Search

The significance of counterfactual thinking in the causal judgment process has been emphasized for nearly two decades, yet no previous research has directly compared the relative effect of thinking counterfactually versus factually on causal judgment. Three experiments examined this comparison by manipulating the task frame used to focus participants’ thinking about a target event. Prior to making judgments about causality, preventability, blame, and control, participants were directed to think about a target actor either in counterfactual terms (what the actor could have done to change the outcome) or in factual terms (what the actor had done that led to the outcome). In each experiment, the effect of counterfactual thinking did not differ reliably from the effect of factual thinking on causal judgment. Implications for research on causal judgment and mental representation are discussed.

In judging posterior probabilities, people often answer with the inverse conditional probability--a tendency named the inverse fallacy. Participants (N = 45) were given a series of probability problems that entailed estimating both p(H / D) and p(approximately H / D). The findings revealed that deviations of participants' estimates from Bayesian calculations and from the additivity principle could be predicted by the corresponding deviations of the inverse probabilities from these relevant normative benchmarks. Methodological and theoretical implications of the distinction between inverse fallacy and base-rate neglect and the generalization of the study of additivity to conditional probabilities are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Generalizations strengthen in traditional sciences, but in psychology (and social and behavioral sciences, more generally) they decay. This is usually viewed as a problem requiring solution. It could be viewed instead as a law-like phenomenon. Generalization decay cannot be squelched because human behavior is metastable and all behavioral data collected thus far have resulted from a thin sliver of human time.

We examine the opportunities and challenges of expert judgment in the social sciences, scrutinizing the way social scientists make predictions. While social scientists show above-chance accuracy in predicting laboratory-based phenomena, they often struggle to predict real-world societal changes. We argue that most causal models used in social sciences are oversimplified, confuse levels of analysis to which a model applies, misalign the nature of the model with the nature of the phenomena, and fail to consider factors beyond the scientist's pet theory. Taking cues from physical sciences and meteorology, we advocate an approach that integrates broad foundational models with context-specific time series data. We call for a shift in the social sciences towards more precise, daring predictions and greater intellectual humility., Competing Interests: Declaration of interests The authors declare no competing interests., (Crown Copyright © 2023. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Organizations in several domains including national security intelligence communicate judgments under uncertainty using verbal probabilities (e.g., likely) instead of numeric probabilities (e.g., 75% chance), despite research indicating that the former have variable meanings across individuals. In the intelligence domain, uncertainty is also communicated using terms such as low, moderate, or high to describe the analyst's confidence level. However, little research has examined how intelligence professionals interpret these terms and whether they prefer them to numeric uncertainty quantifiers. In two experiments (N = 481 and 624, respectively), uncertainty communication preferences of expert (n = 41 intelligence analysts in Experiment 1) and nonexpert intelligence consumers were elicited. We examined which format participants judged to be more informative and simpler to process. We further tested whether participants treated verbal probability and confidence terms as independent constructs and whether participants provided coherent numeric probability translations of verbal probabilities. Results showed that although most nonexperts favored the numeric format, experts were about equally split, and most participants in both samples regarded the numeric format as more informative. Experts and nonexperts consistently conflated probability and confidence. For instance, confidence intervals inferred from verbal confidence terms had a greater effect on the location of the estimate than the width of the estimate, contrary to normative expectation. Approximately one-fourth of experts and over one-half of nonexperts provided incoherent numeric probability translations for the terms likely and unlikely when the elicitation of best estimates and lower and upper bounds were briefly spaced by intervening tasks., (© 2022 The Authors. Risk Analysis published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Society for Risk Analysis.)

