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Most of the existing models for deploying IoT ecosystem involves the vendor being in the loop of the command and control of IoT devices hence users' privacy and security is one of the main challenges. Despite these concerns, users are often faced with a choice between limiting the device functionality or enabling internet access to the IoT devices by signing up to the vendor centralized model in order to access their device from outside their home. In this paper, we argue that although IoT is promising a revolutionary way of offering services to users, most of these devices shouldn't be allowed to have Internet access due to the increased risks to privacy and security. We present an alternative home networking design model which limits the exposure of IoT devices, and enable seamless access to their functionality from outside the home using WireGuard (WG), a state-of-the-art Virtual Private Network (VPN) protocol. We built a test-bed using off-the-shelf IoT devices for testing our proposed network design under various conditions; including access from Home, 4G, Office and Public Wifi networks. We show that our VPN-based remote access to the IoT device offers a better performance in terms of end-to-end delay in all scenarios when using Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTP) and comparable performance when using double encryption Hypertext Transport Protocol Secure (HTTPS) over the VPN.

A common approach to securing end-to-end connectivity between devices on the Internet is to utilise a cloud-based intermediary. With this reliance upon a third-party comes a set of security and privacy concerns that are difficult to mitigate. A promising new protocol, Wireguard, dispenses with the middleman to provide secure peer-to-peer communication. However, support for initial key exchange falls outside Wireguard's scope, making it potentially vulnerable to insecure out-of-band key exchange. The design of secure and usable key exchange methods is challenging, not least in domestic spaces, as they're often characterised by technically naive users in multi-occupancy environments, making them susceptible to insider and passer-by attacks (i.e.: theft, observation attacks, relay and impersonation attacks). We describe and present the results from a design ideation study that probes the use of tangible, multi-factor approaches for securing key exchange in domestic spaces. The study suggests that a home's semi-fixed features (e.g.: lamps, shelves, chairs) can be instrumented to support a promising three-factor authentication approach ('what you have, what you know and where you are') to enable key exchange solutions that are i. more secure than commonly used naive approaches and ii. desirable for end users.

We present the Databox application development environment or SDK as a means of enabling trusted IoT app development at the network edge. The Databox platform is a dedicated domestic platform that stores IoT, mobile and cloud data and executes local data processing by third party apps to provide end-user control over data flow and enable data minimisation. Key challenges for building apps in edge environments concern i. the complexity of IoT devices and user requirements, and ii. supporting privacy preserving features that meet new data protection regulations. We show how the Databox SDK can ease the burden of regulatory compliance and be used to sensitize developers to privacy related issues in the very course of building apps. We present feedback on the SDK's exposure to over 3000 people across a range of developer and industry events.