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4 results on '"Maria Roux-Cesar, A."'

1. A self-employed taxpayer experimental study on trust, power, and tax compliance in eleven countries

Author

Larissa M. Batrancea, Anca Nichita, Ruggero De Agostini, Fabricio Batista Narcizo, Denis Forte, Samuel de Paiva Neves Mamede, Ana Maria Roux-Cesar, Bozhidar Nedev, Leoš Vitek, József Pántya, Aidin Salamzadeh, Eleanya K. Nduka, Janusz Kudła, Mateusz Kopyt, Luis Pacheco, Isabel Maldonado, Nsubili Isaga, Serkan Benk, and Tamer Budak

Subjects
Self-employed taxpayers, Slippery slope framework, Voluntary tax compliance, Enforced tax compliance, Tax evasion, Public finance, K4430-4675, Finance, HG1-9999
Abstract

Abstract The slippery slope framework explains tax compliance along two main dimensions, trust in authorities and power of authorities, which influence taxpayers’ compliance attitudes. Through frequentist and Bayesian analyses, we investigated the framework’s assumptions on a sample of 2786 self-employed taxpayers from eleven post-communist and non-post-communist countries doing business in five economic branches. After using scenarios that experimentally manipulated trust and power, our results confirmed the framework’s assumptions regarding the attitudes of the self-employed taxpayers; trust and power fostered intended tax compliance and diminished tax evasion, trust boosted voluntary tax compliance, whereas power increased enforced tax compliance. Additionally, self-employed taxpayers from post-communist countries reported higher intended tax compliance and lower tax evasion than those from non-post-communist countries. Our results offer tax authorities insights into how trust and power may contribute to obtaining and maintaining high tax compliance levels amid global economic challenges, downturns, and increasing tax compliance costs.

Published
2022
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2. We Learn Not for School but for Life: Empirical Evidence of the Impact of Tax Literacy on Tax Compliance

Author

Ema Masca, Ioan Batrancea, Adilson Aderito da Silva, Ciprian Marcel Pop, Ioan Dan Morar, Larissa Batrancea, Denis Forte, Anca Nichita, Ana Maria Roux-Cesar, and Henrique Formigoni

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, 050208 finance, Public economics, media_common.quotation_subject, 05 social sciences, ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, Literacy, Compliance (psychology), ComputingMilieux_GENERAL, Tax revenue, 0502 economics and business, Business, 050207 economics, Empirical evidence, media_common
Abstract

Tax revenues are fundamental budgetary resources for the majority of governments around the world. Consequently, the goal of identifying efficient strategies that facilitate an increase in tax comp...

Published
2019

3. Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations

Author

József Pántya, Ana Maria Roux-Cesar, Manoj Sharma, Joanne Fuller, Ioan Batrancea, Felipe de Jesús Bello Gómez, Sunghwan Yi, Katarina Nordblom, Sejin Min, Marie Briguglio, Quoc Hung Tran, Barbara Summers, Chun Xia, Ceyhan Aldemir, Sara Ennya, Sanjeev Mehta, Benno Torgler, Medhat Hassanein, Gloria Alarcón-García, Binglin Gong, Komsan Suriya, Anthony Essel-Anderson, Luís Miguel Pacheco, Sarunas Zukauskas, Martine Visser, Jérémy E. Lemoine, Yoichi Hizen, Supanika Leurcharusmee, Avi Weiss, Clara Villegas-Palacio, Elaine Doyle, Jane Frecknall-Hughes, Vidar Schei, Diana Bank Weinberg, Jonas Fooken, Ali Hasanain, Rebone Gcabo, Valerij Dermol, Odilo W. Huber, Oana Apostol, Lucia Savadori, Markus Schaffner, Mervi Niskanen, Vassilis T. Rapanos, Anca Nichita, Janusz Kudła, Erik Hoelzl, Erich Kirchler, Thorolfur Matthiasson, Christine Roland-Lévy, Alexis Belianin, Engin Bağış Öztürk, Georgia Kaplanoglou, Christoph Kogler, Sheheryar Banuri, Larissa Batrancea, Jerome Olsen, Aidin Salamzadeh, George Naufal, Institut de psychologie de l'université de Vienne, Cognition, Santé, Société (C2S), Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne (URCA)-SFR CAP Santé (Champagne-Ardenne Picardie Santé), Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne (URCA)-Université de Picardie Jules Verne (UPJV)-Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne (URCA)-Université de Picardie Jules Verne (UPJV)-Maison des Sciences Humaines de Champagne-Ardenne (MSH-URCA), Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne (URCA), Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Joint BioEnergy Institute [Emeryville], Commissariat à l'énergie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA), Department of neurology, Leiden University Medical Center (LUMC), Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne (URCA)-Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne (URCA)-Maison des Sciences Humaines de Champagne-Ardenne (MSH-URCA), Universiteit Leiden-Universiteit Leiden, and Department of Social Psychology

Subjects
Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science, Power, Slippery slope framework, Tax compliance, Tax evasion, Trust, Best practice, [SHS.PSY]Humanities and Social Sciences/Psychology, Audit, Compliance (psychology), Power (social and political), Politics, 0502 economics and business, 050602 political science & public administration, PUNISHMENT, 050207 economics, Enforcement, Applied Psychology, ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS, Public economics, 05 social sciences, EVASION, Slippery slope, Evasion (ethics), 0506 political science, AUDIT
Abstract

The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

Published
2019

4. Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance across 44 nations

Author

Batrancea, L., Nichita, A., Olsen, J., Kogler, C., Kirchler, E., Hoelzl, E., Weiss, A., Torgler, B., Fooken, J., Fuller, J., Schaffner, M., Banuri, S., Hassanein, M., Alarcón-García, G., Aldemir, C., Apostol, O., Bank Weinberg, D., Batrancea, I., Belianin, A., de Jesús Bello Gómez, F., Briguglio, M., Dermol, V., Doyle, E., Gcabo, R., Gong, B., Ennya, S., Essel-Anderson, A., Frecknall-Hughes, J., Hasanain, A., Hizen, Y., Huber, O., Kaplanoglou, G., Kudła, J., Lemoine, J., Leurcharusmee, S., Matthiasson, T., Mehta, S., Min, S., Naufal, G., Niskanen, M., Nordblom, K., Bağ ı ş Öztürk, E., Pacheco, L., Rapanos, V., Roland-Lévy, C., Maria Roux-Cesar, A., Salamzadeh, A., Savadori, L., Schei, V., Sharma, M., Summers, B., Suriya, K., Tran, Q., Villegas-Palacio, C., Visser, M., Xia, C., Yi, S., and Zukauskas, S.

Abstract

The slippery slope framework of tax compliance emphasizes the importance of trust in authorities as a substantial determinant of tax compliance alongside traditional enforcement tools like audits and fines. Using data from an experimental scenario study in 44 nations from five continents (N = 14,509), we find that trust in authorities and power of authorities, as defined in the slippery slope framework, increase tax compliance intentions and mitigate intended tax evasion across societies that differ in economic, sociodemographic, political, and cultural backgrounds. We also show that trust and power foster compliance through different channels: trusted authorities (those perceived as benevolent and enhancing the common good) register the highest voluntary compliance, while powerful authorities (those perceived as effectively controlling evasion) register the highest enforced compliance. In contrast to some previous studies, the results suggest that trust and power are not fully complementary, as indicated by a negative interaction effect. Despite some between-country variations, trust and power are identified as important determinants of tax compliance across all nations. These findings have clear implications for authorities across the globe that need to choose best practices for tax collection.

Published
2019

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