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The future quantum internet will leverage existing communication infrastructures, including deployed optical fibre networks, to enable novel applications that outperform current information technology. In this scenario, we perform a feasibility study of quantum communications over an industrial 224 km submarine optical fibre link deployed between Southport in the United Kingdom (UK) and Portrane in the Republic of Ireland (IE). With a characterisation of phase drift, polarisation stability and arrival time of entangled photons, we demonstrate the suitability of the link to enable international UK-IE quantum communications for the first time., Comment: 11 pages, 6 figures

Side-channel attacks allow an Eavesdropper to use insecurities in the practical implementation of QKD systems to gain an advantage that is not considered by security proofs that assume perfect implementations. In this work we specify a side-channel capability for Eve that has yet to be considered, before then going on to discuss a scheme to autonomously detect such an attack during an ongoing QKD session, and the limits as to how fast a detection can be made. The side-channel capability is very general and covers a wide variety of possible implementations for the attack itself. We present how Alice and Bob can put in place a countermeasure to continue use of the QKD system, once a detection is made, regardless of the ongoing side-channel attack. This prevents downtime of QKD systems, which in critical infrastructure could pose severe risks. We then extend Eves side-channel capability and present a modified attack strategy. This strengthened attack can be detected under certain conditions by our scheme, however intelligent choices of parameters from Eve allow her strengthened attack to go undetected. From this, we discuss the implications this has on Privacy Amplification, and therefore on the security of QKD as a whole. Finally, consideration is given as to how these types of attacks are analogous to certain types of faults in the QKD system, how our detection scheme can also detect these faults, and therefore how this adds autonomous fault detection and redundancy to implementations of QKD., Comment: 8 pages, 5 figures, to be submitted to Physical Review A

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the best candidate for securing communications against attackers, who may in the future exploit quantum-enhanced computational powers to break classical encryption. As such, new challenges are arising from our need for large-scale deployment of QKD systems. In a realistic scenario, transmitting and receiving devices from different vendors should be able to communicate with each other without the need for matching hardware. Therefore, practical deployment of QKD would require hardware capable of adapting to different protocols and clock rates. Here, we address this challenge by presenting a multi-rate, multi-protocol QKD transmitter linked to a correspondingly adaptable QKD receiver. The flexibility of the transmitter, achieved by optical injection locking, allows us to connect it with two receivers with inherently different clock rates. Furthermore, we demonstrate the multi-protocol operation of our transmitter, communicating with receiving parties employing different decoding circuits., Comment: 7 pages, 4 figures

Quantum mechanics allows the distribution of intrinsically secure encryption keys by optical means. Twin-field quantum key distribution is the most promising technique for its implementation on long-distance fibers, but requires stabilizing the optical length of the communication channels between parties. In proof-of-principle experiments based on spooled fibers, this was achieved by interleaving the quantum communication with periodical adjustment frames. In this approach, longer duty cycles for the key streaming come at the cost of a looser control of channel length, and a successful key-transfer using this technique in a real world remains a significant challenge. Using interferometry techniques derived from frequency metrology, we developed a solution for the simultaneous key streaming and channel length control, and demonstrate it on a 206 km field-deployed fiber with 65 dB loss. Our technique reduces the quantum-bit-error-rate contributed by channel length variations to <1%, representing an effective solution for real-world quantum communications.

Twin-field (TF) quantum key distribution (QKD) fundamentally alters the rate-distance relationship of QKD, offering the scaling of a single-node quantum repeater. Although recent experiments have demonstrated the new opportunities for secure long-distance communications allowed by TF-QKD, formidable challenges remain to unlock its true potential. Previous demonstrations have required intense stabilisation signals at the same wavelength as the quantum signals, thereby unavoidably generating Rayleigh scattering noise that limits the distance and bit rate. Here, we introduce a novel dual-band stabilisation scheme that overcomes past limitations and can be adapted to other phase-sensitive single-photon applications. Using two different optical wavelengths multiplexed together for channel stabilisation and protocol encoding, we develop a setup that provides repeater-like key rates over record communication distances of 555 km and 605 km in the finite-size and asymptotic regimes respectively, and increases the secure key rate at long distance by two orders of magnitude to values of practical significance., Comment: Final version of the manuscript. 18 pages, 5 figures. Methods and supplementary materials are included

