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Simply put, obtaining habeas relief based on the violation of a federal statute has been substantially limited, and innocence seems to be a key indicator of relief eligibility under this [...]

An essay on history of animal rights advocacy and prosecution in the U.S. Topics discussed include agricultural disparagement, introduction of the Ag Gag legislation concerning anti-whistleblower laws in the country, and proliferation of laws related to food safety, worker rights and environmental protection in the U.S.

Legal fields as divergent as family law, torts, contracts, and trusts have each, to varying degrees, addressed the unique legal status of pets. The rights and obligations of pet owners are a topic of increasing legal interest. Even the criminal law has grappled with the uniqueness of animals, to a limited extent, by criminalizing animal abuse. Legal developments such as these tend to counter the anachronistic view that animals are merely property. However, substantial pockets of the law have not yet grappled with the unique status of animals as something more than property but, perhaps, less than human. This Article is the first to analyze the operation of the criminal defenses--the doctrines of exculpation--for persons who use serious, or even lethal, force in defense of their pets. By exploring the intersection of criminal defenses and the status of animals, the ambiguities in our common law doctrines of exculpation and the status of animals in America become apparent. The Article is less an argument for greater animal rights (or increased violence) and more a call to understand how the law's current treatment of pets and pet owners is discordant with our social values and in need of reassessment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on decisions of Arizona Supreme Court on the dispute that occurred on the musical drama "The Ring Cycle." Topics discussed include sentencing policy of Arizona related to death penalty, importance of remand in resentencing the capital punishment and the importance of the Eight Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in the capital sentences. It further discusses role of the Sixth Amendment of the constitution.

The article explores the features of the new and non-trial oriented conception of the right to counsel in the U.S. constitutional law. It highlights the impact of the right to counsel on the day-to-day practice of criminal law in the country. It examines the application of the newly created right to effective assistance as it links to several procedural constitutional rights.

Habeas scholarship has repeatedly assessed whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA's) limitations on federal habeas relief were as severe in practice as they appeared to be on paper. By analyzing recent doctrinal shifts--particularly focusing on two Supreme Court decisions from this Term--and substantial new empirical data, this Article acknowledges that AEDPA's bite has reached substantial proportions, in many ways exceeding the initial concerns and hype surrounding the legislation. More importantly, after acknowledging that federal habeas relief from state court convictions has become "microscopically" rare, this Article considers what the rarity of relief ought to mean as a prescriptive matter for federal oversight of state convictions. Contrary to the dramatic proposals of scholars who have recently suggested that the general futility of habeas litigation dictates that individual, case-by-case habeas review should be abolished, this Article seeks to regain intellectual and practical traction for the longstanding view that federal courts play an important role in overseeing and enforcing the Constitution. To be sure, the path to success for state prisoners on federal habeas review has become infinitesimally narrow, but the recent scholarly interest in abandoning federal review of state convictions in nearly all circumstances other than capital cases misses the mark. This Article suggests that the paucity of success by habeas petitioners does not naturally or necessarily justify the abandonment of federal oversight, as the scholarly trend suggests. Instead, scholars and courts should recognize the critical role federal courts play in ensuring that the state court process is fundamentally fair. Indeed, if the primary responsibility for substantive review now rests with the state courts, the need for federal oversight of the procedures is heightened. To this end, this Article makes the case for focusing more attention on the need for challenges of process rather than result and discusses novel methods, both under § 1983 and § 2254, for bringing such litigation. By focusing federal review on the adequacy of the state process, the deterrence model of federal oversight retains a position of importance and distinction, and principles of comity, federalism, and fair process are well protected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are three general litigation forums for persons aggrieved by constitutional violations--exclusionary rule litigation in a criminal case, habeas corpus challenges to the legality of one's confinement, and civil litigation seeking damages or equitable relief. Over the past three decades, the Supreme Court has drastically limited the availability of remedies for constitutional violations in each of these three fields, and the scope of such limitations has begun to compound exponentially in recent years. The stagnating impact on the development of Fourth Amendment law as a result of the increasingly emaciated constitutional-remedial regime is cause for concern and the subject of this Article. Commentary criticizing recent curtailments of constitutional remedies has focused primarily on the way that limited remedial access might result in the under-enforcement of the Fourth Amendment and a corresponding under deterrence, or skewing of police incentives. This Article, in contrast, addresses the potential for under-announcement of Fourth Amendment law based on a skewing of judicial incentives. Procedural limitations on the development of the Fourth Amendment threaten to create a substantive three-way stop, a virtual freezing of search and seizure doctrine. The threat of a procedurally induced constitutional stagnation is particularly notable in view of the fact that the modern hallmark of Fourth Amendment law is the Katzian imperative of doctrinal evolution and the need for an ever evolving set of legal protections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]