As replications of individual studies are resource intensive, techniques for predicting the replicability are required. We introduce the repliCATS (Collaborative Assessments for Trustworthy Science) process, a new method for eliciting expert predictions about the replicability of research. This process is a structured expert elicitation approach based on a modified Delphi technique applied to the evaluation of research claims in social and behavioural sciences. The utility of processes to predict replicability is their capacity to test scientific claims without the costs of full replication. Experimental data supports the validity of this process, with a validation study producing a classification accuracy of 84% and an Area Under the Curve of 0.94, meeting or exceeding the accuracy of other techniques used to predict replicability. The repliCATS process provides other benefits. It is highly scalable, able to be deployed for both rapid assessment of small numbers of claims, and assessment of high volumes of claims over an extended period through an online elicitation platform, having been used to assess 3000 research claims over an 18 month period. It is available to be implemented in a range of ways and we describe one such implementation. An important advantage of the repliCATS process is that it collects qualitative data that has the potential to provide insight in understanding the limits of generalizability of scientific claims. The primary limitation of the repliCATS process is its reliance on human-derived predictions with consequent costs in terms of participant fatigue although careful design can minimise these costs. The repliCATS process has potential applications in alternative peer review and in the allocation of effort for replication studies., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist., (Copyright: © 2023 Fraser et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.)

Previous research has shown greater risk aversion when people make choices about lives than cash. We tested the hypothesis that compared to placebo, exogenous testosterone administration would lead to riskier choices about cash than lives, given testosterone's association with financial risk-taking and reward sensitivity. A double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized trial was conducted to test this hypothesis (Clinical Trials Registry: NCT02734238, www.clinicaltrials.gov). We collected functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data from 50 non-obese males before and shortly after 28 days of severe exercise-and-diet-induced energy deficit, during which testosterone (200 mg testosterone enanthate per week in sesame oil) or placebo (sesame seed oil only) was administered. Because we expected circulating testosterone levels to be reduced due to severe energy deficit, testosterone administration served a restorative function to mitigate the impact of energy deficit on testosterone levels. The fMRI task involved making choices under uncertainty for lives and cash. We also manipulated whether the outcomes were presented as gains or losses. Consistent with prospect theory, we observed the reflection effect such that participants were more risk averse when outcomes were presented as gains than losses. Brain activation in the thalamus covaried with individual differences in exhibiting the reflection effect. Testosterone did not impact choice, but it increased sensitivity to negative feedback following risky choices. These results suggest that exogenous testosterone administration in the context of energy deficit can impact some aspects of risky choice, and that individual differences in the reflection effect engage a brain structure involved in processing emotion, reward and risk., (Crown Copyright © 2022. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Expectations about future events underlie practically every decision we make, including those in medical research. This paper reviews five studies undertaken to assess how well medical experts could predict the outcomes of clinical trials. It explains why expert trial forecasting was the focus of study and argues that forecasting skill affords insights into the quality of expert judgment and might be harnessed to improve decision-making in care, policy, and research. The paper also addresses potential criticisms of the research agenda and summarizes key findings from the five studies of trial forecasting. Together, the studies suggest that trials frequently deliver surprising results to expert communities and that individual experts are often uninformative when it comes to forecasting trial outcome and recruitment. However, the findings also suggest that expert forecasts often contain a "signal" about whether a trial will be positive, especially when forecasts are aggregated. The paper concludes with needs for further research and tentative policy recommendations.

Bermúdez's case for rational framing effects, while original, is unconvincing and gives only parenthetical treatment to the problematic assumptions of extensional and semantic equivalence of alternative frames in framing experiments. If the assumptions are false, which they sometimes are, no valid inferences about "framing effects" follow and, then, neither do inferences about human rationality. This commentary recaps the central problem.

