Search

A critical introduction to sociobiology is not possible without concern for its theoretical nexuses and controversies. One should not confuse the New Synthesis with the Modern Synthesis. To understand sociobiology, it helps to have an adequate grasp of causation, to conceptualize the interplay of biology and culture, to understand the function of reduction in science, to treat variables qua variables, to firmly grasp the logic of system analysis, and to avoid a superficial reading of Wilson's work tainted by a pseudo-revolutionary tendency to moralize. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article begins by underscoring the widely noted "sociological crisis" and the message from the history of science that the crisis may be susceptible to resolution through an application of a general law pertaining to a neighboring science (sociobiology in our case). From here, the article proceeds to pinpoint the basic argument of Professor Crippen's article (this issue) and then critically examines the two articles that critically accompany it. We find some errors of interpretation in Professor Maryanski's article, but on the whole it is a constructive critique of Crippen's essay and a related invitation to a biologically informed evolutionary sociology. By contrast, Professor Freese's interminable article fails to confront Crippen's argument and in the process offers a tortuous, tendentious itinerary of politically correct interpretations of scientific inquiry in general and sociobiological science in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on the work of sociologist Vilfredo Pareto. In 1866, at the age of 18, Vilfredo Pareto published his first article on the applications of axionometric design. A year later, he received his B.S. in mathematics from the University of Turin and matriculated in mechanical engineering. In 1870, he graduated as an engineer maxima cum laude upon defending a doctoral thesis on "Fundamental Principles on the Theory of Elasticity of Solid Bodies and Basic Research on the Integration of the Equations That Differentiate the Equilibrium." The next 10 years in Pareto's life were full of varied occupational, intellectual and political experiences. For four years he worked as a consulting engineer in the railways of the new Kingdom. Later he was for six years general superintendent of three iron mines. During this period he became interested in economics, noting that there was much to read about it but altogether too little science in it. In 1880 he became general director of the Italian Society of Iron Works.

A brief review of the evolutionism of Comte, Marx, Spencer, and Durkheim, representatives of the Masters, reveals an excessive concern with the integration of differentiation. This represents their most common feature, but neither it nor anything else adds up to a definite evolutionary theory. An antithetical convergence, with Comte excluded, refers to a varying utilization of the Darwinian "mechanism," natural selection. It is not clear, however, that the masters fully grasped the meaning of natural selection, or indeed that this could be understood unequivocally. As a result they failed to convey unambiguously a fundamental interest in evolution to subsequent generations of social scientists. A period of estrangement from evolutionary theory ensued in which the focus seemed to shift from social evolution to social change. By the 1950s, sociology and anthropology experienced a revival of evolutionary interest largely in the form of a reiteration of old conceptions and problems. A critical glance at evolutionary biology reveals, next, an ambiguity in the concept of natural selection when understood as ultimate cause and mechanism of evolution. The basic significance of the evolutionistic alliance known as sociobiology lies in the latter's partial redressing of the ambiguity by way of the "maximization principle." Equally important, indeed complementary, is the sociobiological appeal to the social sciences for help to discover the environmental parameters that impinge on the principle- and thus for a contribution to the development of a biocultural model. A few examples of biocultural theorizing follow that show varying degrees of systemic dependence between the biological and the cultural. The basic nomothetic thrust of the emerging biocultural model is to emphasize the adaptive paths along which cultural phenomena are likely to evolve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the history of science it has often happened that a scholar's ideas are denied full recognition because of that scholar's real or assumed connection to some controversial ideology. The position accorded to Vilfredo Pareto is one illustration of such practice in present-day sociology. This scholar is often said to have been a "Newton of the Moral World," or altogether a fascist ideologist. So Faris informs us that "The book [The Mind and Society] formulates the implicit philosophy of Italian Fascism, advocating the right of the strong to take what they want without apology or appeal to moral principles." In tracing the development of social thought, Bogardus devotes an entire chapter to "Pareto and Fascist Thought," and authoritatively argues that "While fascism has some of its roots in Nietzsche's concepts and other roots in Machiavellianism, yet Pareto's ideas come even closer to giving an adequate basis." Zanden, in turn, interprets Pareto's sociology to be "a philosophy of society, a social creed, determined mainly by violent and ever purely personal passions. The logical fulfillment of this political manifesto is fascism." We need not continue further; analogous affirmations are bountiful in the literature. To be sure, not all sociologists accept this view, but to date little or no systematic effort has been made to resolve the controversy, with the result that many students of sociology are unwitting victims of one of the most cruel intellectual hoaxes perpetrated against their discipline and one of their kind. The present paper proposes to offer a clarification with respect to the alleged connection between Pareto's sociology and fascist ideology. Our approach takes us in two major directions: first, an examination of Pareto's Treatise, his chief sociological work, and second, an examination of a series of letters written to his great friend Pantaleoni during the period when fascism was a political reality in Italy. Before proceeding to present our argument, it may be useful to inquire briefly about the meaning of "fascism," as his critics tend to use that word. A rapid glance at the literature reveals that the following are generally believed to be among the chief characteristics of fascist ideology: distrust of reason, a code of behavior based on "race" and violence, belligerent nationalism, government by an elite, and totalitarianism. Characteristically, these then provide the basis for accusing Pareto of "antirationalism," "anti-intellectualism," "contempt for democracy," and approval of the use of force at all costs. The major portion of this paper will be concerned, therefore, with explicating Pareto's position on these four issues. We shall begin by considering Pareto's alleged antirationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Edward E. Harris explored the association between a nationally derived scale of socio-economic status and the variables of prestige, reward, skill and functional importance. He attempted to provide a view on the functional theory of stratification as stated by Kingsley Davis and Wilbert E. Moore. Prestige refers to a sociopsychological phenomenon. The Davis-Moore theory argues that prestige is dependent on functional importance. The Davis-Moore conceptualization failed to become an explicit theory of human behavior.

It has been almost twenty years since Davis and Moore published their famed theory of stratification. During this period, the discussions which it has engendered have been numerous and highly instructive. It is now time to address ourselves to problems which concern the testability of the theory and its experimental validity. This paper reports the results of an empirical study of one of the basic issues raised by Davis and Moore. A major proposition of their theory argues that in the final analysis, social stratification arises in a society because of differential rewards for performance in the social positions therein. These rewards can be of several types. For our purposes, two are of major importance: symbolic and economic rewards, hereafter referred to as "prestige" and "reward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]