The information theoretic security promised by quantum key distribution (QKD) holds as long as the assumptions in the theoretical model match the parameters in the physical implementation. The superlinear behaviour of sensitive single-photon detectors represents one such mismatch and can pave the way to powerful attacks hindering the security of QKD systems, a prominent example being the after-gate attack. A longstanding tenet is that trapped carriers causing delayed detection can help mitigate this attack, but despite intensive scrutiny, it remains largely unproven. Here we approach this problem from a physical perspective and find new evidence to support a detector's secure response. We experimentally investigate two different carrier trapping mechanisms causing delayed detection in fast-gated semiconductor avalanche photodiodes, one arising from the multiplication layer, the other from the heterojunction interface between absorption and charge layers. The release of trapped carriers increases the quantum bit error rate measured under the after-gate attack above the typical QKD security threshold, thus favouring the detector's inherent security. This represents a significant step to avert quantum hacking of QKD systems., Comment: 8 pages, 6 figures

Phase-randomized optical homodyne detection is a well-known technique for performing quantum state tomography. So far, it has been mainly considered a sophisticated tool for laboratory experiments but unsuitable for practical applications. In this work, we change the perspective and employ this technique to set up a practical continuous-variable quantum random number generator. We exploit a phase-randomized local oscillator realized with a gain-switched laser to bound the min-entropy and extract true randomness from a completely uncharacterized input, potentially controlled by a malicious adversary. Our proof-of-principle implementation achieves an equivalent rate of 270 Mbit/s. In contrast to other source-device-independent quantum random number generators, the one presented herein does not require additional active optical components, thus representing a viable solution for future compact, modulator-free, certified generators of randomness.

Quantum key distribution (QKD) has convincingly been proven compatible with real life applications. Its wide-scale deployment in optical networks will benefit from an optical platform that allows miniature devices capable of encoding the necessarily complex signals at high rates and with low power consumption. While photonic integration is the ideal route toward miniaturisation, an efficient route to high-speed encoding of the quantum phase states on chip is still missing. Consequently, current devices rely on bulky and high power demanding phase modulation elements which hinder the sought-after scalability and energy efficiency. Here we exploit a novel approach to high-speed phase encoding and demonstrate a compact, scalable and power efficient integrated quantum transmitter. We encode cryptographic keys on-demand in high repetition rate pulse streams using injection-locking with deterministic phase control at the seed laser. We demonstrate record secure-key-rates under multi-protocol operation. Our modulator-free transmitters enable the development of high-bit rate quantum communications devices, which will be essential for the practical integration of quantum key distribution in high connectivity networks., Comment: 8 pages, 3 figures

Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two distant parties to share encryption keys with security based on physical laws. Experimentally, it has been implemented with optical means, achieving key rates of 1.26 Megabit/s over 50 kilometres (km) of standard optical fibre and 1.16 bit/hour over 404 km of ultralow-loss fibre in a measurement-device-independent configuration. Increasing the bit rate and range of QKD is a formidable, but important, challenge. A related target, currently considered unfeasible without quantum repeaters, is overcoming the fundamental rate-distance limit of point-to-point QKD. Here we introduce a conceptually new scheme where pairs of phase-randomised optical fields are first generated at two distant locations and then combined at a central measuring station. The fields imparted with the same random phase are "twins" and can be employed to distil a quantum key, as we prove under an explicit security assumption. The key rate of this Twin-Field QKD (TF-QKD) shows the same dependence on distance as a quantum repeater, scaling with the square-root of the channel transmittance, irrespective of whom is in control of the measuring station. Differently from a quantum repeater, however, the new scheme is feasible with current technology and presents manageable levels of noise even on 550 km of standard optical fibre. This is promising to overcome the QKD rate-distance barrier and to greatly extend the range of secure quantum communications., Comment: 4 pages, 3 figures. Supplementary information included as ancillary file on this page

