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Several structural developments in the U.S. economy—including lower neutral interest rates and a flatter Phillips curve—have challenged the ability of the current monetary policy framework to deliver on the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) dual-mandate goals. This paper explores whether makeup strategies, in which policymakers seek to stabilize average inflation around the inflation target over some horizon, could strengthen the FOMC’s ability to fulfill its dual mandate. The quantitative analysis discussed here suggests that credible makeup strategies may provide some moderate stabilization gains. The practical implementation of these strategies, however, faces a number of challenges that would have to be surmounted for the full benefit of these strategies to be realized.

We study optimal monetary policy when the empirical evidence leaves the policymaker uncertain whether the true data-generating process is given by a model with sticky wages or a model with search and matching frictions in the labor market. Unless the policymaker is almost certain about the search and matching model being the correct data-generating process, the policymaker chooses to stabilize wage inflation at the expense of price inflation, a policy resembling the policy that is optimal in the sticky wage model, regardless of the true model. This finding reflects the greater sensitivity of welfare losses to deviations from the model-specific optimal policy in the sticky wage model. Thus, uncertainty about important aspects of the structure of the economy does not necessarily translate into uncertainty about the features of good monetary policy.

Speed limit policy, a monetary policy strategy that focuses on stabilizing inflation and the change in the output gap, consistently delivers better welfare outcomes than flexible inflation targeting or flexible price level targeting in empirical New Keynesian models when policymakers lack the ability to commit to future policies. Even if the policymaker can commit under an inflation targeting strategy, the discretionary speed limit policy performs better for most empirically plausible model parameterizations from a normative perspective.

The global collapse in economic activity triggered by individual and policy-mandated responses to the spread of COVID-19 is unprecedented both in scale and origin. At the time of writing, U.S. GDP is expected by professional forecasters to contract a staggering 6 percent over the course of 2020 driven by its 32 percent collapse in the second quarter (measured at an annual rate).

Drastic public health measures such as social distancing or lockdowns can reduce the loss of human life by keeping the number of infected individuals from exceeding the capacity of the health care system but are often criticized because of the social and the economic cost they entail. We question this view by combining an epidemiological model, calibrated to capture the spread of the COVID-19 virus, with a multisector model, designed to capture key characteristics of the U.S. Input Output Tables. Our two-sector model features a core sector that produces intermediate inputs not easily replaced by inputs from the other sector, subject to minimum-scale requirements. We show that, by affecting workers in this core sector, the high peak of an infection not mitigated by social distancing may cause very large upfront economic costs in terms of output, consumption and investment. Social distancing measures can reduce these costs, especially if skewed towards non-core industries and occupations with tasks that can be performed from home, helping to smooth the surge in infections among workers in the core sector.

We investigate the connection between commodity price shocks and unemployment in advanced resource-rich small open economies from an empirical and theoretical perspective. Shocks to commodity prices are shown to influence labour market conditions primarily through the real exchange rate contrasting sharply with the transmission of technology shocks which are typically argued to affect the economy by changing labour productivity. The empirical impact of commodity price shocks is obtained from estimating a panel vector autoregression; a positive price shock is found to be expansionary for the components of GDP, causes the real exchange rate to appreciate, and improves labour market conditions. For every one percent increase in commodity prices, our estimates suggest a one basis point decline in the unemployment rate and at its peak a 0.3% increase in unfilled vacancies. We then match the impulse responses to a commodity price shock from a small open economy model with net commodity exports and search and matching frictions in the labour market to these empirical responses. As in the data, an increase in commodity prices raises consumption demand in the small open economy and induces a real appreciation. Facing higher relative prices for their goods, non-commodity producing firms post additional job vacancies, causing the number of matches between firms and workers to rise. As a result, unemployment falls, even if employment in the commodity-producing sector is negligible. For commodity price shocks, there is little difference between the standard Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and Pissarides (1985) approach of modelling search and matching frictions and the alternating offer bargaining model suggested by Hall and Milgrom (2008).

The consensus in the recent literature is that the gains from international monetary cooperation are negligible, and so are the costs of a breakdown in cooperation. However, when assessed conditionally on empirically-relevant dynamic developments of the economy, the welfare cost of moving away from regimes of explicit or implicit cooperation may rise to multiple times the cost of economic fluctuations. In economies with incomplete markets, the incentives to act non-cooperatively are driven by the emergence of global imbalances, i.e., large net-foreign-asset positions; and, in economies with complete markets, by divergent real wages.

Monetary policy strategies that target the price level have been advocated as a more effective way to provide economic stimulus in a deep recession when conventional monetary policy is limited by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Yet, the effectiveness of these strategies depends on a central bank's ability to steer agents' expectations about the future path of the policy rate. We develop a flexible method of learning about the central bank's policy rule from observed interest rates that takes into account the limited informational content at the zero lower bound. When agents learn, switching from an inflation targeting to a price-level targeting strategy at the onset of a recession does not yield the desired stabilization benefits. These benefits only materialize after the policy rule has been in place for a sufficiently long time. Temporary price-level targeting strategies are likely to be much less effective than their permanent counterparts.

