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It has been generally believed that the major shareholders of family firms are more willing to implement egoistic behaviors aimed at benefiting the family. This study analyses whether the major shareholder of the family firm whose name contains “Confucian symbols” such as benevolence, righteousness, loyalty, and kindness will reduce family self-interested behaviors as his name indicates. Using a sample consisting of all 425 family firms listed on Small and Medium Enterprise Board and Growth Enterprise Board, the result shows that the major shareholder whose name contains Confucian symbols is less likely to misappropriate corporate assets and less likely to make “family-first” personnel arrangements, meanwhile is more open to external supervision. Further mechanism testing reveals that the major shareholder whose name contains Confucian symbols also tends to choose corporate culture that reflects Confucianism. The study confirms that the name of the major shareholder is one of the factors which can affect the operation of the family business, demonstrates that different family firms have different attitudes towards family self-interest, and promotes the extant research from the “differences between family and non-family firms” level further to the “differences among family firms running by different families” level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This is an empirical study to examine the impact of corporate governance (CG) variables, namely independent directors index (IDI), family directorship (FD), and family ownership (FO), on the types of related party transactions (RPTs) that prevail in family-owned firms in developing countries. The focus of this study is on Pakistan whereby it was found major shareholders of Pakistani family-owned firms expropriate resources through RPTs. This study analysed panel data of 108 firms of family-owned firms listed on the Karachi stock exchange from 2004 to 2014 after the introduction of CG codes in 2002. The study contributes to literature by categorising all RPTs into three types - RPTb, RPTe, and RPTo. It also develops an index of independence directors comprising three dimensions, namely board composition, financial expertise, and tenure of the independent non-executive director. Different panel least squares models for different RPTs have been employed to examine the relationship between RPTs and CG variables. This study found that 90% of familyowned firms in Pakistan scored low for independent director's index. Hence, CG is weaker in Pakistani family-owned firms where major shareholders expropriate resources through RPTb and RPTe. Further, CG variables, namely IDI and FD are negatively related to RPTs and the concentration of family ownership of firms has a negative relationship with RPTs, and this has a negative tendency for the resource expropriation of family-owned firms. The study concludes the negative relationship of corporate governance and concentration of major shareholder exploit the interest of minority shareholders in Pakistani family-owned firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a functional and economical procedure, the change of firm ownership into generalization, leads to a growth in firm fund and as a result, an Expansion in its commercial operation. The need for great funds in commercial units and the formation of corporation as a result, leaded to separation of ownership from manager firms, and so to a conflict among the managers and the owners. In recent years, corporate governance-including a network of connections among stockholders, managers, accountants, and other beneficiaries- has been posed as a decreasing factor of the great discrepancy among stockholders and also the segregation of ownership from commercial unit control. One of the most important factors which contribute to the control of management relationship is the board of director and its composition. As a result, it is of crucial importance to survey factors related to board composition and its effect on the firm operation. The locative domain of this survey is the collection of listed Companies in Tehran Stock Exchange and its temporal domain lies between year1382 till 1386. On the basis of this, the chosen samples include 130 firms. Considered questions in this research have been posed as six hypotheses. The result of hypothesis testing shows that corporate governance variables including the number of members of board, the number of its non-executive members and the number of major shareholders have no effect on the return on equity (ROE), but on the other hand, this variables affect Tobin’s. The results show that the number of board members has a negative and at the same time negligible effect on Tobin’s, but the nonexecutive members of board and the number of majority shareholders have positive and also insignificant effect on Tobin’s.

A strong economy always boasts a strong stock market. The purpose of this article is to raise awareness towards the importance of capital markets, by referring to the obligations arising for a shareholder when taking over a listed company, with a particular focus on the mandatory bid rule. The mandatory bid rule is being discussed both in the light of Directive 2004/25/EC and of Romanian Law 297/2004 on capital markets, analyzing its application, the notion of control it implies, its deterrent effect upon investors, in an incentive to evaluate its (in)efficiency. This article should be a first step in promoting this underrated subject into a circle of intense legal debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]