Life in an increasingly information-rich but highly uncertain world calls for an effective means of communicating uncertainty to a range of audiences. Senders prefer to convey uncertainty using verbal (e.g., likely) rather than numeric (e.g., 75% chance) probabilities, even in consequential domains, such as climate science. However, verbal probabilities can convey something other than uncertainty, and senders may exploit this. For instance, senders can maintain credibility after making erroneous predictions. While verbal probabilities afford ease of expression, they can be easily misunderstood, and the potential for miscommunication is not effectively mitigated by assigning (imprecise) numeric probabilities to words. When making consequential decisions, recipients prefer (precise) numeric probabilities., Competing Interests: Declaration of interests None are declared., (Crown Copyright © 2022. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Objective: To assess the accuracy of principal investigators' (PIs) predictions about three events for their own clinical trials: positivity on trial primary outcomes, successful recruitment and timely trial completion., Study Design and Setting: A short, electronic survey was used to elicit subjective probabilities within seven months of trial registration. When trial results became available, prediction skill was calculated using Brier scores (BS) and compared against uninformative prediction (i.e. predicting 50% all of the time)., Results: 740 PIs returned surveys (16.7% response rate). Predictions on all three events tended to exceed observed event frequency. Averaged PI skill did not surpass uninformative predictions (e.g., BS = 0.25) for primary outcomes (BS = 0.25, 95% CI 0.20, 0.30) and were significantly worse for recruitment and timeline predictions (BS 0.38, 95% CI 0.33, 0.42; BS = 0.52, 95% CI 0.50, 0.55, respectively). PIs showed poor calibration for primary outcome, recruitment, and timelines (calibration index = 0.064, 0.150 and 0.406, respectively), modest discrimination in primary outcome predictions (AUC = 0.76, 95% CI 0.65, 0.85) but minimal discrimination in the other two outcomes (AUC = 0.64, 95% CI 0.57, 0.70; and 0.55, 95% CI 0.47, 0.62, respectively)., Conclusion: PIs showed overconfidence in favorable outcomes and exhibited limited skill in predicting scientific or operational outcomes for their own trials. They nevertheless showed modest ability to discriminate between positive and non-positive trial outcomes. Low survey response rates may limit generalizability., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Structured protocols offer a transparent and systematic way to elicit and combine/aggregate, probabilistic predictions from multiple experts. These judgements can be aggregated behaviourally or mathematically to derive a final group prediction. Mathematical rules (e.g., weighted linear combinations of judgments) provide an objective approach to aggregation. The quality of this aggregation can be defined in terms of accuracy, calibration and informativeness. These measures can be used to compare different aggregation approaches and help decide on which aggregation produces the "best" final prediction. When experts' performance can be scored on similar questions ahead of time, these scores can be translated into performance-based weights, and a performance-based weighted aggregation can then be used. When this is not possible though, several other aggregation methods, informed by measurable proxies for good performance, can be formulated and compared. Here, we develop a suite of aggregation methods, informed by previous experience and the available literature. We differentially weight our experts' estimates by measures of reasoning, engagement, openness to changing their mind, informativeness, prior knowledge, and extremity, asymmetry or granularity of estimates. Next, we investigate the relative performance of these aggregation methods using three datasets. The main goal of this research is to explore how measures of knowledge and behaviour of individuals can be leveraged to produce a better performing combined group judgment. Although the accuracy, calibration, and informativeness of the majority of methods are very similar, a couple of the aggregation methods consistently distinguish themselves as among the best or worst. Moreover, the majority of methods outperform the usual benchmarks provided by the simple average or the median of estimates., Competing Interests: The University of Melbourne provided consultancy fees to Cognimotive Consulting Inc. in which DRM has a financial interest. However this did not alter our adherence to PLOS ONE policies on sharing data and materials because it did not interfere with the full and objective presentation of results and methods." The University of Melbourne provided consultancy fees to DelphiCloud in which AL has a financial interest. However this did not alter our adherence to PLOS ONE policies on sharing data and materials because it did not interfere with the full and objective presentation of results and methods.

