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We present a theory, and its computer implementation, of how mental simulations underlie the abductions of informal algorithms and deductions from these algorithms. Three experiments tested the theory's predictions, using an environment of a single railway track and a siding. This environment is akin to a universal Turing machine, but it is simple enough for nonprogrammers to use. Participants solved problems that required use of the siding to rearrange the order of cars in a train (experiment 1). Participants abduced and described in their own words algorithms that solved such problems for trains of any length, and, as the use of simulation predicts, they favored "while-loops" over "for-loops" in their descriptions (experiment 2). Given descriptions of loops of procedures, participants deduced the consequences for given trains of six cars, doing so without access to the railway environment (experiment 3). As the theory predicts, difficulty in rearranging trains depends on the numbers of moves and cars to be moved, whereas in formulating an algorithm and deducing its consequences, it depends on the Kolmogorov complexity of the algorithm. Overall, the results corroborated the use of a kinematic mental model in creating and testing informal algorithms and showed that individuals differ reliably in the ability to carry out these tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports investigations of inferences that depend both on connectives between clauses, such as or else, and on relations between entities, such as in the same place as. Participants made more valid inferences from biconditionals-for instance, Ann is taller than Beth if and only if Beth is taller than Cath-than from exclusive disjunctions (Exp. 1). They made more valid transitive inferences from a biconditional when a categorical premise affirmed rather than denied one of its clauses, but they made more valid transitive inferences from an exclusive disjunction when a categorical premise denied rather than affirmed one of its clauses (Exp. 2). From exclusive disjunctions, such as Either Ann is not in the same place as Beth or else Beth is not in the same place as Cath, individuals tended to infer that all three individuals could be in different places, whereas in fact this was impossible (Exps. 3a and 3b). The theory of mental models predicts all of these results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a theory of recursion in thinking and language. In the logic of computability, a function maps one or more sets to another, and it can have a recursive definition that is semi-circular, i.e., referring in part to the function itself. Any function that is computable – and many are not – can be computed in an infinite number of distinct programs. Some of these programs are semi-circular too, but they needn't be, because repeated loops of instructions can compute any recursive function. Our theory aims to explain how naive individuals devise informal programs in natural language, and is itself implemented in a computer program that creates programs. Participants in our experiments spontaneously simulate loops of instructions in kinematic mental models. They rely on such loops to compute recursive functions for rearranging the order of cars in trains on a track with a siding. Kolmogorov complexity predicts the relative difficulty of abducing such programs – for easy rearrangements, such as reversing the order of the cars, to difficult ones, such as splitting a train in two and interleaving the two resulting halves (equivalent to a faro shuffle). This rearrangement uses both the siding and part of the track as working memories, shuffling cars between them, and so it relies on the power of a linear-bounded computer. Linguistic evidence implies that this power is more than necessary to compose the meanings of sentences in natural language from those of their grammatical constituents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]