In a two-country DSGE model, the effects of foreign demand shocks on the home country are greatly amplified if the home economy is constrained by the zero lower bound on policy interest rates. This result applies even to countries that are relatively closed to trade such as the United States. Departing from many of the existing closed-economy models, the duration of the liquidity trap is determined endogenously. Adverse foreign shocks can extend the duration of the trap, implying more contractionary effects for the home country. The home economy is more vulnerable to adverse foreign shocks if the neutral rate is low – consistent with "secular stagnation" – and trade openness is high.

This paper derives analytical results for the relationship between the slope of the excess demand function and the dynamic properties around a deterministic steady state in a two country model. In models that admit multiple steady states, the sign of the slope of the excess demand function is positive for some steady states and negative for others. To obtain stationarity of the net foreign asset position under incomplete financial markets I introduce the stationary inducing devices analyzed in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and Ghironi (2006) . For portfolio costs, a debt-elastic interest rate, or an overlapping generations framework the equilibrium dynamics around a steady state are unbounded if the excess demand function for the foreign traded good is increasing in the good’s own price. Otherwise the dynamics are bounded and locally unique. By contrast, with Uzawa-type preferences, the equilibrium dynamics around a steady state are shown to be bounded and locally unique irrespective of the sign of the slope of the excess demand function.

As the nominal interest rate cannot fall below zero, a central bank with imperfect credibility faces a significant challenge to stabilize the economy in a New Keynesian model during a large recession. We characterize the optimal monetary policy at the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate if credibility is imperfect. Confronting monetary policy communication of the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Swedish Riksbank with such a framework, the credibility of both institutions is shown to have been low in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis.

The paper provides the first quantitative analysis of how U.S. monetary policy responses should differ depending on the source of the observed oil price fluctuations. It presents three main sets of results. First, the paper proposes a novel decomposition of the marginal cost of production that highlights the role of each factor input for the evolution of inflation. Second, conditional on an estimated interest rate policy reaction function, the paper demonstrates that no two structural shocks induce the same monetary policy response, even after controlling for the impact response of the real price of oil, and quantifies these differences. Third, the paper shows that the policy responses implied by a policy rule, whose coefficients were chosen to maximize U.S. welfare, differ substantially from the policy response implied by the same rule estimated on historical data. Among a wide range of rules, a rule that is easily implementable and that nearly maximizes U.S. welfare involves the Federal Reserve putting zero weight on the price of oil and responding to wage inflation without interest rate smoothing.

The macroeconomic implications of oil price fluctuations vary according to their sources. Our estimated two-country DSGE model distinguishes between country-specific oil supply shocks, various domestic and foreign activity shocks, and oil efficiency shocks. Changes in foreign oil efficiency, modeled as factor-augmenting technology, were the key driver of fluctuations in oil prices between 1984 and 2008, but have modest effects on U.S. activity. A pickup in foreign activity played an important role in the 2003-2008 oil price runup. Beyond quantifying the responses of oil prices and economic activity, our model informs about the propagation mechanisms. We find evidence that nonoil trade linkages are an important transmission channel for shocks that affect oil prices. Conversely, nominal rigidities and monetary policy are not.

This paper investigates how oil price shocks affect the trade balance and terms of trade in a two country DSGE model. We show that the response of the external sector depends critically on the structure of financial market risk-sharing. Under incomplete markets, higher oil prices reduce the relative wealth of an oil-importing country, and induce its non-oil terms of trade to deteriorate, and its non-oil trade balance to improve. The magnitude of the non-oil terms of trade response hinges on structural parameters that affect the divergence in wealth effects across oil importers and exporters, including the elasticity of substitution between oil and other inputs in production, and the discount factor. By contrast, cross-country wealth differences effectively disappear under complete markets, with the implication that oil shocks have essentially no effect on the non-oil terms of trade or the non-oil trade balance.

The Barro-Gordon inflation bias has provided the most influential argument for fixed exchange rate regimes. However, with low inflation rates now widespread, credibility concerns seem no longer relevant. Why give up independent monetary policy to contain an inflation bias that is already under control? We argue that credibility problems do not end with the inflation bias and they are a larger drawback for flexible exchange rates than usually thought. Absent commitment, independent monetary policy can induce expectation traps---that is, welfare ranked multiple equilibria---and perverse policy responses to real shocks, i.e., an equilibrium policy response that is welfare inferior to policy inaction. Both possibilities imply that flexible exchange rates feature unnecessary macroeconomic volatility.

Several methods have been proposed to obtain stationarity in open economy models. I find substantial qualitative and quantitative differences between these methods in a two-country framework, in contrast to the results of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). In models with a debt elastic interest rate premium or a convex portfolio cost, both the steady state and the equilibrium dynamics are unique if the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and the foreign traded good is high. However, there are three steady states if the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low. With endogenous discounting, there is always a unique and stable steady state irrespective of the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution. Similar to the model with convex portfolio costs or a debt elastic interest rate premium, though, there can be multiple convergence paths for low values of the elasticity in response to shocks.

