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Why do voters in single-party regimes express support for the ruling party in such large numbers? Scholars offer three sets of explanations: 1) Support is manipulated by regime leaders or falsified by frightened voters; 2) Support is due to genuine popularity or 'performance legitimacy'; 3) The incumbent party holds an extreme incumbency advantage due to voters' certainty about their candidates' policy positions or access to state resources. Despite the impressive theoretical development in this literature, these arguments have not been subjected to a research design capable of examining the relative importance of each of these factors. We use a unique survey experiment on nearly 42,000 Vietnamese citizens over three years that reduces the threat of preference falsification and allows us to isolate voter's true preferences as much as possible. While we find some evidence for all three explanations, we find substantial support for incumbency bias. An important subset of Vietnamese voters--those inclined to vote for non-party candidatessincerely favor the party under conditions of uncertainty about the candidates' policy stances or experience in the legislature. Keywords preference falsification, authoritarian elections, incumbency advantage, conjoint survey experiment, Vietnam, Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) members won 96 percent of the seats in the 2016 National Assembly elections despite fielding only 89 percent of the candidates. Why did CPV members [...]

The article provides an overview of Vietnam's anti-corruption campaign and its impact on the country's political and economic landscape. The campaign, known as the "blazing furnace," has resulted in the dismissal and punishment of corrupt officials. It has also led to a more centralized leadership under the general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party. The campaign has affected the press, social media, and civil society, leading to constraints on public discourse. Efforts to combat corruption have shown some success, with businesses reporting a decline in bribe payments and citizens perceiving a willingness from the government to address corruption. The article also discusses high-profile corruption cases involving prominent individuals. The appointment of Vo Van Thuong as president is seen as a step in consolidating power under the current leadership. Legal changes have shifted authority to the party leadership and simplified procedures for the dismissal and resignation of officials. The article concludes by mentioning preparations for the next party congress in 2026. Additionally, the text highlights various developments in Vietnam in 2023, including a reshuffling of cadres, economic challenges, environmental concerns, and efforts to strengthen diplomatic relationships. The sources listed cover a range of topics related to Vietnam's political power, corruption, economic development, labor market, foreign investment, real estate market, environmental issues, and international relations. These sources provide diverse perspectives, including concerns about corruption, restrictions on freedom of speech, and the need for sustainable development. [Extracted from the article]

Despite strong theoretical foundations, randomized evaluations demonstrate that subnational performance assessments have a mixed record in improving governance. We suggest that a key factor influencing this disappointing result has been the omission of facilitation—working with bureaucrats on how to use subnational performance assessments (SPAs) effectively and encouraging collaboration across government agencies. The argument is tested on a nationally representative panel of townships in precoup Myanmar. Facilitation workshops were conducted in 20 randomly assigned townships, bringing together officials from multiple government agencies and introducing them to the results of the Myanmar Business Environment Index (MBEI), an SPA that scored a panel of 60 townships on 92 governance indicators. Results show that businesses in townships where officials attended facilitation workshops ranked their townships twice as high as the businesses in the control group. Variation in MBEI improvements was moderated by the degree of decentralization in bureaucratic agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]