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Este Trabajo de Fin de Grado trata sobre las apps aplicadas a la educación primaria. En la primera parte, veremos las TICs, las aplicaciones educativas y la gamificacíón. Analizaremos las ventajas y desventajas que tienen estas en la escuela, la importancia del papel del profesorado y conoceremos una selección de aplicaciones educativas interesantes, entre otras cosas. En la segunda parte, se plantea una propuesta didáctica innovadora teniendo en cuenta las nuevas aplicaciones que nos aportan las NTICs. Esta se llevará a cabo siguiendo las características del colegio donde realicé las últimas prácticas y orientada a una clase de 6º de Primaria. This Final Degree Project deals with apps applied to primary education. In the first part, we will see ICTs, educational applications and gamification. We will analyze the advantages and disadvantages that these have in school, the importance of the role of teachers and and we will know a selection of interesting educational applications, among other things. In the second part, an innovative didactic proposal is proposed taking into account the new applications that NICTs provide us. This will be carried out following the characteristics of the school where I did the last internships and aimed at a 6th grade class.

This study examines whether the transition from a system of multiple issuing banks to a monopoly on currency issuance was a step in the Bank of Spain's becoming a central bank in the true sense of the word (a non-profit-maximizing institution); or on the contrary, whether the Bank used its privilege as the only private issuing institution to obtain extra profits while neglecting its duties as a central bank. We find that thanks to the monopoly, the Spanish issuer did make extraordinary profits (above average for the banking industry). Further, the Bank's “private interest” prevailed over the “public interest” (convertibility into gold), while the monopoly was not decisive to its becoming a genuine central bank. The Bank of Spain was a highly profitable financial institution for its shareholders, and little concerned with the public interest. History shows that its transformation into an institution responsible for monetary and financial policy did not come until well into the twentieth century.

The purpose of this study is to examine whether the transition from a system of various issuing banks to a monopoly system was a step in the Bank of Spain becoming a central bank in the true sense of the word (a non-profit maximizing bank); or on the contrary, whether the Bank used its privilege as the only private issuing institution to obtain extra profits, and neglected its duties as a central bank. The study shows that thanks to the monopoly, the Spanish issuer obtained extraordinary profits (above the average for the sector). We also show that the Bank's "private interest" prevailed over the "public interest" (convertibility into gold) and that the monopoly was not a decisive step in its becoming a genuine central bank. The Bank of Spain was a very profitable financial institution for its shareholders, and little concerned with the public interest. History shows that the Bank of Spain's transformation into an institution responsible for monetary and financial policy did not occur until well into the twentieth century.

This draft, June 2018, This article contributes to the literature on central bank independence and monetary stability during the classical gold standard era. On the eve of the First World War, European periphery had not achieved stable adherence to gold despite the protection of central banks against political pressures to monetize debt. In the 19th century, most issuing institutions were private banks whose main objective was profit maximization. As a result, monetary stability depended on negotiations between monetary and fiscal authorities and not directly on central bank independence as is the case nowadays. Strong governments were needed to impose the objective of monetary stability on central banks in negotiation practices. To test our argument, we have constructed indicators of government strength and central bank independence to measure bargaining power for the case of Spain. Results confirm that a highly independent private central bank avoided the responsibility of defending gold adherence when negotiating with weak government, even in a stable macroeconomic environment. Our research suggests that the success of central bank independence in generating monetary stability during the gold standard period depended on sound political institutions., Elena Martínez-Ruiz and Pilar Nogues-Marco acknowledge Spanish government support through Projects ECO2012-33337 (MINECO) and ECO2015-66782-P (MINECO/FEDER).

This article contributes to the literature on central bank independence and monetary stability during the classical gold standard era. On the eve of the First World War, European periphery had not achieved stable adherence to gold despite the protection of central banks against political pressures to monetize debt. In the 19th century, most issuing institutions were private banks whose main objective was profit maximization. As a result, monetary stability depended on negotiations between monetary and fiscal authorities and not directly on central bank independence as is the case nowadays. Strong governments were needed to impose the objective of monetary stability on central banks in negotiation practices. To test our argument, we have constructed indicators of government strength and central bank independence to measure bargaining power for the case of Spain. Results confirm that a highly independent private central bank avoided the responsibility of defending gold adherence when negotiating with weak government, even in a stable macroeconomic environment. Our research suggests that the success of central bank independence in generating monetary stability during the gold standard period depended on sound political institutions.

