Search

�The Trust� Stalin�s own secret service organizations were appropriately named in 1930, for the exclusive purpose of using the emigration upon which he considered the OGPU has not concentrated sufficiently or used to the fullest extent, and this he believed to be because the OGPU, was already overloaded with work in other directions. The work of �The Trust� was the subject of the direct personal control of Stalin who had expressed the opinion that with the advance of Hitler to power in Germany, the political importance of Russian Emigration was growing with the increasing internal difficulties of the Soviet Union. The care with which the agents of �The Trust� were selected was to ensure that only men with a reputation built in long years of experience were chosen. The work of the organizations was divided into several sections, including that: - Using amongst Russian emigrants who were charged with spying work by several officers. - The coming of the Hitler regime in Germany made the Trust institute numerous press organizations of the Russian emigrants in all country's new papers. This paper focuses on the activity of �The Trust� in the 1930s. The paper is based on original documents discovered following research carried out in the British archives.

A meeting was held on 14th January 1944 to discuss the possibilities which might exist for increased collaboration between S.O.E. and N.K.V.D. in the Balkans. The following agenda was submitted: A review of S.O.E. aims in each area and an outline of their resources with the object of examining the possibilities of a concerted Balkans plan for all countries concerned. The coordination of all these plans into one directive. The possibility of discussing such a plan with the N.K.V.D. in an endeavor to enlist their cooperation and assistance in a common plan for S.O.E., O.S.S. and N.K.V.D. Our article follows the evolution of these plans during January-August 1944.

George Beza (1907-1997) joined the Iron Guard. He acquired the title “Commander” of the legion but soon left the organization. He worked for a while with Mihai Stelescu (excluded from the Iron Guard on September 25, 1934) to publish the magazine "Crusade of Romanism", in which they criticized the legion. In April 1936, he and Stelescu were placed on the watch list of those who were to be punished for their treachery. Beza joined PNȚ and played and played an important role in World War II a monument was erected in Jerusalem in honor of Beza. He played an important role in the plans of SOE to organize anti-Antonescu propaganda in Romania. He was the author of the Vlaicu anti-axis resistance in Romania. This paper presents some aspects of SOE's organizational activities related to the Vlaicu program.

Between 1941-1944, S.O.E. (Special Operation Executive)activity in Romania depended heavily on the collaboration with Maniu and P.N.T (National Peasant Party - Partidul National Țărănesc). In order to improve its activity, S.O.E. has taken steps to create a reliable communication channel between S.O.E. residents in Istanbul and Bucharest. The connections between the residence in Istanbul and the S.O.E. network in Romania were made through the connections of Switzerland and Turkey or through the transmitters sent to Istanbul, Ankara and Cairo, or through radio and radio transmissions launched by the parachute. Our study aims to find the connection between the S.O.E. activity in Romania, the Soviet Iasi-Chisinau offensive and the coup d’etat on August 23, 1944.

The memorandum concluded by S.O.E.(Special Operations Executive) and N.K.V.D., (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs-Народный комиссариат внутренних дел) in September 1941, obliged the two intelligence services to collaborate in a wide range of fields. The British wanted to take advantage of “the powerful communist N.K.V.D. during world war II network in Europe to destabilize the German-occupied countries by organizing sabotages and subversive actions. The Russians, on the other hand, did not want to organize sabotage operations in areas far from the front line, but were interested in contacting their Western European information network. The present article presents aspects of the co-operation between the two services in the light of the research we have undertaken in the London archives.

After Mussolini entered World War II on the side of Hitler, the British sent a colonel into Albania in April 1941 to help the resistance, but he was soon captured. It would not be until April 16, 1943, that two more SOE officers, Lt. Col. Neil McLean and Captain David Smiley, parachuted into northern Greece and crossed the border. Others would follow, including a former lieutenant in the Spanish Foreign Legion, Peter Kemp; Himalayan explorer Bill Tillman; and Reginald Hibbert, whose view of events in Albania in the years to come would put him bitterly at odds with his fellow SOE officers. SOE operations were hampered by woeful British ignorance about Albania. London had only a lower-level diplomatic presence there before the Italian occupation, and the main source of information had been an elderly Englishwoman who had lived there for 20 years. This paper told the story of SOE operations in Albania.

On March 27th, 1933 a British MI5 officer Oswald Allen Harker received a report on the inter+relation of the Comintern, GPU and Department IV of the Staff of the Red Army. The source of this report was a Jewish communist. Another report received by Harker, on the same day, was the OGPU method of investigation. He informed his superiors that the source of this document was the first-hand source. This article presents these documents because they are relevant to the level of knowledge of MI5 about Russian Espionage and subversive activity at that moment.

During September-November 1968 there was a crisis situation in the Romanian-Soviet relations, generated by the criticism that the Romanian government formulated for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 23, 1968. This crisis came to the attention of decision-makers in the United Kingdom and Allied bodies within NATO. Both the British Cabinet and the representatives of the North Atlantic Alliance member countries held several meetings in which the issue of Romania and Yugoslavia was discussed in the context of Soviet threats. The Secretary of State of the Foreign Office visited Romania and discussed with Nicolae Ceauşescu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Corneliu Mănescu. This article aims to present debates within the NATO and the UK bodies on the political crisis in the Romanian-Soviet relations from the autumn of 1968 and the position adopted by them against a possible Soviet invasion in Romania and Yugoslavia.