Intelligence analysis is fundamentally an exercise in expert judgment made under conditions of uncertainty. These judgments are used to inform consequential decisions. Following the major intelligence failure that led to the 2003 war in Iraq, intelligence organizations implemented policies for communicating probability in their assessments. Virtually all chose to convey probability using standardized linguistic lexicons in which an ordered set of select probability terms (e.g., highly likely) is associated with numeric ranges (e.g., 80-90%). We review the benefits and drawbacks of this approach, drawing on psychological research on probability communication and studies that have examined the effectiveness of standardized lexicons. We further discuss how numeric probabilities can overcome many of the shortcomings of linguistic probabilities. Numeric probabilities are not without drawbacks (e.g., they are more difficult to elicit and may be misunderstood by receivers with poor numeracy). However, these drawbacks can be ameliorated with training and practice, whereas the pitfalls of linguistic probabilities are endemic to the approach. We propose that, on balance, the benefits of using numeric probabilities outweigh their drawbacks. Given the enormous costs associated with intelligence failure, the intelligence community should reconsider its reliance on using linguistic probabilities to convey probability in intelligence assessments. Our discussion also has implications for probability communication in other domains such as climate science. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Research suggests political identity has strong influence over individuals' attitudes and beliefs, which in turn can affect their behavior. Likewise, firsthand experience with an issue can also affect attitudes and beliefs. A large ( N = 6,383) survey (Pew Research and Ipsos W64) of Americans was analyzed to investigate the effects of both political identity (i.e., Democrat or Republican) and personal impact (i.e., whether they suffered job or income loss) on individuals' reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic. Results show that political identity and personal impact influenced the American public's attitudes about and response to COVID-19. Consistent with prior research, political identity exerted a strong influence on self-reports of emotional distress, threat perception, discomfort with exposure, support for restrictions, and perception of under/overreaction by individuals and institutions. The difference between Democrats and Republican responses were consistent with their normative value differences and with the contemporary partisan messaging. Personal impact exerted a comparatively weaker influence on reported emotional distress and threat perception. Both factors had a weak influence on appraisal of individual and government responses. The dominating influence of political identity carried over into the bivariate relations among these self-reported attitudes and responses. In particular, the appraisal of government response divided along party lines, tied to opposing views of whether there has been over- or under-reaction to the pandemic. The dominance of political identity has important implications for crisis management and reflects the influence of normative value differences between the parties, partisan messaging on the pandemic, and polarization in American politics., Competing Interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2021 Collins, Mandel and Schywiola.)

Across a wide range of domains, experts make probabilistic judgments under conditions of uncertainty to support decision-making. These judgments are often conveyed using linguistic expressions (e.g., x is likely). Seeking to foster shared understanding of these expressions between senders and receivers, the US intelligence community implemented a communication standard that prescribes a set of probability terms and assigns each term an equivalent numerical probability range. In an earlier PLOS ONE article, [1] tested whether access to the standard improves shared understanding and also explored the efficacy of various enhanced presentation formats. Notably, they found that embedding numeric equivalents in text (e.g., x is likely [55-80%]) substantially outperformed the status-quo approach in terms of the percentage overlap between participants' interpretations of linguistic probabilities (defined in terms of the numeric range equivalents they provided for each term) and the numeric ranges in the standard. These results have important prescriptive implications, yet Wintle et al.'s percentage overlap measure of agreement may be viewed as unfairly punitive because it penalizes individuals for being more precise than the stipulated guidelines even when the individuals' interpretations fall perfectly within the stipulated ranges. Arguably, subjects' within-range precision is a positive attribute and should not be penalized in scoring interpretive agreement. Accordingly, in the present article, we reanalyzed Wintle et al.'s data using an alternative measure of percentage overlap that does not penalize in-range precision. Using the alternative measure, we find that percentage overlap is substantially elevated across conditions. More importantly, however, the effects of presentation format and probability level are highly consistent with the original study. By removing the ambiguity caused by Wintle et al.'s unduly punitive measure of agreement, these findings buttress Wintle et al.'s original claim that the methods currently used by intelligence organizations are ineffective at coordinating the meaning of uncertainty expressions between intelligence producers and intelligence consumers. Future studies examining agreement between senders and receivers are also encouraged to reflect carefully on the most appropriate measures of agreement to employ in their experiments and to explicate the bases for their methodological choices., Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Background: Decisions about trial funding, ethical approval, or clinical practice guideline recommendations require expert judgments about the potential efficacy of new treatments. We tested whether individual and aggregated expert opinion of oncologists could predict reliably the efficacy of cancer treatments tested in randomized controlled trials., Materials and Methods: An international sample of 137 oncologists specializing in genitourinary, lung, and colorectal cancer provided forecasts on primary outcome attainment for five active randomized cancer trials within their subspecialty; skill was assessed using Brier scores (BS), which measure the average squared deviation between forecasts and outcomes., Results: A total of 40% of trials in our sample reported positive primary outcomes. Experts generally anticipated this overall frequency (mean forecast, 34%). Individual experts on average outperformed random predictions (mean BS = 0.29 [95% confidence interval (CI), 0.28-0.33] vs. 0.33) but underperformed prediction algorithms that always guessed 50% (BS = 0.25) or that were trained on base rates (BS = 0.19). Aggregating forecasts improved accuracy (BS = 0.25; 95% CI, 0.16-0.36]). Neither individual experts nor aggregated predictions showed appreciable discrimination between positive and nonpositive trials (area under the curve of a receiver operating characteristic curve, 0.52 and 0.43, respectively)., Conclusion: These findings are based on a limited sample of trials. However, they reinforce the importance of basing research and policy decisions on the results of randomized trials rather than expert opinion or low-level evidence., Implications for Practice: Predictions of oncologists, either individually or in the aggregate, did not anticipate reliably outcomes for randomized trials in cancer. These findings suggest that pooled expert opinion about treatment efficacy is no substitute for randomized trials. They also underscore the challenges of using expert opinion to prioritize interventions for clinical trials or to make recommendations in clinical practice guidelines., (© 2020 AlphaMed Press.)