Quantum key distribution is rising as an important cryptographic primitive for protecting the communication infrastructure in the digital era. However, its implementation security is often weakened by components whose behavior deviates from what is expected. Here, we analyse the response of a self-differencing avalanche photodiode, a key enabler for high speed quantum key distribution, to intense light shone from a continuous-wave laser. Under incorrect settings, the cancellation entailed by the self-differencing circuitry can make the detector insensitive to single photons. However, we experimentally demonstrate that even in such cases intensity modulation can be used as an effective measure to restore the detector's expected response to the input light.

Random numbers are an essential resource to many applications, including cryptography and Monte Carlo simulations. Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) represent the ultimate source of randomness, as the numbers are obtained by sampling a physical quantum process that is intrinsically probabilistic. However, they are yet to be widely employed to replace deterministic pseudo random number generators (PRNG) for practical applications. QRNGs are regarded as interesting devices. However they are slower than PRNGs for simulations and are typically seen as clumsy laboratory prototypes, prone to failures and unreliable for cryptographic applications. Here we overcome these limitations and demonstrate a compact and self-contained QRNG capable of generating random numbers at a pace of 8 Gbit/s uninterruptedly for 71 days. During this period, the physical parameters of the quantum process were monitored in real time by self-checking functions implemented in the generator itself. At the same time, the output random numbers were analyzed with the most stringent suites of statistical tests. The analysis shows that the QRNG under test sustained the continuous operation without physical instabilities or hardware failures. At the same time, the output random numbers were analyzed with the most stringent suites of statistical tests, which were passed during the whole operation time. This extensive trial demonstrates the reliability of a robustly designed QRNG and paves the way to its use in practical applications based on randomness., Comment: 8 pages, 7 figures

Quantum key distribution is a way to distribute secret keys to distant users with information theoretic security and key rates suitable for real-world applications. Its rate-distance figure, however, is limited by the natural loss of the communication channel and can never surpass a theoretical limit known as point-to-point secret key capacity. Recently, a new type of quantum key distribution with an intermediate relay was proposed to overcome this limit (M. Lucamarini, Z. L. Yuan, J. F. Dynes and A. J. Shields, Nature, 2018). However, a standard application of the decoy state method limited the security analysis of this scheme to hold under restrictive assumptions for the eavesdropper. Hence, overcoming the point-to-point secret key capacity with an information-theoretic secure scheme is still an open question. Here, we propose a novel way to use decoy states to answer this question. The key idea is to switch between a Test mode and a Code mode, the former enabling the decoy state parameter estimation and the latter generating a key through a phase encoding protocol. This way, we confirm the scaling properties of the original scheme and overcome the secret key capacity at long distances. Our work plays a key role to unlock the potential of practical secure quantum communications., Comment: 25 pages, 3 figures

An author (arXiv:1709.09262 [quant-ph] (2017), Nanoscale Research Letters (2017) 12:552) has recently questioned the security of two-way quantum key distribution schemes by referring to attack strategies which leave no errors in the (raw) key shared by the legitimate parties. We argue that the article is based on a flawed understanding of the actual workings of a two-way protocol, thus the erroneous conclusions drawn thereof.

