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This article analyses processes of social change in rural India through an ethnographic analysis of everyday politics in two Indian states, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. Its main argument is that even if overt resistance or 'noisy' collective action by the poor is rarely seen, a great deal of social change is occurring through a subtle 'politics of negotiation' whereby poor, low-caste agricultural labourers are questioning social norms that underpin their oppression. These negotiations are structured around labour relations and caste norms, which are so inextricably intertwined that a modification of one set of 'rules' necessarily has an impact on the other. The processes of democratization, the erosion of patron-client relations, the spread of education, an enduring agrarian crisis aggravated by climate change and the availability of alternative employment opportunities for the poor are chipping away at the dominance of India's rural elite. This continuous negotiating process between the (upper-caste) landed elite and the (lower-caste) labouring classes is non-confrontational and while it would be ambitious to suggest that it overturns the existing power relations, it nonetheless challenges and modifies them in a way that results in progressive social change.

The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) in India opens a new chapter in rural governance, signifying transformative potential for enhancing economic and social security. One of the key objectives of the Act is to aid in the empowerment of marginalised communities, especially women, Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). However, no analytically rigorous attempt has been made to study the mechanisms and processes that are leading to empowerment or even the (unintended) processes of disempowerment. Our paper investigates (dis) empowerment as a process rather than as a (quantifiable) outcome and analyses the mechanisms through which the embedded gender and caste norms are being challenged (though not completely eroded), but also how powerful actors at household, community and market levels can come to resent processes that entail upward mobility of women and marginalised communities. We draw on a comparative study based on extensive qualitative indepth interviews and participant observation, in rural areas of two Indian states, Uttar Pradesh (North India) and Andhra Pradesh (South India). The former exhibits almost all the elements we associate with low development, whereas the latter belongs to a group of southern Indian states with higher levels of human and economic development.

Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India’s (and the world’s) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan’s decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh’s centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find that in both states local implementers have incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in Rajasthan, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP.