individuals as means to fulfill divine will rather than ends in themselves. The influence of José de Acosta on Locke's ideas about Amerindians is also discussed, with Acosta's belief in education and Christianization as a means to overcome barbarism seen as foundational to Locke's views on sovereignty, property, and individual rights. The article challenges interpretations by authors like Nozick and Simmons and proposes a teleological reading of Locke's ethics. Additionally, the text explores Acosta and Bartolomé de Las Casas' perspectives on the observation and education of Amerindians, with Acosta justifying conquest and colonization based on cultural resemblance to European ideals, while Las Casas advocates for dialogue and education. Locke's views on Native Americans are also examined, with the belief that they needed to be educated by property-owning Europeans. The text suggests that Locke's views supported a Eurocentric program of civilization in America. Lastly, the article discusses Locke's perspective on the conquest of America and the hierarchy of humanity he introduces, categorizing individuals based on their resemblance to the ideal of humanity. The text concludes that while authors like Nozick and Simmons have used Locke's ideas to construct liberal theories, it is challenging to justify the invasion of America or the enslavement of Africans based on Locke's belief in freedom and equality, as [Extracted from the article]

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Copyright of Journal of Social & Cultural Studies / Toplum ve Kültür Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of Journal of Social & Cultural Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)