As in other areas of expert judgment, intelligence analysis often requires judging the probability that hypotheses are true. Intelligence organizations promote the use of structured methods such as "Analysis of Competing Hypotheses" (ACH) to improve judgment accuracy and analytic rigor, but these methods have received little empirical testing. In this experiment, we pitted ACH against a factorized Bayes's theorem (FBT) method, and we examined the value of recalibration (coherentization) and aggregation methods for improving the accuracy of probability judgment. Analytic techniques such as ACH and FBT were ineffective in improving accuracy and handling correlated evidence, and ACH in fact decreased the coherence of probability judgments. In contrast, statistical postanalytic methods (i.e., coherentization and aggregation) yielded large accuracy gains. A wide range of methods for instantiating these techniques were tested. The interactions among the factors considered suggest that prescriptive theorists and interventionists should examine the value of ensembles of judgment-support methods., (© 2020 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada Risk Analysis © 2020 Society for Risk Analysis.)

Intelligence analysts, like other professionals, form norms that define standards of tradecraft excellence. These norms, however, have evolved in an idiosyncratic manner that reflects the influence of prominent insiders who had keen psychological insights but little appreciation for how to translate those insights into testable hypotheses. The net result is that the prevailing tradecraft norms of best practice are only loosely grounded in the science of judgment and decision-making. The "common sense" of prestigious opinion leaders inside the intelligence community has pre-empted systematic validity testing of the training techniques and judgment aids endorsed by those opinion leaders. Drawing on the scientific literature, we advance hypotheses about how current best practices could well be reducing rather than increasing the quality of analytic products. One set of hypotheses pertain to the failure of tradecraft training to recognize the most basic threat to accuracy: measurement error in the interpretation of the same data and in the communication of interpretations. Another set of hypotheses focuses on the insensitivity of tradecraft training to the risk that issuing broad-brush, one-directional warnings against bias (e.g., over-confidence) will be less likely to encourage self-critical, deliberative cognition than simple response-threshold shifting that yields the mirror-image bias (e.g., under-confidence). Given the magnitude of the consequences of better and worse intelligence analysis flowing to policy-makers, we see a compelling case for greater funding of efforts to test what actually works.

The susceptibility of decision-makers' choices to variations in option framing has been attributed to individual differences in cognitive style. According to this view, individuals who are prone to a more deliberate, or less intuitive, thinking style are less susceptible to framing manipulations. Research findings on the topic, however, have tended to yield small effects, with several studies also being limited in inferential value by methodological drawbacks. We report two experiments that examined the value of several cognitive-style variables, including measures of cognitive reflection, subjective numeracy, actively open-minded thinking, need for cognition, and hemispheric dominance, in predicting participants' frame-consistent choices. Our experiments used an isomorph of the Asian Disease Problem and we manipulated frames between participants. We controlled for participants' sex and age, and we manipulated the order in which choice options were presented to participants. In Experiment 1 ( N = 190) using an undergraduate sample and in Experiment 2 ( N = 316) using a sample of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, we found no significant effect of any of the cognitive-style measures taken on predicting frame-consistent choice, regardless of whether we analyzed participants' binary choices or their choices weighted by the extent to which participants preferred their chosen option over the non-chosen option. The sole factor that significantly predicted frame-consistent choice was framing: in both experiments, participants were more likely to make frame-consistent choices when the frame was positive than when it was negative, consistent with the tendency toward risk aversion in the task. The present findings do not support the view that individual differences in people's susceptibility to framing manipulations can be substantially accounted for by individual differences in cognitive style.