In this paper I present the general background picture of the development of Gruppe (group) 6 E from German Secret Service. As a result, for the personal interest of Ernst Kaltenbrunner in the work of the Gruppe, 6E developed a working basis which differs from the normal functioning of the other Laendergruppen (groups of countries), a tendency which became more marked after the transfer of the central office from Berlin to Vienna in 1943. A liaison officer only remained in Berlin. This paper presents the final structure of the Gruppe and the leading personnel, and it is under this final organization that the work of the Gruppe in the Balkan States. The Gruppe maintained liaison officers with the Herman Neubacher and Altenberg Dienststellen (Altenberg offices), these liaison officers being directly subordinated to the Gruppenleiter (Group leader). In common with the outside offices, with which he kept in personal contact, and an Auswerter (analyst) responsible for the evaluation and dissemination of information. The Referate (Abstrat) conducted their operation through the Hauptbeauftragte (Chief Comissioner) working in the various countries under suitable cover.

The Change in The Activity of The American Intelligence Services in The Security Context of the Last 24 Years Abstract The security events dynamics poses an overwhelming challenge for the decision makers’political agenda, priorities. The wide range of risks and rhythm of significant security events determine a difficult enterprise for security theories. A scientific analysis of the security evolutions entails a profound historical introspection and an appropriate understanding of the security events with significant impact over the global evolutions. Probably in the next period of time, hundreds of papers will be written regarding the period since 9/11. The aim of this paper is to provide a perspective over the security context, and the intelligence services activity of the last 15 years, period of time dramatically divided by the unprecedented shock and suffering in the history of the from 9/11. The reorganization of the Western Intelligence Community was ordered as a result of the September 11th attacks and with future counterterrorism efforts in mind. Specifically, the 9/11 terrorists exploited the wall between the U.S.’s foreign and domestic intelligence collection efforts, and yet the IRTPA and EO 12333 avoid the issue of how to best integrate foreign and domestic intelligence while minimizing the threat to civil liberties. This manner in which the Western Countries separates its foreign and domestic intelligence collection is particularly exploitable by terrorists and non-state actorsthose currently posing one of the most serious threats to international security. To ensure both the best intelligence integration possible as well as the defense of civil liberties, clear and sensible rules should be formed which dictate how intelligence from these two spheres is collected and in what way and at what level it is integrated and disseminated.

Propaganda represents a powerful war weapon. In this respect, its goal was to dehumanize and to produce hatred against a supposed enemy. The techique used was to create a false image in the target groups. This can be done by using some special words or avoiding some other words on purpose or asserting that the enemy is responsible for some negative facts. The war propaganda implies the fact that the population perceives the enemy as making something unjust, this asertion being based on real facts or on the fiction created by the propaganda specialists. The sophisticated propaganda from the war agaist some supposed atrocities caused by the enemy represents an effective psychological weapon usually used to enflame soldiers’ mind, making them believe the would fight for a just cause. The enemy becomes some sort of monster by innoculating them with all sorts of supposed attrocities. Mass media repeats endlessly how cruel and demonic the enemy can be. During the Second World War, the allied powers propaganda had an important role to make people believe in the AXA’a s victory, from which Romania was a part. The British ran their propaganda programs through a special organism “British Political Warfare Executive”. The moment the war started, in Romania there was a public opinion oriented exclusively towards Great Britain and France. In spite of the interdictions, the BBC went on to be listened. The British propaganda urged Romania to mobilise against Germany, asking insistently to leave the war, turning the weapons, forming an effective opposition, abolishing the regime, a sabbotage of the German machine war. How much success those operations had, we are going to analyse further on. In special the political influence of this action in Romanian between 1941-1944.

Propaganda represents a powerful war weapon. In this respect, its goal was to dehumanize and to produce hatred against a supposed enemy. The techique used was to create a false image in the target groups. This can be done by using some special words or avoiding some other words on purpose or asserting that the enemy is responsible for some negative facts. The war propaganda implies the fact that the population perceives the enemy as making something unjust, this asertion being based on real facts or on the fiction created by the propaganda specialists. The sophisticated propaganda from the war agaist some supposed atrocities caused by the enemy represents an effective psychological weapon usually used to enflame soldiers’ mind, making them believe the would fight for a just cause. The enemy becomes some sort of monster by innoculating them with all sorts of supposed attrocities. Mass media repeats endlessly how cruel and demonic the enemy can be. During the Second World War, the allied powers propaganda had an important role to make people believe in the AXA’a s victory, from which Romania was a part. The British ran their propaganda programs through a special organism “British Political Warfare Executive”. The moment the war started, in Romania there was a public opinion oriented exclusively towards Great Britain and France. In spite of the interdictions, the BBC went on to be listened. The British propaganda urged Romania to mobilise against Germany, asking insistently to leave the war, turning the weapons, forming an effective opposition, abolishing the regime, a sabbotage of the German machine war. How much success those operations had, we are going to analyse further on. In special the political influence of this action in Romanian between 1941-1944.