In recent years, there has been a great effort to prove the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a minimum number of assumptions. Besides its intrinsic theoretical interest, this would allow for larger tolerance against device imperfections in the actual implementations. However, even in this device-independent scenario, one assumption seems unavoidable, that is, the presence of a protected space devoid of any unwanted information leakage in which the legitimate parties can privately generate, process and store their classical data. In this paper we relax this unrealistic and hardly feasible assumption and introduce a general formalism to tackle the information leakage problem in most of existing QKD systems. More specifically, we prove the security of optical QKD systems using phase and intensity modulators in their transmitters, which leak the setting information in an arbitrary manner. We apply our security proof to cases of practical interest and show key rates similar to those obtained in a perfectly shielded environment. Our work constitutes a fundamental step forward in guaranteeing implementation security of quantum communication systems., Comment: 37 pages, 5 figures

Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two users to communicate with theoretically provable secrecy by encoding information on photonic qubits. Current encoders are complex, however, which reduces their appeal for practical use and introduces potential vulnerabilities to quantum attacks. Distributed-phase-reference (DPR) systems were introduced as a simpler alternative, but have not yet been proven practically secure against all classes of attack. Here we demonstrate the first DPR QKD system with information-theoretic security. Using a novel light source, where the coherence between pulses can be controlled on a pulse-by-pulse basis, we implement a secure DPR system based on the differential quadrature phase shift protocol. The system is modulator-free, does not require active stabilization or a complex receiver, and also offers megabit per second key rates, almost three times higher than the standard Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol. This enhanced performance and security highlights the potential for DPR protocols to be adopted for real-world applications., Comment: 5 pages, 4 figures, supplementary materials included as ancillary file

Time-bin encoding is an attractive method for transmitting photonic qubits over long distances with minimal decoherence. It allows a simple receiver for quantum key distribution (QKD) that extracts a key by measuring time of arrival of photons and detects eavesdropping by measuring interference of pulses in different time bins. In the past, coherent pulses have been generated using a CW laser and an intensity modulator. A greatly simplified transmitter is proposed and demonstrated here that works by directly modulating the laser diode. Coherence between pulses is maintained by a weak seed laser. The modulator-free source creates time-bin encoded pulses with a high extinction ratio (29.4 dB) and an interference visibility above 97 %. The resulting QKD transmitter gives estimated secure key rates up to 4.57 Mbit/s, the highest yet reported for coherent-one-way QKD, and can be programmed for all protocols using weak coherent pulses., Comment: 4 pages, 3 figures

Quantum key distribution (QKD) permits information-theoretically secure transmission of digital encryption keys, assuming that the behaviour of the devices employed for the key exchange can be reliably modelled and predicted. Remarkably, no assumptions have to be made on the capabilities of an eavesdropper other than that she is bounded by the laws of Nature, thus making the security of QKD "unconditional". However, unconditional security is hard to achieve in practice. For example, any experimental realisation can only collect finite data samples, leading to vulnerabilities against coherent attacks, the most general class of attacks, and for some protocols the theoretical proof of robustness against these attacks is still missing. For these reasons, in the past many QKD experiments have fallen short of implementing an unconditionally secure protocol and have instead considered limited attacking capabilities by the eavesdropper. Here, we explore the security of QKD against coherent attacks in the most challenging environment: the long-distance transmission of keys. We demonstrate that the BB84 protocol can provide positive key rates for distances up to 240 km without multiplexing of conventional signals, and up to 200 km with multiplexing. Useful key rates can be achieved even for the longest distances, using practical thermo-electrically cooled single-photon detectors., Comment: 6 pages, 3 figures, supplementary information

Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides an attractive means for securing communications in optical fibre networks. However, deployment of the technology has been hampered by the frequent need for dedicated dark fibres to segregate the very weak quantum signals from conventional traffic. Up until now the coexistence of QKD with data has been limited to bandwidths that are orders of magnitude below those commonly employed in fibre optic communication networks. Using an optimised wavelength divisional multiplexing scheme, we transport QKD and the prevalent 100 Gb/s data format in the forward direction over the same fibre for the first time. We show a full quantum encryption system operating with a bandwidth of 200 Gb/s over a 100 km fibre. Exploring the ultimate limits of the technology by experimental measurements of the Raman noise, we demonstrate it is feasible to combine QKD with 10 Tb/s of data over a 50 km link. These results suggest it will be possible to integrate QKD and other quantum photonic technologies into high bandwidth data communication infrastructures, thereby allowing their widespread deployment.