The gold standard began to emerge as a universal monetary system in the late 1870s, and it had spread throughout the world economy by 1900. It was unusual for nations to be off the gold standard, and it meant that they were detached from the international financial community. Spain never joined the gold standard club in any of its varieties, either before or after 1914. Unlike the vast majority of the European currencies, the peseta’s exchange rate fluctuated, sometimes widely, against gold and gold currencies. Gold convertibility was suspended in 1883 and never resumed. Nevertheless, the monetary authorities were aware that the Spanish economy, off the gold standard, was an outlier in the international economy and made plans to put the peseta on gold both before and after 1914.Why Spain never adopted the gold standard is a complex issue, and our paper offers a possible answer by examining the behaviour of an issuing bank that refused to accept, or resisted, its role as a central bank. Our study also provides a basis for a comparison between the Bank of Spain, some of its features and policies, with other peripheral issuing institutions. Moreover, our paper encompasses both the pre-war and the post-war periods, which allows us to present both the similarities and the differences in the exchange and monetary policies of the Spanish authorities during the era of the classical gold standard and the years of the gold exchange standard

The gold standard began to emerge as a universal monetary system in the late 1870s, and it had spread throughout the world economy by 1900. It was unusual for nations to be off the gold standard, and it meant that they were detached from the international financial community. Spain never joined the gold standard club in any of its varieties, either before or after 1914. Unlike the vast majority of the European currencies, the peseta’s exchange rate fluctuated, sometimes widely, against gold and gold currencies. Gold convertibility was suspended in 1883 and never resumed. Nevertheless, the monetary authorities were aware that the Spanish economy, off the gold standard, was an outlier in the international economy and made plans to put the peseta on gold both before and after 1914.Why Spain never adopted the gold standard is a complex issue, and our paper offers a possible answer by examining the behaviour of an issuing bank that refused to accept, or resisted, its role as a central bank. Our study also provides a basis for a comparison between the Bank of Spain, some of its features and policies, with other peripheral issuing institutions. Moreover, our paper encompasses both the pre-war and the post-war periods, which allows us to present both the similarities and the differences in the exchange and monetary policies of the Spanish authorities during the era of the classical gold standard and the years of the gold exchange standard

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The impact that the francoist autarkic economic policy had on the Spanish economy is assessed using the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) as an indicator. This indicator compares the real opportunity cost of the primary factors used in the production of a certain good with its aggregated value at international prices. Since the DRC provides a ranking of sectors classified according their relative efficiency, it can be interpreted as an indicator of comparative advantage. Our results indicate that the inefficient allocation of productive factors induced by the interventionist economic policy resulted in a significant loss of efficiency for the economy, such that only 50 out of 125 industries, accounting for 39 percent of the Spanish industrial production, could be considered efficient. However, the paper also shows that the Spanish economy was in a good position to take advantage of the opportunities created by the 1959 reform, as the lion’s share of industrial production was on the verge of relative efficiency.

Ed. rev

Editada en la Fundación SEPI Publicado

El trabajo presenta una nueva reconstrucción de las balanzas de pagos del periodo autárquico (1940-1958). El uso de fuentes complementarias y nuevos métodos para el tratamiento de los datos da como resultado una mejor aproximación a la realidad del sector exterior español. Entre los resultados más significativos se pueden destacar la cuantificación de aspectos ya conocidos, sobre los que se carecía de datos, como el alcance de la crisis del sector exterior ante el Plan de Estabilización, o la confirmación de algunas de las hipótesis presentes en la bibliografía sobre el periodo, por ejemplo, d creciente volumen del déficit comercial durante el decenio de los cincuenta o la significación de los flujos financieros de Argentina y EE.UU. para la economía española.