There is vigorous debate about the reproducibility of research findings in cancer biology. Whether scientists can accurately assess which experiments will reproduce original findings is important to determining the pace at which science self-corrects. We collected forecasts from basic and preclinical cancer researchers on the first 6 replication studies conducted by the Reproducibility Project: Cancer Biology (RP:CB) to assess the accuracy of expert judgments on specific replication outcomes. On average, researchers forecasted a 75% probability of replicating the statistical significance and a 50% probability of replicating the effect size, yet none of these studies successfully replicated on either criterion (for the 5 studies with results reported). Accuracy was related to expertise: experts with higher h-indices were more accurate, whereas experts with more topic-specific expertise were less accurate. Our findings suggest that experts, especially those with specialized knowledge, were overconfident about the RP:CB replicating individual experiments within published reports; researcher optimism likely reflects a combination of overestimating the validity of original studies and underestimating the difficulties of repeating their methodologies.

The scientific community often portrays science as a value-neutral enterprise that crisply demarcates facts from personal value judgments. We argue that this depiction is unrealistic and important to correct because science serves an important knowledge generation function in all modern societies. Policymakers often turn to scientists for sound advice, and it is important for the wellbeing of societies that science delivers. Nevertheless, scientists are human beings and human beings find it difficult to separate the epistemic functions of their judgments (accuracy) from the social-economic functions (from career advancement to promoting moral-political causes that "feel self-evidently right"). Drawing on a pluralistic social functionalist framework that identifies five functionalist mindsets-people as intuitive scientists, economists, politicians, prosecutors, and theologians-we consider how these mindsets are likely to be expressed in the conduct of scientists. We also explore how the context of policymaker advising is likely to activate or de-activate scientists' social functionalist mindsets. For instance, opportunities to advise policymakers can tempt scientists to promote their ideological beliefs and values, even if advising also brings with it additional accountability pressures. We end prescriptively with an appeal to scientists to be more circumspect in characterizing their objectivity and honesty and to reject idealized representations of scientific behavior that inaccurately portray scientists as value-neutral virgins.

Intelligence analysis plays a vital role in policy decision making. Key functions of intelligence analysis include accurately forecasting significant events, appropriately characterizing the uncertainties inherent in such forecasts, and effectively communicating those probabilistic forecasts to stakeholders. We review decision research on probabilistic forecasting and uncertainty communication, drawing attention to findings that could be used to reform intelligence processes and contribute to more effective intelligence oversight. We recommend that the intelligence community (IC) regularly and quantitatively monitor its forecasting accuracy to better understand how well it is achieving its functions. We also recommend that the IC use decision science to improve these functions (namely, forecasting and communication of intelligence estimates made under conditions of uncertainty). In the case of forecasting, decision research offers suggestions for improvement that involve interventions on data (e.g., transforming forecasts to debias them) and behavior (e.g., via selection, training, and effective team structuring). In the case of uncertainty communication, the literature suggests that current intelligence procedures, which emphasize the use of verbal probabilities, are ineffective. The IC should, therefore, leverage research that points to ways in which verbal probability use may be improved as well as exploring the use of numerical probabilities wherever feasible., (© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by Defence Research and Development Canada 2015.)

