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This study explores the computational mechanisms underlying the resolution of cognitive dissonances. We focus on scenarios in which an observation violates the expected relationship between objects. For instance, an agent expects object A to be smaller than B in some feature space but observes the opposite. One solution is to adjust the expected relationship according to the new observation and change the expectation to A being larger than B. An alternative solution would be to adapt the representation of A and B in the feature space such that in the new representation, the relationship that A is smaller than B is maintained. While both pathways resolve the dissonance, they generalize differently to different tasks. Using Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) capable of relational learning, we demonstrate the existence of these two pathways and show that the chosen pathway depends on the dissonance magnitude. Large dissonances alter the representation of the objects, while small dissonances lead to adjustments in the expected relationships. We show that this effect arises from the inherently different learning dynamics of relationships and representations and study the implications.

The nature of abstract reasoning is a matter of debate. Modern artificial neural network (ANN) models, like large language models, demonstrate impressive success when tested on abstract reasoning problems. However, it has been argued that their success reflects some form of memorization of similar problems (data contamination) rather than a general-purpose abstract reasoning capability. This concern is supported by evidence of brittleness, and the requirement of extensive training. In our study, we explored whether abstract reasoning can be achieved using the toolbox of ANNs, without prior training. Specifically, we studied an ANN model in which the weights of a naive network are optimized during the solution of the problem, using the problem data itself, rather than any prior knowledge. We tested this modeling approach on visual reasoning problems and found that it performs relatively well. Crucially, this success does not rely on memorization of similar problems. We further suggest an explanation of how it works. Finally, as problem solving is performed by changing the ANN weights, we explored the connection between problem solving and the accumulation of knowledge in the ANNs.

In this paper, we aimed to help bridge the gap between human fluid intelligence - the ability to solve novel tasks without prior training - and the performance of deep neural networks, which typically require extensive prior training. An essential cognitive component for solving intelligence tests, which in humans are used to measure fluid intelligence, is the ability to identify regularities in sequences. This motivated us to construct a benchmark task, which we term \textit{sequence consistency evaluation} (SCE), whose solution requires the ability to identify regularities in sequences. Given the proven capabilities of deep networks, their ability to solve such tasks after extensive training is expected. Surprisingly, however, we show that naive (randomly initialized) deep learning models that are trained on a \textit{single} SCE with a \textit{single} optimization step can still solve non-trivial versions of the task relatively well. We extend our findings to solve, without any prior training, real-world anomaly detection tasks in the visual and auditory modalities. These results demonstrate the fluid-intelligent computational capabilities of deep networks. We discuss the implications of our work for constructing fluid-intelligent machines.

In the cognitive sciences, it is common to distinguish between crystal intelligence, the ability to utilize knowledge acquired through past learning or experience and fluid intelligence, the ability to solve novel problems without relying on prior knowledge. Using this cognitive distinction between the two types of intelligence, extensively-trained deep networks that can play chess or Go exhibit crystal but not fluid intelligence. In humans, fluid intelligence is typically studied and quantified using intelligence tests. Previous studies have shown that deep networks can solve some forms of intelligence tests, but only after extensive training. Here we present a computational model that solves intelligence tests without any prior training. This ability is based on continual inductive reasoning, and is implemented by deep unsupervised latent-prediction networks. Our work demonstrates the potential fluid intelligence of deep networks. Finally, we propose that the computational principles underlying our approach can be used to model fluid intelligence in the cognitive sciences.

Exploration is a fundamental aspect of Reinforcement Learning, typically implemented using stochastic action-selection. Exploration, however, can be more efficient if directed toward gaining new world knowledge. Visit-counters have been proven useful both in practice and in theory for directed exploration. However, a major limitation of counters is their locality. While there are a few model-based solutions to this shortcoming, a model-free approach is still missing. We propose $E$-values, a generalization of counters that can be used to evaluate the propagating exploratory value over state-action trajectories. We compare our approach to commonly used RL techniques, and show that using $E$-values improves learning and performance over traditional counters. We also show how our method can be implemented with function approximation to efficiently learn continuous MDPs. We demonstrate this by showing that our approach surpasses state of the art performance in the Freeway Atari 2600 game., Comment: Final version for ICLR 2018

Idiosyncratic tendency to choose one alternative over others in the absence of an identified reason, is a common observation in two-alternative forced-choice experiments. It is tempting to account for it as resulting from the (unknown) participant-specific history and thus treat it as a measurement noise. Indeed, idiosyncratic choice biases are typically considered as nuisance. Care is taken to account for them by adding an ad-hoc bias parameter or by counterbalancing the choices to average them out. Here we quantify idiosyncratic choice biases in a perceptual discrimination task and a motor task. We report substantial and significant biases in both cases. Then, we present theoretical evidence that even in idealized experiments, in which the settings are symmetric, idiosyncratic choice bias is expected to emerge from the dynamics of competing neuronal networks. We thus argue that idiosyncratic choice bias reflects the microscopic dynamics of choice and therefore is virtually inevitable in any comparison or decision task.