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In 2020 Germany released its Indo‐Pacific guidelines in response to global shifts and escalating Sino‐US rivalries in the region. This article scrutinises Germany's ambitions and stance in the Indo‐Pacific, utilising the middle power concept as an analytical tool. It argues that Germany's Indo‐Pacific strategy is broadly in line with its wider foreign policy approach rather than marking a radical shift. Divided into three sections, the article explores middle power theories, Germany's foreign policy approach and Germany's Indo‐Pacific tilt. Assessing Germany's progress in the Indo‐Pacific, the paper employs a middle power framework based on capabilities, identity and engagement. We argue that Germany seems intent on positioning itself as a civilian middle power, evident in its deeply engrained norms determining identity and guiding engagement. The article uses a qualitative approach, drawing from primary material such as official statements of German policymakers and policy documents, supplemented by secondary sources covering the literature on middle power dynamics, the Indo‐Pacific region and Germany's foreign policy. Employing thematic documentary analysis, the paper identifies recurring patterns and trends in Germany's evolving role in the Indo‐Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU's latest decision on adopting the recovery fund was revolutionary, both quantitatively and qualitatively. It would also dominate the EU's economic governance of the decade of the 2020s. This article is an attempt to evaluate whether the EU's recovery fund was the right policy answers to the post-COVID-19 EU economy or not, and explore its meanings and implications for European integration. This article argues that COVID-19 hit the EU at a time of health and social precariousness, and proved the conventional economic governance unsustainable. Necessities for game-changing in the post-COVID-19 economic governance were justified on both practical and moral grounds. Judging with these yardsticks, the EU's recovery fund was evaluated as a welcomed paradigm shift in both the ideology and methodology of its economic governance. Beyond a contemporary economic rescue package, the recovery fund implied laying the cornerstone of completing a fiscal union in the Eurozone, for enhancing institutional functions of the European Commission, and for rediscovering the nature of European integration as the rescuer of national states, through the newly-forming consensus between Eurosceptic nationalists and pro-EU integrationists. This article reminds us that the COVID-19 crisis was a crucial opportunity for EU leadership to legitimize the EU's existence in the post-Brexit era. If well implemented, the recovery fund could usher in a new chapter of European integration. If it fails, European integration would be at risk of further fragmentation and entrench into an ever-stronger anti-EU populism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]