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While there is a broad consensus in the literature that stock ownership is associated with individual characteristics, such as wealth, income, risk preferences, and financial literacy, less is known about the dynamics of stock market participation (SMP). Major fluctuations in SMP are oftentimes related to political events, economic shocks, and technological disruptions. We discuss the literature that investigates some of these shocks, as well as personal life circumstances that determine SMP across various demographic groups. Consolidating the literature allows us to identify systematic drivers into and out of stock ownership, along with its distributional consequences. Major forces behind SMP fluctuations are changes in participation costs and benefits, risk exposure, economic policy uncertainty, income uncertainty, peer effects, and windfall gains.

We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of oil resources. In a panel of 132 countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that oil windfalls increase the probability of conflict in onshore-rich countries, while they decrease this probability in offshore-rich countries. We use a simple model of conflict to illustrate how these opposite effects can be explained by a fighting capacity mechanism, whereby the government can use offshore oil income to increase its fighting capacity, while onshore oil may be looted by oppositional groups to finance a rebellion. We provide empirical evidence supporting this interpretation: we find that oil windfalls i ncrease both the number and strength of active rebel groups in onshore-rich countries, while they strengthen the government in offshore-rich ones.

Firms subject to cost-of-service regulation cannot withhold windfall profits associated with free emissions allowances. This paper examines the efficiency and distributional impacts of two approaches to transfer free allowances to consumers: output subsidies and lump-sum payments. We employ an empirically calibrated model of the U.S. economy that features regulated monopolies in the electricity sector and many heterogeneous households. Under a carbon dioxide cap-and-trade policy, we find that using free allowances to subsidize regulated electricity prices increases aggregate welfare costs by 40-80 percent relative to lump-sum transfers. These inefficiencies are disproportionately borne by households in the tails of the income distribution., Economics Working Paper Series, 13/178