Optical access networks connect multiple endpoints to a common network node via shared fibre infrastructure. They will play a vital role to scale up the number of users in quantum key distribution (QKD) networks. However, the presence of power splitters in the commonly used passive network architecture makes successful transmission of weak quantum signals challenging. This is especially true if QKD and data signals are multiplexed in the passive network. The splitter introduces an imbalance between quantum signal and Raman noise, which can prevent the recovery of the quantum signal completely. Here we introduce a method to overcome this limitation and demonstrate coexistence of multi-user QKD and full power data traffic from a gigabit passive optical network (GPON). The dual feeder implementation is compatible with standard GPON architectures and can support up to 128 users, highlighting that quantum protected GPON networks could be commonplace in the future., Comment: 11 pages, 5 figures

In the quantum version of a Trojan-horse attack, photons are injected into the optical modules of a quantum key distribution system in an attempt to read information direct from the encoding devices. To stop the Trojan photons, the use of passive optical components has been suggested. However, to date, there is no quantitative bound that specifies such components in relation to the security of the system. Here, we turn the Trojan-horse attack into an information leakage problem. This allows us quantify the system security and relate it to the specification of the optical elements. The analysis is supported by the experimental characterization, within the operation regime, of reflectivity and transmission of the optical components most relevant to security., Comment: 18 pages, 11 figures. Some typos corrected

Information-theoretical security of quantum key distribution (QKD) has been convincingly proven in recent years and remarkable experiments have shown the potential of QKD for real world applications. Due to its unique capability of combining high key rate and security in a realistic finite-size scenario, the efficient version of the BB84 QKD protocol endowed with decoy states has been subject of intensive research. Its recent experimental implementation finally demonstrated a secure key rate beyond 1 Mbps over a 50 km optical fiber. However the achieved rate holds under the restrictive assumption that the eavesdropper performs collective attacks. Here, we review the protocol and generalize its security. We exploit a map by Ahrens to rigorously upper bound the Hypergeometric distribution resulting from a general eavesdropping. Despite the extended applicability of the new protocol, its key rate is only marginally smaller than its predecessor in all cases of practical interest., Comment: 8 pages, 2 figures, 2 tables. Special Issue on Quantum Communication & Cryptography

We report on a gated single-photon detector based on InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes (APDs) with a single-photon detection efficiency exceeding 55% at 1550 nm. Our detector is gated at 1 GHz and employs the self-differencing technique for gate transient suppression. It can operate nearly dead time free, except for the one clock cycle dead time intrinsic to self-differencing, and we demonstrate a count rate of 500 Mcps. We present a careful analysis of the optimal driving conditions of the APD measured with a dead time free detector characterization setup. It is found that a shortened gate width of 360 ps together with an increased driving signal amplitude and operation at higher temperatures leads to improved performance of the detector. We achieve an afterpulse probability of 7% at 50% detection efficiency with dead time free measurement and a record efficiency for InGaAs/InP APDs of 55% at an afterpulse probability of only 10.2% with a moderate dead time of 10 ns., Comment: 10 pages, 4 figures

The theoretically proven security of quantum key distribution (QKD) could revolutionise how information exchange is protected in the future. Several field tests of QKD have proven it to be a reliable technology for cryptographic key exchange and have demonstrated nodal networks of point-to-point links. However, so far no convincing answer has been given to the question of how to extend the scope of QKD beyond niche applications in dedicated high security networks. Here we show that adopting simple and cost-effective telecommunication technologies to form a quantum access network can greatly expand the number of users in quantum networks and therefore vastly broaden their appeal. We are able to demonstrate that a high-speed single-photon detector positioned at a network node can be shared between up to 64 users for exchanging secret keys with the node, thereby significantly reducing the hardware requirements for each user added to the network. This point-to-multipoint architecture removes one of the main obstacles restricting the widespread application of QKD. It presents a viable method for realising multi-user QKD networks with resource efficiency and brings QKD closer to becoming the first widespread technology based on quantum physics., Comment: 6 pages, 4 figures

