Search

This article analyzes a learning experience in Brazil that combined traditional lectures and experiential learning inspired by ethnographic research. It innovates by applying the experiential learning cycle to the theme of street-level bureaucracy (SLB) in a highly unequal context. The main objectives are to discuss the challenges of teaching SLB, report on the course structure, and discuss the findings taken from the student's assessment of the course. We evaluated three dimensions of learning outcomes -- affective, knowledge, and skills-based -- using a short questionnaire and focus groups. We found that students experienced the course differently depending on their professional background. Students with academic profiles particularly benefited from the increase of their teaching repertoire. Overall, they were highly motivated, applied the SLB framework to their research projects, and engaged in long-term activities related to the theme.

This special issue investigates the impact of populism and democratic backsliding on street‐level bureaucracy (SLB) across various countries and contexts. The cooccurrence of populism and democratic erosion significantly alters public administration, particularly affecting public sector employees responsible for policy implementation. This issue explores how populist strategies differ in their application to SLBs as compared to the Civil Service, the distinctive challenges SLBs encounter due to populism and democratic backsliding, and the pressures exacerbated during crises. By examining studies from Brazil, Mexico, Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Switzerland, and the United States, the papers highlight the interplay between political pressures and frontline service delivery. The findings underscore the necessity of understanding the relationship between democratic backsliding, populism, and SLBs, proposing a research agenda to further explore these dynamics and their implications for public administration and policy implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bribery and other forms of petty corruption typically arise in bureaucratic encounters and are a common element of the everyday experience of the state in many countries, particularly in places with weak institutions. This type of corruption is especially troublesome because it creates direct costs for citizens when accessing services and benefits to which they are formally entitled. However, only a few studies deal with how situational attributes of bureaucratic interactions create incentives for citizens to pay bribes and opportunities for street-level bureaucrats to demand them. We contribute to filling this gap by providing evidence that administrative burdens increase the chance of bribery. We do so by analyzing the prevalence of (attempted) bribery in more than 63,000 interactions across 20 different types of bureaucratic encounters, ranging from paying taxes to accessing essential services, using multilevel logistic regression analysis. Our study contributes to understanding the possible consequences of administrative burdens and the factors conducive to petty corruption in specific citizen–state interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]