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We briefly review the rationale behind technological alliances and provide a snapshot of their role in global competition, especially insofar as it is based around intellectual capital. They nicely illustrate the increased importance of horizontal agreements and thus establish the relevance of the topic. We move on to discuss the organisation of industries in a dynamic context and draw out consequences for competition policy. We conclude with an outlook on the underlying tensions between technology alliances, competition policy, and industrial policy.

The paper analyses the extent of and the reasons behind limits to competition policy harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in Eastern Europe. We then describe competition policy practice in all ten EU candidate countries and point out differences both between East and West and among the candidates. Finally, we examine a large database of inter-firm agreements in Eastern Europe’s car industry and use insights from case studies of subcontracting to highlight instances of non-conformity between (1) East European competition law and practice and (2) EU rules and East European competition law enforcement. The conclusion recommends how to improve competition policy practice, and thus compliance, postenlargement.

We study the rationale for the use of exclusivity to protect transfer of technology in subcontracting agreements. The legal possibility arises through the EU Notice on Subcontracting. Empirically, the link between exclusive agreements and technology transfer among firms in the automotive supply industry in EU candidate countries is surprisingly weak, although with exclusive-supply or exclusive-buying clauses in subcontracting agreements upstream transfer of technology is more likely. Exclusive agreements are often reciprocal, and are typically passed on. Downstream firms are more likely to face and use vertical restraints. Technology trickles upstream: Multinational final assemblers transfer more technology than lower-tier suppliers.

The paper analyses the extent of and the reasons behind limits to competition policy harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in Eastern Europe. We then describe competition policy practice in all ten EU candidate countries and point out differences both between East and West and among the candidates. Finally, we use insights from case studies of subcontractor agreements in the Eastern Europe. to highlight instances of non-conformity between (1) East European competition law and practice and (2) EU rules and East European competition law enforcement. Our conclusion targets an underdeveloped competition culture as primary culprit for limits to effective – as opposed to merely legal – harmonisation of competition policy in the run-up to EU enlargement.

The paper analyses the extent of and the reasons behind limits to competition policy harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in Eastern Europe. We then describe competition policy practice in all ten EU candidate countries and point out differences both between East and West and among the candidates. Finally, we use insights from case studies of subcontractor agreements in the Eastern Europe. to highlight instances of non-conformity between (1) East European competition law and practice and (2) EU rules and East European competition law enforcement. Our conclusion targets an underdeveloped competition culture as primary culprit for limits to effective – as opposed to merely legal – harmonisation of competition policy in the run-up to EU enlargement.

We test the relationship between exclusive agreements and technology transfer among firms in the automotive supply industry in EU candidate countries. Exclusive agreements come in bundles, are reciprocal and are passed on up- or downstream. The type of exclusivity employed by a firm depends on its position in the supply chain. Downstream firms are more likely to be subject to and/or impose vertical restraints. Technology trickles upstream: Multinational final assemblers transfer a lot of technology; lower-tier suppliers less. Technology transfer is negatively related to the exclusive agreements that should protect it, suggesting a certain incidence of anti- rather than pro-competitive motives. Complementary case studies reveal three possible motives for vertical restraints. Owners of technology protect their intellectual property; recipients of technology protect investments in relation-specific assets; and either or both engage in attempts to increase market power. This has implications for competition policy in an enlarging Europe.

This work describes the opening of the Hungarian economy from the early 1980s to the current transitional position. It analyzes the management of external debt and international competitiveness, and shows that the dismal economic performance of the country was only partially homemade. Assurances by the international financial community - that uninterrupted debt service would guarantee access to international capital markets - as well as protectionist western trade practices contributed considerably to Hungary's difficulties in credit management and export performance. --List of Figures --List of Tables --Foreword / Susan Strange --Preface --List of Abbreviations --Introduction 1 --1. The Management of External Debt 22 --2. The Management of Industrial Policy and Trade 63 --3. International Competitiveness 91 --4. The Management of Foreign Direct Investment: A Preliminary Assessment 151 --Notes 180 --References 191 --Index 208 Published version of EUI PhD thesis, 1993

Defence date: 11 June 1993 Examining board: Prof. Susan Strange (European University Institute, supervisor) ; Prof. Robert Waldmann (European University Institute, co-supervisor) ; Prof. Tamás Bácskai (International Training Center for Bankers, Budapest) ; Prof. Patrick Messerlin (Institut d'Études Politiques, Paris) ; Prof. Louis Pauly (University of Toronto) PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digitised archive of EUI PhD theses completed between 2013 and 2017