Understanding the causes of human behavior is essential for advancing one's interests and for coordinating social relations. The scientific study of how people arrive at such understandings or explanations has unfolded in four distinguishable epochs in psychology, each characterized by a different metaphor that researchers have used to represent how people think as they attribute causality and blame to other individuals. The first epoch was guided by an "intuitive scientist" metaphor, which emphasized whether observers perceived behavior to be caused by the unique tendencies of the actor or by common reactions to the requirements of the situation. This metaphor was displaced in the second epoch by an "intuitive lawyer" depiction that focused on the need to hold people responsible for their misdeeds. The third epoch was dominated by theories of counterfactual thinking, which conveyed a "person as reconstructor" approach that emphasized the antecedents and consequences of imagining alternatives to events, especially harmful ones. With the current upsurge in moral psychology, the fourth epoch emphasizes the moral-evaluative aspect of causal judgment, reflected in a "person as moralist" metaphor. By tracing the progression from the person-environment distinction in early attribution theories to present concerns with moral judgment, our goal is to clarify how causal constructs have been used, how they relate to one another, and what unique attributional problems each addresses., (© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by Defence Research and Development Canada 2015.)

An experiment was conducted to test the effectiveness of brief instruction in information structuring (i.e., representing and integrating information) for improving the coherence of probability judgments and binary choices among intelligence analysts. Forty-three analysts were presented with comparable sets of Bayesian judgment problems before and immediately after instruction. After instruction, analysts' probability judgments were more coherent (i.e., more additive and compliant with Bayes theorem). Instruction also improved the coherence of binary choices regarding category membership: after instruction, subjects were more likely to invariably choose the category to which they assigned the higher probability of a target's membership. The research provides a rare example of evidence-based validation of effectiveness in instruction to improve the statistical assessment skills of intelligence analysts. Such instruction could also be used to improve the assessment quality of other types of experts who are required to integrate statistical information or make probabilistic assessments.

Objective: The objective was to investigate the interaction between the mode of performance outcome feedback and task difficulty on timing decisions (i.e., when to act)., Background: Feedback is widely acknowledged to affect task performance. However, the extent to which feedback display mode and its impact on timing decisions is moderated by task difficulty remains largely unknown., Method: Participants repeatedly engaged a zero-sum game involving silent duels with a computerized opponent and were given visual performance feedback after each engagement. They were sequentially tested on three different levels of task difficulty (low, intermediate, and high) in counterbalanced order. Half received relatively simple "inside view" binary outcome feedback, and the other half received complex "outside view" hit rate probability feedback. The key dependent variables were response time (i.e., time taken to make a decision) and survival outcome., Results: When task difficulty was low to moderate, participants were more likely to learn and perform better from hit rate probability feedback than binary outcome feedback. However, better performance with hit rate feedback exacted a higher cognitive cost manifested by higher decision response time., Conclusion: The beneficial effect of hit rate probability feedback on timing decisions is partially moderated by task difficulty., Application: Performance feedback mode should be judiciously chosen in relation to task difficulty for optimal performance in tasks involving timing decisions.

Categorization is fundamental to cognition, and evidence suggests that categorizing emotional stimuli holds a privileged position in human information processing. According to theories on embodied emotion, the subjective emotional feeling elicited by a stimulus plays a causal role in its categorization. Using functional MRI, we tested the hypothesis that categorizing emotional stimuli in terms of valence would activate structures involved in valence-specific experience of emotion. On each trial, two pictures from the International Affective Picture System were presented successively. Upon viewing the second picture, participants categorized it as belonging to the same valence category as or a different valence category from the first picture. Categorization activated an exclusively left-lateralized set of regions implicated in taxonomic categorization (i.e. judging whether two items are of the same kind) including the middle temporal gyrus and precuneus, as well as the posterior cingulate cortex. Critically, for negative pictures categorization activated structures that underlie the experience of negative emotions (anterior insula, left orbitofrontal cortex), whereas for positive pictures categorization activated structures that underlie the experience of positive emotions (dorsomedial and ventromedial prefrontal cortex). Consistent with predictions derived from theories on embodied emotion, these results suggest that experience of emotion contributes to categorizing emotional valence.

Lankford challenges two popular views of suicide terrorists: first, that they are psychologically normal and, second, that they are heroic, not unlike professional soldiers. I augment Lankford's critique by tracing these views to a simplistic situationist narrative and to a careless form of moral relativism to which many scholars adhere. Conceptual weaknesses of these positions are briefly discussed.