We propose a model to study monetary policy under discretion. We focus on Markov perfect equilibria, ruling out trigger strategies. The model is simple enough that the determinants of monetary policy under discretion are clear. We also find that for all parameterizations with an equilibrium inflation rate around 2%, there is a second equilibrium with an inflation rate just above 10%. Thus the model can simultaneously account for the low- and high-inflation episodes in the U.S. experience.

A large class of international business cycle models admits multiple locally isolated deterministic steady states, if the elasticity of substitution between traded goods is sufficiently low. I explore the conditions under which such multiplicity occurs and characterize the dynamic properties in the neighborhood of each steady state. Models with standard incomplete markets, portfolio costs, a debt-elastic interest rate, or an overlapping generations framework allow for multiple steady states, if the model features multiple steady states under financial autarchy. If the excess demand for the foreign traded good is increasing in the good's own price in a given steady state, the equilibrium dynamics around this steady state are unbounded. Otherwise, the dynamics are bounded and unique. By contrast, with Uzawa-type preferences, the steady state is always unique and the associated equilibrium dynamics are always bounded and unique. The same results obtain under complete markets.

This paper investigates the behavior of rent-seeking politicians in an environment of increasing economic integration. The focus of the paper is on the implications of globalization-induced political yardstick competition for constitutional design with a view to the current discussion in the European Union. In contrast to the established literature, we carefully portray the double-tiered government structure in federal systems. The number of lower-tier governments and the allocation of policy responsibilities to the two levels of government are subject to constitutional choice.

Beginning in 2008, in many advanced economies, policy rates reached their zero lower bound (ZLB) and almost at the same time, oil prices started rising again. We analyze how the ZLB affects the propagation of oil shocks. As these shocks move inflation and output in opposite directions, their effects on economic activity are cushioned when monetary policy is constrained. The burst of inflation from an oil price increase lowers real interest rates at the ZLB and stimulates the interest-sensitive component of GDP, offsetting the usual contractionary effects. We show that the mitigation of the output decline from the zero lower bound depends on the source of the shock and on the persistence that alternative shocks induce in the price of oil.

When the nominal interest rate reaches its zero lower bound, credibility is crucial for conducting forward guidance. We determine optimal policy in a New Keynesian model when the central bank has imperfect credibility and cannot set the nominal interest rate below zero. In our model, an announcement of a low interest rate for an extended period does not necessarily re∞ect high credibility. Even if the central bank does not face a temptation to act discretionarily in the current period, policy commitments should not be postponed. Nevertheless, even banks with low credibility should use forward guidance to the best of their abilities. In reality, central banks are often reluctant to allow a recovery path with output and in∞ation temporarily above target. From the perspective of our model such a policy re∞ects a low degree of credibility. We flnd increased forecast uncertainty in in∞ation and the output gap at the zero lower bound while interest rate uncertainty is reduced. This change in uncertainty is more pronounced for policymakers with less credibility. Furthermore, misalignments between announced interest rate paths and market expectations are found to be best explained by lack of credibility.

In a stylized DSGE model with an energy sector, the optimal policy response to an adverse energy supply shock implies a rise in core inflation, a larger rise in headline inflation, and a decline in wage inflation. The optimal policy is well-approximated by policies that stabilize the output gap, but also by a wide array of "dual mandate" policies that are not overly aggressive in stabilizing core inflation. Finally, policies that react to a forecast of headline inflation following a temporary energy shock imply markedly different effects than policies that react to a forecast of core, with the former inducing greater volatility in core inflation and the output gap.

Under a large degree of extrinsic inflation persistence, there is a strong yet simple case for inflation targeting even if we are uncertain about many other dimensions of the economy. If inflation persistence is high and driven by extrinsic sources, even an excessively strict inflation-targeting regime is preferable to full policy discretion. Our result is entirely built on stabilization policy: long-run inflation rates are optimal under full policy discretion in our model. It is instead the medium-term dynamics of inflation expectations that render the policy response under discretion worse than inaction.

We provide a tractable model to study monetary policy under discretion. We restrict our analysis to Markov equilibria. We find that for all parametrizations with an equilibrium inflation rate of about 2 percent, there is a second equilibrium with an inflation rate just above 10 percent. Thus, the model can simultaneously account for the low and high inflation episodes in the United States. We carefully characterize the set of Markov equilibria along the parameter space and find our results to be robust, suggesting that expectation traps are more than just a theoretical curiosity.

This paper investigates the behavior of rent-seeking politicians in an environment of increasing economic integration. The focus of the paper is on the implications of globalization-induced political yardstick competition for constitutional design with a view to the current discussion in the European Union. In contrast to the established literature, we carefully portray the double-tiered government structure in federal systems. The number of lower-tier governments and the allocation of policy responsibilities to the two levels of government are subject to constitutional choice.