Quantum key distribution protocols typically make use of a one-way quantum channel to distribute a shared secret string to two distant users. However, protocols exploiting a two-way quantum channel have been proposed as an alternative route to the same goal, with the potential advantage of outperforming one-way protocols. Here we provide a strategy to prove security for two-way quantum key distribution protocols against the most general quantum attack possible by an eavesdropper. We utilize an entropic uncertainty relation, and only a few assumptions need to be made about the devices used in the protocol. We also show that a two-way protocol can outperform comparable one-way protocols., Comment: 10 pages, 5 figures

In this paper we set forth a novel connection between the Bennett 1992 protocol and a Bell inequality. This allows us to extend the usual prepare-and-measure protocol to its entanglement-based formulation. We exploit a recent result in the frame of device-independent quantum key distribution to provide a simple, model-independent, security proof for the new protocol. The minimum efficiency required for a practical implementation of the scheme is the lowest reported to date., Comment: 7 pages, 3 figures. 3nd version: published version

We review a communication protocol recently proposed by us that makes use of a two-way quantum channel. We provide a characterization of such a protocol from a practical perspective, and consider the most relevant eavesdropping strategies against it. This allows us to compare its potentialities with those of a standard protocol which uses a one-way quantum channel., Comment: Submitted in March 2009 to the special issue of Quantum Key Distribution in TCS and NACO

An asymmetric preparation of the quantum states sent through a noisy channel can enable a new way to monitor and actively compensate the channel noise. The paradigm of such an asymmetric treatment of quantum information is the Bennett 1992 protocol, in which the ratio between conclusive and inconclusive counts is in direct connection with the channel noise. Using this protocol as a guiding example, we show how to correct the phase drift of a communication channel without using reference pulses, interruptions of the quantum transmission or public data exchanges., Comment: 5 pages, 3 figures

We introduce a novel form of decoy-state technique to make the single-photon Bennett 1992 protocol robust against losses and noise of a communication channel. Two uninformative states are prepared by the transmitter in order to prevent the unambiguous state discrimination attack and improve the phase-error rate estimation. The presented method does not require strong reference pulses, additional electronics or extra detectors for its implementation., Comment: 7 pages, 2 figures

Decoherence may significantly affect the polarization state of optical pulses propagating in dispersive media because of the unavoidable presence of more than a single frequency in the envelope of the pulse. Here we report on the suppression of polarization decoherence in a ring cavity obtained by properly retooling for photonic qubits the ``bang-bang'' protection technique already employed for nuclear spins and nuclear-quadrupole qubits. Our results show that bang-bang control can be profitably extended to quantum information processes involving flying polarization qubits., Comment: 5 pages, 3 figures

We study the detection of weak coherent forces by means of an optomechanical device formed by a highly reflecting isolated mirror shined by an intense and highly monochromatic laser field. Radiation pressure excites a vibrational mode of the mirror, inducing sidebands of the incident field, which are then measured by heterodyne detection. We determine the sensitivity of such a scheme and show that the use of an entangled input state of the two sideband modes improves the detection, even in the presence of damping and noise acting on the mechanical mode., Comment: 8 pages, 4 figures

I present an eavesdropping on the protocol proposed by W.-H. Kye, et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 040501 (2005)]. I show how an undetectable Eve can steal the whole information by labeling and then measuring the photons prepared by the user Alice., Comment: Comments and/or opinions are welcome and encouraged

We study the temporal evolution of entanglement pertaining to two qubits interacting with a thermal bath. In particular we consider the simplest nontrivial spin bath models where symmetry breaking occurs and treat them by mean field approximation. We analytically find decoherence free entangled states as well as entangled states with an exponential decay of the quantum correlation at finite temperature., Comment: 10 pages, 2 figures