The accuracy of 1,514 strategic intelligence forecasts abstracted from intelligence reports was assessed. The results show that both discrimination and calibration of forecasts was very good. Discrimination was better for senior (versus junior) analysts and for easier (versus harder) forecasts. Miscalibration was mainly due to underconfidence such that analysts assigned more uncertainty than needed given their high level of discrimination. Underconfidence was more pronounced for harder (versus easier) forecasts and for forecasts deemed more (versus less) important for policy decision making. Despite the observed underconfidence, there was a paucity of forecasts in the least informative 0.4-0.6 probability range. Recalibrating the forecasts substantially reduced underconfidence. The findings offer cause for tempered optimism about the accuracy of strategic intelligence forecasts and indicate that intelligence producers aim to promote informativeness while avoiding overstatement.

Previous research finds that Republicans report being happier or more satisfied with their lives than Democrats. Using representative American samples from 2002, 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2010, we tested a Person × Situation interactionist account in which political affiliation (Democrat, Republican) and political climate (favorable when the president in office is of the same party) are proposed to affect past, present, and anticipated future life satisfaction. Meta-analyses of related tests of key hypotheses confirmed that (a) life satisfaction was greater when the political climate was favorable rather than unfavorable and (b) Republicans were more sensitive to political climate than Democrats. As predicted, Republicans also were more politically polarized than Democrats. Taken together, the findings indicate that, compared to Democrats, Republicans are more apt to self-identify in political terms, and core aspects of their subjective well-being are more easily affected by the outcome of political events.

Framing effects have long been viewed as compelling evidence of irrationality in human decision making, yet that view rests on the questionable assumption that numeric quantifiers used to convey the expected values of choice options are uniformly interpreted as exact values. Two experiments show that when the exactness of such quantifiers is made explicit by the experimenter, framing effects vanish. However, when the same quantifiers are given a lower bound (at least) meaning, the typical framing effect is found. A 3rd experiment confirmed that most people spontaneously interpret the quantifiers in standard framing tests as lower bounded and that their interpretations strongly moderate the framing effect. Notably, in each experiment, a significant majority of participants made rational choices, either choosing the option that maximized expected value (i.e., lives saved) or choosing consistently across frames when the options were of equal expected value., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.)

There is evidence to suggest that successful lying necessitates cognitive effort. We tested this hypothesis by instructing participants to lie or tell the truth under conditions of high and low working memory (WM) load. The task required participants to register a response on 80 trials of identical structure within a 2 (WM Load: high, low) × 2 (Instruction: truth or lie) repeated-measures design. Participants were less accurate and responded more slowly when WM load was high, and also when they lied. High WM load activated the fronto-parietal WM network including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), middle frontal gyrus, precuneus, and intraparietal cortex. Lying activated areas previously shown to underlie deception, including middle and superior frontal gyrus and precuneus. Critically, successful lying in the high vs. low WM load condition was associated with longer response latency, and it activated the right inferior frontal gyrus-a key brain region regulating inhibition. The same pattern of activation in the inferior frontal gyrus was absent when participants told the truth. These findings demonstrate that lying under high cognitive load places a burden on inhibition, and that the right inferior frontal gyrus may provide a neural marker for successful lying.

Recent literature suggests that lying may be revealed by elevated cognitive effort. A functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment using a match-mismatch detection task was conducted that found support for this hypothesis in two ways. First, compared to truthful reporting, lying (i.e., responding that matches were mismatches or vice versa) triggered greater activation of the working memory network in the brain. This was especially true for lying about a match, where activation in the WM network was found to be greater than when lying about a mismatch. Lying also activated the right rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 10)-a key cognitive control region that regulates the interplay between stimulus-oriented and internally-generated schemas. Second, activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44) - a brain region underpinning inhibition - predicted lying skill. The findings show that the neural correlates of cognitive effort and control can be used to detect lying, and that a specific neural marker of inhibition can predict how well one lies., (Crown Copyright © 2012. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.)